

CONFIDENTIAL

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

LONDON OBSERVER
25 August 1974

THE PRESIDENT'S SECRET ARMY

A fog of mystification and elaborate security hides the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, with its world-wide network of secret agents and allies. Originally formed with the respectable purpose of ensuring that the Government was better informed, it has become a clandestine operational tool of the United States Presidency, organising undercover intervention in the internal politics of foreign countries.

Now the facts have been revealed for the first time by an ex-CIA man, VICTOR MARCHETTI, who in 14 years rose to a top-level job, working in the office of the Director. In collaboration with JOHN D. MARKS, a former intelligence agent in the State Department, he resolved to break the wall of silence around the Agency.

Backed by the Government, the CIA tried to kill their book before it was written, then held up publication for nearly a year. Under a legal ruling, it ordered the deletion of 339 passages. The authors and publishers (one of the biggest in America) fought back in the courts, won the reinstatement of 171 passages (including those published below in black type) and defeated the CIA and the Government by publishing the book, leaving blank spaces (identified here as • • •) where the text is still censored.

Our opening extract from this book—the first in American history subjected to prior Government censorship—describes how successive Presidents used the CIA and lied for it.

THERE exists in the United States today a powerful and dangerous secret cult—the cult of intelligence.

Its holy men are the clandestine professionals of the Central Intelligence Agency. Its patrons and protectors are the highest officials of the Federal Government. The Agency's methods and assets are a resource that come with the office of the Presidency. Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger used them to the full.

The purpose of the cult is to further the foreign policies of the US Government by covert and usually illegal means. Traditionally, the cult's hope has been to foster a world order in which America would reign supreme, the unchallenged international leader. Today, however, the dream stands tarnished by time and frequent failures. Thus, the cult's objectives are now less grandiose, but no less disturbing. Its world-wide war against Communism has to some extent been reduced to a covert struggle to maintain a self-serving stability in the Third World, using whatever clandestine methods are available.

The CIA is the primary instrument of the cult of intelligence. It engages in espionage and counter-espionage, in propaganda and the deliberate circulation of false information, in psychological warfare and paramilitary activities. It penetrates and manipulates, private institutions, and creates its own commercial organisations (called 'proprietarys'). It recruits agents and mercenaries; it bribes and blackmails foreign officials to carry out its unsavoury tasks. It does whatever is required to achieve its goals, without any consideration of the ethics involved or the moral consequences of its actions. As the secret action arm of American foreign policy, the CIA's most potent weapon is its covert intervention in the internal affairs of countries the US Government wishes to control or influence.

Members of the cult of intelligence, including Presidents (who are always aware of, generally approve of and often actually initiate the CIA's major undertakings), have lied to protect the CIA and hide their own responsibility for its operations. The Eisen-

hower Administration lied about the CIA's support of the unsuccessful rebellion in Indonesia in 1958; and Francis Gary Powers's 1960 U-2 mission. The Kennedy Administration lied about the CIA's role in the abortive invasion of Cuba in 1961, admitting its involvement only after the operation had failed disastrously. The Johnson Administration lied about all of the CIA's commitments in Vietnam and Laos. And the Nixon Administration publicly lied about the Agency's attempt to fix the Chilean election in 1970.

The justification for the 'right to lie' is that secrecy in covert operations is necessary to prevent US policies and actions from coming to the attention of the 'enemy'—or, in the parlance of the clandestine trade, 'the opposition'. None the less, in many instances the opposition knows exactly what covert operations are being targeted against it. The

Extracted from 'The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence' by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, to be published by Jonathan Cape on 5 September, price £3.95.

U-2 overflights and, later, those of the photographic satellites were, and are, as well known to the Soviets and the Chinese as Soviet overhead reconnaissance of the US is to the CIA.

From 1952 to 1964, at the height of the Cold War, the Soviet KGB electronically intercepted even the most secret messages routed through the code room of the US Embassy in Moscow. This breach in secrecy, however, apparently caused little damage to US national security, nor did the Soviet Government collapse because the CIA had for years secretly intercepted the private conversations of the top Russian leaders as they talked over their limousine radio-telephones. Both sides knew more than enough to cancel out the effect of any leak. The fact is that, in the US, secrecy and deception in intelligence operations are as much to keep Congress and the public from learning what their Government is doing as to shield those activities from the opposition.

A good part of the CIA's power position is dependent upon its careful mythologising and glorification of the exploits of the clandestine profession. Like most myths, the intrigues and successes of the CIA over the years have been more imaginary than real. What is real, unfortunately, is the willingness of both the public and adherents of the cult to believe the fictions.

In the field of classical espionage, the CIA's Clandestine Services have been singularly unsuccessful in their attempts to penetrate or spy on the major targets. The Penkovsky case in the early 1960s, the only espionage operation against the Soviets that the Agency can point to with pride, was a fortuitous windfall which British Intelligence made possible for the CIA.

In the beginning, Penkovsky was not a CIA spy. He worked for British Intelligence. He had tried to join the CIA in Turkey, but had been turned down, mainly because the Soviet Bloc Division of the Clandestine Services was overly careful not to be taken in by KGB double agents, in the period following the Burgess-Maclean catastrophe.

The loudly heralded Berlin tunnel operation of the mid-1950s—actually a huge telephone wiretap—produced literally tons of trivia and gossip, but provided little in the way of high-grade secret information that could be used by the Agency's intelligence analysts. The operation's true value was the embarrassment it caused the KGB and the favourable publicity it generated for the CIA. Against China, there have been no agent-related espionage successes whatever.

Fortunately for the US, however, the CIA's technical experts, working with their counterparts in the Pentagon and in the private sector, have been able over the years to develop a wide array of electronic methods for collecting much useful information on the USSR and China. From these collection systems, supplemented by material accumulated through diplomatic channels and open sources, the analysts on the CIA and elsewhere in the in-

telligence community have been able to keep abreast of developments within the Communist Powers.

There can be no doubt that the gathering of intelligence is a necessary function of modern government. Without an effective programme to collect information and to analyse the capabilities and possible intentions of other major Powers, the US could neither have confidently negotiated nor now abide by the SALT agreements, or achieve any measure of true détente with its international rivals.

The issue at hand is a simple one of purpose. Should the CIA function in the way it was originally intended to—as a co-ordinating agency responsible for gathering, evaluating, and preparing foreign intelligence for use by Government policy-makers—or should it be permitted to function, as it has done over the years, as an operational arm, a secret instrument of the Presidency?

The extreme secrecy in which the CIA works increases the chances that a President will call it into action. He does not have to justify the Agency's activities to Congress, the Press, or the American people so, barring premature disclosure, there is no institutional force within the US to stop him from doing what he wants.

For example, after Salvador Allende had been elected President of Chile in 1970, President Nixon was asked at a press conference why the US was willing to intervene militarily in Vietnam to prevent a Communist takeover, but would not do the same thing in Chile to prevent a Marxist from taking power.

He replied that 'for the United States to have intervened in a free election and to have turned it around, I think, would have had repercussions all around Latin America that would have been far worse than what happened in Chile.'

The President failed to mention that he had approved * * * * *

but by keeping his action secret, he was able to avoid the 'adverse political reaction' he feared. If there had been no CIA to do the job covertly, the US Government almost certainly would not have tried to involve itself in the Chilean elections, since it was obviously not willing to own up to its actions.

Almost three years to the day after Allende's election, he was overthrown and killed in a bloody *coup d'état* carried out by the combined action of the Chilean armed services and national police. His Marxist Government was replaced by a military junta. What role American business or the CIA may have played in the *coup* is not publicly known, and may never be. But CIA Director William Colby admitted in secret testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the Agency had 'penetrated' all of Chile's major political parties; and that it had secretly furnished 'some assistance' to certain Chilean groups.

Even if the CIA did not intervene directly in the final putsch,

CIA and Cyprus

VICTOR MARCHETTI cabled from Washington last week:

The Greek background to the Cypriot disaster presents one more reason why the CIA's policies and practices should be more tightly controlled by the United States Congress.

The seeds of the disaster were sown in Greece almost a decade ago, when the clandestine agency encouraged King Constantine's effort to thwart the political reforms of Leftist Premier Papandreu—reportedly a former CIA agent. Within two years, a military junta took control of the country. If the CIA did not actively abet the *coup d'état*, it undoubtedly collaborated with the junta afterward—despite official denials by Washington.

By then, the CIA's operational imperative, replacing its threadbare 'to keep the world free for democracy,' had become 'to maintain stability.' Thus, a repressive dictatorship in Greece was preferable to a democratically elected, Left-leaning Government.

Athens was also a large CIA station, from which operations could be supported and launched against other targets in the Middle East.

Eventually, the crude methods of the junta became a liability even to the CIA and the US Government. The Agency quietly began to disengage, apparently transferring certain operational assets to Iran—a safer station, now overseen by former CIA Director, Ambassador Richard Helms. There would, of course, be no trouble with the Shah. The CIA had restored him to his throne earlier by overthrowing Premier Mussadiq.

On Cyprus, meanwhile, Nicos Sampson moved—with the approval of the junta—to oust Archbishop Makarios. Allegedly, the CIA had 10 days' warning of the coup but chose to do nothing about it. Official Washington sources now claim the threatened parties were forewarned. Perhaps,

the US Government as a whole did take a series of actions designed to undercut the Allende regime. Henry Kissinger set the tone at a background press conference in September 1970, when he said that Allende's Marxist regime would contaminate Argentina, Bolivia and Peru—a stretch of the geopolitical imagination reminiscent of the South-East Asian domino theory. Another measure of the White House attitude—and an indication of the methods it was willing to use—was the burgling of the Chilean Embassy in Washington in May 1972 by some of the same men who the next month staged the break-in at the Watergate. And the US admittedly worked to weaken the Allende Government by cutting off most economic aid.

Henry Kissinger has dismissed speculation that the CIA helped along this economic collapse and then engineered Allende's downfall; privately he has said that the secret agency wasn't competent to manage an operation as difficult as the Chilean *coup*. Kissinger had already been supervising the CIA's

most secret operations for more than four years when he made this disparaging remark. Whether he was telling the truth about the CIA's non-involvement in Chile or was simply lying (called 'plausible denial'), he along with the President would have made the crucial decisions on the Chilean situation.

THE failure of traditional espionage against the principal 'opposition,' the Soviet Union, meant that the emphasis within the CIA's Clandestine Services shifted toward the Third World. This change reflected to a certain extent a bureaucratic need as a secret agency to find areas where it could be successful. More importantly, the shift came as a result of a hardened determination that the US would protect the rest of the world from Communism. Referring to CIA *coups* in Iran and Guatemala, Allen Dulles, who was Director during the Cold War period, wrote: 'Where there begins to be evidence that a country is slipping and Communist takeover is threatened... we can't wait for an engraved invitation to come and give aid.'

The Agency's shift towards covert action was quite obvious to young officers taking operational training during the mid-1950s at 'The Farm,' the CIA's West Point, located near Williamsburg, Virginia, and operated under the cover of a military base called Camp Peary. Most of the methods and techniques taught there at that time applied to covert action rather than traditional espionage, and to a great extent training was oriented toward such paramilitary activities as infiltration/exfiltration, demolitions and night-time parachute jumps.

The Third World countries, underdeveloped and often corrupt, offered far more tempting targets for covert action than those in Europe. Relatively small sums of money, whether delivered directly to local forces or deposited (for their leaders) in Swiss bank accounts, can have an almost magical effect in changing volatile political loyalties.

The CIA's early operations in Asia met with mixed success. Attempts to develop resistance movements in China in the 1950s, accomplished nothing more than the capture of Agency officers John Downey and Richard Fecteau—and death for the Nationalist Chinese agents they were trying to plant. Mainland China was not fertile territory for Agency operations.

But there were successes elsewhere. The Huk insurgency in the Philippines was put down with help from the CIA, who played upon local superstitions about vampires. The last member of a rebel patrol would be ambushed, his neck punctured vampire-fashion with two holes, and the corpse drained of blood before it was thrown back on the trail. The rebels, as superstitious as any other Filipinos, fled the region.

Agency-supported Nationalist Chinese troops in Burma (when not engaged in their principal pastime of trafficking in opium) were induced to conduct occasional raids

into the hinterland of Communist China. In South Vietnam the CIA, in the person of Colonel Edward Lansdale (the original of Graham Greene's 'The Quiet American'), played a large part in propping up the Diem regime—and this was considered by the Agency to be a major accomplishment.

Such gains in Southeast Asia were offset by some notable failures, particularly the Agency's failure to overthrow President Sukarno of Indonesia in 1958.

Contrary to denials by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, the CIA gave direct assistance to rebel groups on the island of Sumatra. Agency B-26s even carried out bombing missions in support of the insurgents. On 18 May 1958, the Indonesians shot down one of these B-26s and captured the American pilot, Allen Pope.

Although US Government officials claimed that Pope was 'a soldier of fortune,' he was, in fact, an employee of a CIA-owned proprietary company, Civil Air Transport.

The Agency also became deeply involved in the chaotic struggle which broke out in the Congo in the early 1960s. Clandestine Services operators regularly bought and sold Congolese politicians, and the Agency supplied money and arms to the supporters of Cyrille Adoula and Joseph Mobutu. By 1964, the CIA had imported its own mercenaries into the Congo, and the Agency's B-26 bombers, flown by Cuban exile pilots—many of whom were Bay of Pigs veterans—carried out regular missions against insurgent groups.

During these years, the CIA and its Special Operations Divisions were becoming increasingly preoccupied with Southeast Asia. In Laos, Agency operators organised a private army of more than 30,000 men and built an impressive string of bases throughout the country. A

few of these bases were used as jumping-off points to send guerrilla raiding parties into North Vietnam and China.

The CIA viewed the secret war in Laos much more favourably than the huge military struggle that eventually developed in Vietnam. The Laos fighting was not visible to the American public or the world. In fact, the Laotian war had been going for years before the US Congress even became aware of it.

The CIA was in complete control in Laos, but at no time were more than 40 or 50 operations officers required to direct the paramilitary effort. The ground fighting was handled by hundreds of Agency contract personnel and more than 30,000 Lao tribesmen, whom the CIA from time to time secretly decorated with 'intelligence' medals.

The CIA's Laotian forces were augmented by thousands of Thai 'volunteers' paid by the Agency. Air support, an extremely dangerous business, was supplied by Air America—a CIA-owned airline—and on occasion by the Thai Air Force.

Meanwhile, in Vietnam, the

CIA supported and financed a force of roughly 45,000 Civilian Irregular Defence Guards, local guerrilla troops who fought under the operational direction of the US Army's Special Forces. CIA operators and Agency contractors ran the Counter Terror teams. The Agency also organised guerrilla raids against North Vietnam, with special emphasis on intrusions by seaborne commando groups coming 'over the beach' on specially designed, heavily armed, high-speed PT-type boats.

At least one such CIA raiding party was operating in that part of the Tonkin Gulf in 1964 where two US destroyers allegedly came under attack by North Vietnamese ships.

These CIA raids may well have specifically provoked the North Vietnamese action against the destroyers, which in turn led to the US Congress passing its Tonkin Gulf resolution in 1964, setting the stage for large-scale American military involvement in Indo-China.

DEEPLY embedded within the clandestine service mentality is the belief that human ethics and social laws have no bearing on covert operations or their practitioners. The intelligence profession, because of its lofty 'natural security' goals, is free from all moral restrictions. The determining factors in secret operations are purely pragmatic: Does the job need to be done? Can it be done? And can secrecy (or 'plausible denial') be maintained?

One of the lessons learned from the Watergate experience is the scope of this amorality and its influence on the clandestine mentality. E. Howard Hunt (who worked in clandestine operations for the CIA for 21 years) claimed that his participation in the Watergate break-in and the other operations of the White House plumbers group was in 'what I believed to be the... best interests of my country.'

Hunt expanded on this point when interrogated before a federal grand jury in April 1973 by Assistant US Attorney Earl Silbert.

S: Were you aware of or did you participate in any other what might commonly be referred to as illegal activities?

H: Illegal?

S: Yes, sir.

H: I have no recollection of any, no sir.

S: What about clandestine activities?

H: Yes, sir.

S: All right. What about that?

H: I'm not quibbling, but there's quite a difference between something that's illegal and something that's clandestine.

S: Well, in your terminology, would the entry into Mr. Fielding's (Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist) office have been clandestine, illegal, neither or both?

H: I would simply call it

an entry operation conducted under the auspices of competent authority.

Within the CIA, similar activities are undertaken with the consent of 'competent authority.' The Watergate conspirators, assured that 'national security' was at stake, did not question the legality or the morality of their methods; nor do most CIA operators.

In early October 1969, the CIA learned through a secret agent that a group of radicals was about to hijack a plane in Brazil and escape to Cuba. This intelligence was forwarded to CIA headquarters and from there sent on an 'eyes only' basis to Henry Kissinger at the White House and top officials of the State Department, the Defence Department, and the National Security Agency.

Within a few days, on 8 October, the radical group commandeered at gunpoint a Brazilian commercial airliner

with 49 people aboard and after a refuelling stop in Guyana forced the pilot to fly to Havana. Neither the CIA nor the other agencies of the US Government which had advance warning of the radicals' plan moved to stop the crime being committed, although at that time the official policy of the US—as enunciated by the President—was to take all possible measures to stamp out aerial piracy.

Afterwards, when officials of the State Department questioned their colleagues in the CIA on why measures had not been taken to stop the hijacking, the Agency's clandestine operators delayed more than a month before responding.

During the interim, security forces in Brazil succeeded in breaking up that country's principal revolutionary group and killing its leader, Carlos Marighella. Shortly after the revolution-

ary leader's death on 4 November, the CIA informally passed word back to the State Department noting that if any action had been taken to stop the October sky-jacking, the Agency's penetration in the radical movement might have been exposed and Marighella's organisation could not have been destroyed.

While it was never clear whether the agent who alerted the clandestine operators to the hijacking had also fingered Marighella, that was the impression the CIA tried to convey to the State Department. The Agency implied it had not prevented the hijacking because to have done so would have lessened the chances of scoring the more important goal of 'neutralising' Marighella and his followers. To the CIA's clandestine operators, the end—wiping out the Brazilian radical movement—apparently had justified the

means, thus permitting the hijacking to take place.

During the last 25 years American foreign policy has been dominated by the concept of containing Communism. Sincere men in the highest Government posts believed—and still do believe—that their country could not survive without resorting to the same distasteful methods employed by the other side. In recent years there have been changes in America's conduct of foreign affairs. Yet the feeling remains strong among the nation's top officials, in the CIA and elsewhere, that America has an inherent right—a sort of modern Manifest Destiny—to intervene in other countries' internal affairs. Changes may have occurred at the negotiating table, but not in the planning arena.

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THE CIA EXPOSED: More excerpts from the book the US Government tried to kill.

The chart below was originally censored at the CIA's demand—then restored after legal action.

SECRETS OF THE SPY

THE CIA is big, very big. Officially, it has authorised manpower of 16,500, and an authorised budget of \$750 million—and those figures are jealously guarded, generally made available only to Congress. Yet the Agency is far larger and more affluent than even these figures indicate.

The manpower total does not reflect the tens of thousands who serve under contract, or who work for the Agency's proprietary companies. There are one-time agents hired for specific missions, contract agents who serve for extended periods of time, and career agents who spend their entire working lives secretly employed by the CIA.

In some instances contract agents are retained long after their usefulness has passed, but usually are known only to the case officers with whom they deal. One of the Watergate burglars, Eugenio Martinez, was in this category. When he was caught inside the Watergate on that day in June 1972, he still was receiving \$100-a-month stipend from the Agency for work apparently unrelated to his covert assignment for the Committee to Re-Elect the President.

Complete records of employment are not kept in any single place. In 1967 when the CIA's role on American campuses was under

SIZE AND COST OF THE CIA		
	Personnel	\$ Millions
Office of the Director	400	10
Clandestine Services	6,000	440
(Directorate of Operations)		
Espionage/Counterespionage	(4,200)	(180)
Covert Action	(1,800)	(260)
Directorate of Management and Services	5,300	110
Communications	(2,000)	(70)
Other Support	(3,300)	(40)
Directorate of Intelligence	3,500	70
Analysis	(1,200)	(50)
Information Processing	(2,300)	(20)
Directorate of Science and Technology	1,300	120
Technical Collection	(1,000)	(50)
Research and Development	(300)	(70)
	16,500*	750**

*Nearly 5,000 CIA personnel serve overseas, the majority (60-70 per cent) being members of the Clandestine Services. Of the remainder, most are communications officers and other operational support personnel.

**Does not include the Director's Special Contingency Fund.

close scrutiny, Director Richard Helms asked his staff to find out just how many university personnel were under secret contract to the CIA. After a few days of investigation, senior CIA officers reported back that they could not find the answer. Helms immediately ordered a full study, and after more than a month of searching records all over the Agency, a report was handed in to Helms listing hundreds of professors and administrators on over 100 campuses. But

the staff officers who compiled the report knew that their work was incomplete. Within weeks another campus connection was exposed in the Press. The contract was not on the list that had been compiled for the Director.

Just as the personnel figure is deceptive, so does the budget figure nor account for a great part of the CIA's campaign chest. The Agency's proprietaries, or front organisations, are often money-making enterprises, and thus pro-

vide 'free' services to the parent organisation.

Similarly, the CIA's annual budget does not show the Pentagon's annual contribution to the Agency. For example, the CIA's Science and Technology Directorate has an annual budget of only a little more than \$100 million, but it actually spends well over \$500 million a year. The difference is funded largely by the Air Force, which underwrites the national overhead-reconnaissance effort for the entire United States intelligence community.

For some reason—perhaps because of the general view in the CIA that its operations are above the law—the Agency has tended to play fiscal games that other Government departments would not dare engage in. One example concerns the Agency's use of its employee retirement fund, certain agent and contract-personnel accounts, and the CIA credit union's capital, to play the stock market. With the approval of the top CIA leadership, a small group of senior Agency officers has for years secretly supervised the management of these funds and invested them in stocks, hoping to turn a greater profit than normally would be earned through the Treasury Department's traditional low-interest but safe bank deposits and bond issues. Originally, the investment group, consisting of CIA economists, accountants and lawyers, dealt with an established Boston brokerage house, which made the final investment decisions. Within a matter of months the Agency investors were earning bigger profits than ever before.

Any reasonable reviewer of the CIA, after supervising the deployment of Agency funds and personnel and weighing these against the intelligence gains produced by the various directorates, would probably come to the same conclusion as did Richard Helms's temporary replacement as Director, James Schlesinger. On 5 April 1973 Schlesinger admitted to the Senate Armed Forces Committee that, 'We have a problem... we just have too many people. It turns out to be too many people in the operational areas. These are the people who in the past served overseas... Increasing emphasis is being placed on science and technology, and on intelligence judgments.'

Schlesinger's words—and the fact that he was not a 'house man' from the Clandestine Services—were auguries of hope to those many critics of the CIA who believe that it is overly preoccupied with the covert side of intelligence. But Schlesinger has been succeeded by William Colby—a man who had a highly successful career as a clandestine operator specialising in 'dirty tricks,' and who can only be expected to maintain the Dulles-Helms policy of concentration on covert action.

At present the Agency uses about two-thirds of its funds and its manpower for covert operations and their support—proportions that have been held relatively constant for more than 10 years. Thus, out of the Agency's career workforce of

roughly 16,500 people and yearly budget of about \$750 million, 11,000 personnel and roughly \$550 million are earmarked for the Clandestine Services and covert activities.

Although the CIA has had since its creation exclusive responsibility for carrying out overseas espionage operations for the collection of national intelligence, the various military intelligence agencies and the intelligence units of American forces stationed abroad have retained the right to seek out tactical information for their own departmental requirements. With US forces permanently stationed in countries like England, Germany, Italy, Morocco, Turkey, Panama, Japan and Australia, the military intelligence services have sought to acquire information through secret agents—the justification, of course, always being the need for departmental or tactical intelligence.

A military intelligence unit assigned to Bangkok, Thailand, as late as 1971 was trying to entrap Soviet KGB officers, recruit local spies, and even was attempting to run its own agents into China through Hong Kong. Little or none of this activity was being cleared with the CIA.

In 1967 Helms was urged by his staff to authorise an official review of intelligence collection by community members, with special emphasis on the many technical collection systems. After several months of intense investigation, the small group concluded—this was the first sentence of their report—'The US intelligence community collects too much information.' The study noted that the glut of raw data was clogging the intelligence system and making it difficult for the analysts to separate out what was really important and to produce thoughtful material for the policymakers. The study* also observed that there simply were too many reports on too many subjects for the high-level policymakers to cope with. The study caused such consternation in the CIA that Helms refused to disseminate it.

Secrecy is an absolute way of life at the Agency, and while outsiders might consider some of the resulting practices comical in the extreme, the subject is treated with great seriousness in the CIA. Training officers lecture new personnel for hours on end about 'security consciousness,' and these sessions are augmented during an employee's entire career by refresher courses, warning posters, and the semi-annual requirement for each employee to review the Agency's security rules and to sign a copy, as an indication it has been read. As a matter of course, outsiders should be told absolutely nothing

*Some intelligence was not being evaluated at all, and, as a result, a new concept, 'the linear drawer foot,' entered the English language. Translated from Portuguese, this refers to the amount of paper needed to fill a file drawer up to one foot in length. A 1969 House Armed Services Committee report noted that the Southeast Asia office of the CIA alone had 517 linear drawer feet of unanalysed raw intelligence locked in its vaults.

about the CIA, and fellow employees should be given only that information for which they have an actual 'need to know.'

CIA personnel become so accustomed to the rigorous security precautions (some of which are indeed justified) that they easily accept them all. They work with a telephone book marked SECRET, which is intentionally incomplete. It lists no one working in the Clandestine Services, and each semi-annually revised edition leaves out the names of many of those employed by the overt directorates, so that if the book ever falls into unauthorised hands, no enterprising foreign agent or reporter will be able to figure out how many people work at CIA headquarters, or even how many work in non-clandestine jobs. Those temporarily omitted can look forward to having their names appear in the next edition of the directory, at which time others are selected for telephonic limbo.

Added to this confusion is the fact that most Agency phone numbers are regularly changed for security reasons. Employees manage to keep track of commonly called numbers by listing them in their own personal desk directories, although they have to be careful to lock these in their safes by night—or else risk being charged with a security violation.

Along with the phone books, all other classified material (including typewriter ribbons and scrap paper) is placed in these safes whenever an office is unoccupied. Security guards patrol every part of the agency at roughly half-hour intervals in the evenings and on weekends.

Even a charwoman at the CIA must gain security clearance in order to qualify for the badge that she, too, must wear at all times; then she must be accompanied by an armed security guard while she cleans offices (where all classified material has presumably already been locked up). Some rooms at the Agency are considered so secret that the charwoman and her guard must also be watched by someone who works in the office.

The pervasive secrecy extends everywhere. Cards placed on Agency bulletin boards offering items for sale conclude: 'Call Bill, extension 6464.' It was only in 1973 that employees were allowed to answer their phones with any words other than those signifying the four-digit extension number.

The headquarters building, located on a partially wooded 125-acre tract eight miles from downtown Washington, is a modernistic fortress-like structure. Until the spring of 1973 one of the two roads leading into the secluded compound was totally unmarked, and the other featured a sign identifying the installation as the Bureau of Public Roads.

When the CIA headquarters building was being constructed during the late 1950s, the subcontractor responsible for putting in the heating and air-conditioning system asked the Agency how many people the structure was intended to accommodate. For security

reasons, the Agency refused to tell him, and he was forced to make his own estimate based on the building's size. The resulting heating system worked reasonably well, while the air-conditioning was quite uneven. After initial complaints in 1961, the contractor installed an individual thermostat in each office, but so many Agency employees were continually re-adjusting their thermostats that the system got worse.

At this point the CIA took the subcontractor to court to force him to make improvements. His defence was that he had installed the best system he could, without a clear indication of how many people would occupy the building. The CIA could not counter this reasoning and lost the decision.

Another unusual feature of the CIA headquarters is the cafeteria. It is partitioned into a secret and an open section, the secret part being for Agency employees only. The partition ensures that no visitor will see the face of any clandestine operator eating lunch.

The CIA's 'supergrades' (civilian equivalents of generals) have their own private dining room in the executive suite, however. There they are provided with higher-quality food at lower prices than in the cafeteria, served on fine china with fresh linen by black waiters in immaculate white coats. These waiters and the executive cooks are regular CIA employees, in contrast to the cafeteria personnel, who work for a contractor. On several occasions the Office of Management and Budget has questioned the high cost of this private dining room, but the Agency has always been able to fend off the attacks, as it fends off virtually all attacks on its activities, by citing 'national security.'

Although no statistics are available, mental breakdowns seem more common in the Agency's tension-laden atmosphere than in the population as a whole, and the CIA tends to have a more tolerant attitude toward mental health problems and psychiatric therapy than the general public. In the Clandestine Services, breakdowns are considered virtually normal work hazards, and employees are encouraged to return to work after they have completed treatment.

Usually no stigma is attached to illness of this type; in fact, Richard Helms suffered a breakdown when he was still with the Clandestine Services during the 1950s and it clearly did not hurt his career. Ex-Clandestine Services chief Frank Wisner had a similar illness, and he later returned to work as the CIA station chief in London.

Many Agency officials are known for their heavy drinking, which also seems to be looked upon as an occupational hazard. Again, the CIA is more sympathetic to drinking problems than outside organisations. Drug use, however, remains absolutely taboo.

INTELLIGENCE agencies, in the popular view, are organisations of glamorous master spies who, in the best tradition of James Bond, daringly uncover the evil intentions of a nation's enemies. In reality, however, the CIA has comparatively little success in acquiring

intelligence through secret agents. This classical form of espionage has for many years ranged considerably below space satellites, code-breaking, and other forms of technical collection as a source of important foreign information to the US Government. Even open sources (the Press and other communications media) and official channels (diplomats, military attachés, and the like) provide more valuable information than the Clandestine Services of the CIA. Against its two principal targets, the Soviet Union and Communist China, the effectiveness of CIA spies is virtually nil.

To be sure, the Agency has pulled off an occasional espionage coup, but these have generally involved the 'walk-ins'—defectors who take the initiative in offering their services to the Agency.

Nearly all the Soviets and Chinese who either spied for the CIA or defected to the West did so without being actively recruited by America's leading espionage agency.

A large percentage of defectors become psychologically depressed with their new lives once the initial excitement of resettlement in a new country wears off. A few have committed suicide. To try to keep the defector content, the CIA assigns a case officer to each one for as long as is thought necessary. With a particularly volatile defector the Agency maintains even closer surveillance, including telephone taps and mail intercepts.

In some instances, case officers will watch over the defector for the rest of his life. More than anything else, the Agency wants no defector to become so dissatisfied that he will be tempted to return to his native country.

Agents are intricate and, often, delicately balanced individuals. With the Soviet Oleg Penkovsky, his British and CIA handlers found that flattery was a particularly effective method of motivation. Although he preferred British manners, Penkovsky greatly admired American power. Accordingly, he was secretly granted US citizenship and presented with his 'secret' CIA medal. As a military man he was quite conscious of rank; consequently, he was made a colonel in the US Army to show him that he suffered no loss of status because of his shift in allegiance.

On two occasions while Penkovsky was an active spy, he travelled outside the USSR on official duty with high-level delegations attending Soviet-sponsored trade shows. Both times, first in London and then in Paris, he slipped away from his Soviet colleagues for debriefing and training sessions with British and American case officers.

During one of the London meetings, he asked to see his US Army uniform. None of the CIA men, nor any of the British operators, had anticipated such a request. One quick-thinking officer, however, announced that the uniform was at another safe house and that

driving there and bringing it back for Penkovsky to see would take a while. The spy was temporarily placated, and a CIA case officer was immediately dispatched to find a colonel's uniform to show to the agent. After scurrying around London for a couple of hours in search of an American Army colonel with a build similar to Penkovsky's, the operator returned triumphantly to the debriefing session just as it was concluding—uniform in hand; Penkovsky was pleased.

Months later, in Paris, the CIA operators were better prepared. A brand-new uniform tailored to Penkovsky's measurements was hung in a closet in a room adjacent to where he was being debriefed, and he inspected it happily when the meeting was concluded.

A NUMBER of years ago the CIA established a secret historical library, later a secret internal professional journal, and in 1967 began the preparation of the exhaustive history of the Agency, being written by retired senior officers.

Recognising the irresistible tendency of former intelligence officers to write their memoirs and thereby often to embarrass their organisations and their Governments with their revelations Director Helms prudently agreed to permit the preparation of an official secret history of the CIA and its clandestine activities. Retired senior officials were rehired on contract at their former salaries to spend a couple of additional years with the Agency putting their recollections down on paper.

Helms's decision was a master stroke. The history will never be completed, nor will it ever be published. By definition it is a perpetual project and one that can be read only by those who have a clear 'need to know.' But the writers, the battle-scarred old hands, have got their frustrations out of their systems—with no harm done—and they have probably been better paid than they would have been had they gone public.

Counter-espionage, like covert action, has become a career speciality in the CIA; some clandestine operators do no other type of work during their years with the Agency. These specialists have developed their own clannish sub-culture within the Clandestine Services, and even other CIA operators often find them excessively secretive and deceptive. The function of the counter-espionage officers is to question and verify every aspect of CIA operations; taking nothing at face value, they tend to see deceit everywhere. In an Agency full of extremely mistrustful people, they are the professional paranoids, even to the extent of, reportedly, keeping a list of the 50 or so key positions in the CIA most likely to have been infiltrated by the KGB and maintaining constant surveillance on the occupants.

RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH
25 AUG 1974

How the CIA Trains Its Recruits Down on 'the Farm' in Virginia

Ever since Nathan Hale was caught, Americans have surrounded the "spy game" with a romantic mystique. Miles Copeland describes in his new book, *"Without Click or Dagger,"* the process by which a red-blooded American lad can become a full-fledged CIA "company" man.

By Miles Copeland

When I toured the United States in 1970 to lecture to university audiences, I found that the most vocal students in all parts of the country saw the Central Intelligence Agency as representative of all that is wrong with "the rotten society we live in."

Question periods were all taken up by heated discussions revolving around the agency's supposed intrigues in all capitals of the world, including Washington and London; its backing of right-wing totalitarian regimes; and its "working for the large corporations rather than for the American people."

BACK AT THE HOTEL there was another story. I was deluged with calls from students wanting to know how to join.

Although a high percentage of the students who sought me out to discuss the possibilities of a career in intelligence were straightforward types who thought in terms of practical advantages, either for a lifetime career or as a stepping-stone to something else, even more were romantics — Walter Mittys, in fact. ("See that little man over there?" said Inspector Hargreaves. "You wouldn't think it to look at him, but he has all the secrets of the world in his head.")

Whatever the motives, there are thousands of young Americans who would give their eyeteeth to be employed by the CIA or, simply, to "get into the intelligence business," as one student put it to me, and by "intelligence" he clearly meant the spookier side.

Although every one of the thousands of letters of application that reach the CIA headquarters at Langley, Va., is given serious consideration, the attitude of agency recruiters is generally one of "Don't call us; we'll call you."

The mere fact of offering one's services

to the CIA is regarded as ground for suspicion. And for good reason. An analysis of these letters shows clearly that many of them were prompted by motives other than patriotic ones, a chance to "have a look at the inside so that I can write a book about it later" being a particularly prominent one.

The CIA keeps what must certainly be the largest card file in existence of possible recruits for its organization — university students, members of certain professions and people having certain special qualifications. A person may find himself propositioned by a CIA recruiter because some area division chief has asked for "a man, age early 20s, who has a background in electronics, who speaks Hungarian although is not of Hungarian ancestry, and who can meet the agency's criteria for career officers."

He is more likely to be approached, however, if he is simply a senior in "one of the better American universities" (i.e., one that has a minimum of student demonstrations) with a B average, an absence of left-wing affiliations and a record of sound emotional health. The CIA employs professors and graduate students at "the better American universities" to canvass members of senior classes, either in the name of the CIA itself or through some "front," commercial or institutional.

ONCE YOU GET IN, you will find yourself in a whole new world. The CIA's recruiters do their best to screen out the romantics and to select only young men and women whose motivations are entirely practical; but I would say that 99 percent of those who join the agency are at least partly attracted by the glamor. Even those few who are entirely blasé when they first get into the agency are certain to be dazzled by the indoctrination.

The first training undergone by young CIA employees who are "officer material" takes place in the modern, streamlined buildings at Langley. Much of it is concerned with routine matters such as forms for reports, how to grade information, how to use registry, etc., but there are also many exciting exhibitions. Experts put on demonstrations of how to

pick locks, plant microphones, steam open letters, forge documents.

Then there is a positively frightening series of lectures, complete with slides, charts, and photocopies of secret official Soviet documents and Communist Party correspondence, which is delivered with such authority that it would convince anyone not only that the Cold War still goes on, but that it holds greater and greater dangers which can be thwarted only by an alert and efficient intelligence system.

FINALLY, THERE IS A DISPLAY of the "national security machinery" — or "the real Washington," as one instructor calls it — which shows how, despite all the bumbling that is inevitable in any large organization, the U.S. government does manage to protect the nation's interests and how, at the same time, it has a system of "fuses" which ensure that no element of the "machinery" can acquire an excess of power. This part of the course is most impressive.

The second part of the indoctrination takes place at a country estate, a few hours' drive south of Washington, known as "the farm." Here the new CIA employee gets a taste of what it is like "out in the cold" — i.e., in the danger areas where persons in clandestine services supposedly operate: on the border between East and West Germany, on the Soviet-Iranian border, in "reception" areas in Communist China.

In one "night exercise" the trainees black their faces and try to cross a border protected by charged barbed wire, dogs, electric eyes, traps, floodlights and border patrols. When they are caught, as they inevitably are, they are put through an interrogation by "East German security officials" played with enormous realism by the training division's actors.

In another "field exercise," trainees go into a nearby town to "cas restaurants and other places to determine their suitability as meeting places for agents.

SOME OF THE TRAINEES parachute jumps, one in the daytime and one at night, after which they have to

their parachutes in the approved manner. Only a few of the trainees will ever have do any of these things in real life, of course, and those few take additional training but they are given a feel for the problem they may later assign others as they comfortably at headquarters planning operations.

These two indoctrination courses are just the beginning of CIA training. A career officer of the CIA spends a great deal of his service in courses "retreading" every year or so to bring up-to-date on recently developed methods, provided with language training, and given courses in political revolution, counter evolution and counterinsurgency, among others.

The first job of a new recruit to the CIA's espionage branch is likely to be assistant to a "desk officer" — at the Low Countries Desk or any one of 33 to 40 others. His duties will mostly involve servicing requests from "the field" — for a new automobile, for special equipment of various kinds, or for an adjustment in some accounting mistake.

The first step upward of the new officer is not from assistant desk officer to desk officer, but from assistant desk officer to assistant case officer in some field station.

It is in the field that the up-and-coming espionage specialist first sucks his neck out. He will be entirely at the mercy of his chief of station, and, as is well known, good chief of station is a master at the art of taking personal credit for everything that goes right and blaming his subordinates for everything that goes wrong while giving the appearance of doing just the opposite. In any case, the relation between the chief of station and the new officer will be both close and stormy.

The real ambition of the CIA officer in training is to get bigger and better assignments between headquarters and the field, in as wide a variety of places as possible.

(C) 1974 by Miles Copeland. From the book *"Without Click or Dagger"* by Miles Copeland. Reprinted by permission of Simon & Schuster, Inc.

WASHINGTON POST
22 August 1974

William B. Shattuck Employee Of the CIA For 20 Years

William Beverly Shattuck, 67, an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency for more than 20 years until his retirement in 1968, died of a heart condition Sunday at Suburban Hospital in Bethesda.

Mr. Shattuck joined the CIA when it was first being formed following World War II, in which he had been an Army

lieutenant-colonel assigned to the Inter-American Defense Board in Washington.

Before the war, he worked with a number of firms on Wall Street, including Moody's Investment Service, A. Vere Shaw & Co., and Sweetser & Co., of which he was a partner.

Mr. Shattuck, who was born in Brazil, Ind., graduated from the University of Indiana and attended Harvard University business before going to Wall Street.

Survivors include his wife, Betty Taylor Shattuck, of the home at 8509 Burdette Rd., Bethesda; a sister, Lucy Shackelford of Roachdale, Ind.; and a brother, James C. Shattuck of

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 September 1974

CIA: But who will watch the watchers?

Without Cloak or Dagger, by Miles Copeland. New York: Simon and Schuster. \$8.95.

By Leon Lindsay

If you want to know as much about the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency as possible — without compromising its present or future operations, of course — what better source than a man who was present at its inception, has served it long and well in many capacities, and retains his status in the agency's "gentlemen's club"?

Miles Copeland is that man. For 278 well-written pages the author educates the reader about intelligence, espionage, and counterespionage, carefully avoiding any exposures of sensitive identities or operations.

There is not much doubt that this is an "authorized biography" of the CIA, published to counter recent publication of adverse articles and books.

If it is not a defense or an apologia for the Agency — which has recently seen its romantic, "cloak and dagger" public image stripped away to expose the uglier aspects of its operations — it is at least an attempt to present the "real" CIA.

If, in casual, disarming references, some of the cold-bloodedness, cliquishness, and self-justification slip through — well, that is not going to alarm the reader very much. Even the assertion that *someone* has to take care of "dirty tricks" may seem a truism in these times.

But there are still, one would hope, a lot of Americans who are not going to be able to accept Mr. Copeland's final chapter, "Some Conclusions." Most of these "conclusions" are stated with the kind of righteous assurance one usually expects only from fanatics. For example:

"If it isn't already, the CIA may well become 'the world's most powerful government agency,' as one columnist called it."

The word "agency" may not exactly put the CIA on the same plane as the three great branches of U.S. government — until one reads a few lines farther on:

"The dangers are increasing," an Agency official told me, "and our power to deal with them is increasing proportionately. But so is the public's fear of us. Although the nature of the dangers is such that the Agency can hardly become less secret in handling its information . . . It can at least put its trust in a representative number of Congressmen" (my italics).

What are the "increasing dangers"? Mr. Copeland identifies two: first, terrorism, and particularly new-

left terrorism, which he says is a worldwide, if amorphous conspiracy; second, the competing imperialisms of the Soviet Union and Communist China — vying with each other to economically strangle the U.S. by taking over, through one means or another, areas of the world with strategic materials.

The extent of records kept by the FBI, Army CIC, and other agencies, in connection with suspected left-wing associations, has only recently been discovered — and decried. Mr. Copeland admits that the CIA has the most comprehensive computerized file on individuals in the world, and he gives it a name: "Octopus."

The file's existence is justified, he says, by the terrorist threat. Even some of the CIA's liberals don't like it. But, explains Mr. Copeland, even these civil-rights-conscious people accept its necessity for *they* know frightening facts the ordinary citizen doesn't.

He makes some other statements that seem relevant: "*Removing the dangers inherent in a 'powerful' government agency is not a matter of decreasing the power, but of ensuring that those who exercise it are incorruptible and truly responsive to public interest.*" (italics his).

The CIA "will support politicians, political groups, and governments through the world [including in the U.S.?] whose objectives are compatible with our own; it will sometimes work with unpopular organizations — American, international, and foreign.

"All these actions are certain to result in some public outcry, and the extent to which the agency is able to survive it will depend on the extent to

which the public becomes confident that the agency really has unpublishable information necessitating the moves, and is acting entirely in the public interest and not for the gain of individual political figures, political parties, or special-interest groups."

In this case, the reader is led to assume, as in justifying other activities, the CIA "will give its contacts in Congress ample information to prove the necessity for so doing." The implication here, possibly unintentional, is that the agency itself will determine who those congressional contacts will be.

But the same "defusing" process that works to abort assignments that the CIA "gentlemen's club" considers unwise has other uses. Mr. Copeland gives a very disturbing example:

When James Schlesinger became director of the Agency and immediately began a shakeup (for whatever motives), his efforts were cleverly sabotaged. Clearly, the CIA will be internally changed only if the "gentlemen's club" wishes it so.

Mr. Copeland says one maxim is being inculcated in the younger men now: "Always keep in mind whom you are working for" — meaning it's not for the President of the United States as a person, not for the Director of the CIA, but for the CIA as an instrument of the American democracy."

Considering the existence of "Octopus," the Agency's coziness with selected politicians, "dirty tricks" at home and abroad, and Mr. Copeland's indication that the CIA strongly doubts the possibility of real detente, one can't help but wonder about their definition of democracy.

In fact, after reading Mr. Copeland's conclusions, one might conclude that Big Brother is about to unlock a door marked "1984."

Leon W. Lindsay, chief of the Monitor's New England news bureau, was a member of the U.S. Army's Counter-Intelligence Corps.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 September 1974

FORD NAMES BUSH AS ENVOY TO CHINA TO SUCCEED BRUCE

Choice of G.O.P. Chairman
Is Among Moves to Revise
Party and Government

KENNETH RUSH SHIFTED

Selected for Post in Bonn—
Cooper to Be Ambassador
to East Germany

By PHILIP SHABECOFF

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 4—President Ford today named George Bush, the Republican National Chairman, to be the United States envoy to China as he announced his first major changes in key diplomatic, political and economic posts.

Mr. Bush, who is 50 years old, will succeed the 76-year-old David K. E. Bruce, who reportedly has been ill, as head of the United States liaison office in Peking.

Because they have not established formal diplomatic relations, the United States and China do not have embassies in each other's capitals and have not exchanged ambassadors. As head of a liaison mission rather than an ambassador, Mr. Bush will not require confirmation by the Senate.

Paris Post for Rush

A White House official close to the President said that today's appointments marked the beginning of Mr. Ford's efforts to reshape both the Government and the Republican party. The other significant personnel changes announced today by the White House press secretary, J. F. terHorst, include the following:

• Kenneth Rush, the economic counselor to former President Nixon, who has continued in his post under Mr. Ford, was nominated to be Ambassador to France.

• John Sherman Cooper, a Republican Senator from Kentucky until he retired in 1972, was named to be the first United States Ambassador to East Germany.

• William D. Rogers, a Washington lawyer and former State Department official, was nominated by Mr. Ford to be Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

At a news briefing today, Mr. terHorst also said that President Ford and the White House chief of staff, Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., had been discussing possible new assignments for General Haig and that one was the post of commander in chief of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces.

Mr. terHorst said that no decision had been reached and that meanwhile, General Haig would continue to serve "indefinitely" as the White House chief of staff. However, he said that General Haig had indicated to the President that he would like to return to the Army.

Explaining the selection of Mr. Bush for the Peking post, a high White House official said: "George Bush was a strong and viable candidate to be Ford's Vice President until the last minute. He is somebody the President holds in high regard. His appointment, therefore, is a signal to the Chinese that the new United States envoy is somebody who has the President's ear."

Post Has Ambassador's Rank

Mr. Bush served two terms as a member of the House of Representatives from Texas. His only experience in diplomacy has been about two years he spent as United States representative at the United Nations.

As head of the liaison mission in Peking, Mr. Bush will hold ambassadorial rank. His appointment to a diplomatic post clears the way for Mr. Ford to assume effective charge of the Republican National Committee, a White House official acknowledged today.

The official agreed that Mr. Ford's recommendation that Mary Louise Smith be appointed to succeed him indicated that the President intended to exercise practical control over the party.

Mrs. Smith is a party professional who has held no major elective position.

Although Mr. Bush fought against attempts by the White House, under President Nixon, to use the Republican party to defend Mr. Nixon against impeachment, he was associated with the "imagery" of the Watergate scandal, according to one White House official.

The appointment of Kenneth Rush to the Paris post also helps solve a domestic problem for President Ford. Mr. Ford had been criticized for retaining President Nixon's economic advisers even though economic conditions have steadily worsened.

Mr. Rush, who has served both Mr. Nixon and Mr. Ford as chief economic spokesman, was also named recently chair-

LONDON TIMES
22 August 1974

Intelligence bashing

Operation Splinter Factor

By Stewart Steven

(Hodder, £3.25)

I am not convinced by this book, and since the author provides no evidence to support his story the reviewer does not have to provide any evidence to refute it—though it does, in fact, contain some factual errors. What Mr. Steven claims is that the wave of show trials and terror which swept across eastern Europe before Stalin's death was masterminded by Mr. Allan Dulles of the CIA, who hoped that it would so discredit the communist regimes that the people would rise up in revolt.

As it turned out, when people did rise up somewhat later they were put down, but there is no evidence that the show trials had much to do with it. Many ordinary people were totally indifferent to whether one lot of communist leaders was putting another lot in prison.

Mr. Steven, who was on the *Daily Express* and is now on the *Daily Mail*, admits that the alleged plot did not work but insists that there really was a plot. Its key figure, he says, was Jozef Swiatlo, a deputy head of department in the Polish security police, who defected to the west in 1953. Mr. Steven says he was a double

agent from 1949 onwards and did Mr. Dulles's work by systematically feeding Stalin's paranoia about the infiltration of western agents into eastern Europe.

There is no evidence that Swiatlo was a double agent, but even if he was he did not have the power attributed to him, and there were so many other known reasons for the show trials that there was little need for him or for Mr. Dulles to add more. Such trials had been a part of the established system in the Soviet Union since well before the war and it was logical to transfer them to eastern Europe along with other aspects of the system. That, among other things, to find scapegoats for economic failures, to resolve rivalries within the communist parties, and to induce an atmosphere of terror and uncertainty. Perhaps the CIA added a little fuel to the flames by sowing additional suspicions here and there but it seems very unlikely that its role, if any, was as crucial as Mr. Steven suggests.

If one is going to rewrite history one needs to provide a little evidence. And if one is going to indulge in the fashionable and often justified pastime of bashing the intelligence services one needs to show that one has higher standards.

Richard Davy

Wage and Price Stability. The White House did not disclose today who would replace him in his various jobs.

Mr. Rush, who held posts as Ambassador to West Germany, Deputy Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of State before moving to the White House, was said to be delighted with his new assignment. He will replace John N. Irwin 2d in Paris.

Mr. Rush is said to be close to the French Foreign Minister, Jean Sauvagnargues. The two men were Ambassadors in Bonn at the same time and helped negotiate the 1972 agreement with the Soviet Union regulating civilian travel in and around Berlin.

The appointments of Mr. Cooper and Mr. Rogers had been expected for some weeks.

President Ford also announced today that he planned to retain Dean Burch and Ann Armstrong as counselors on a permanent basis. Both will serve political functions. Mr. Burch will maintain liaison between the White House and the Re-

publican party as well as with Republicans in Congress, and will be active in matters affecting political patronage.

Mr. terHorst declined to confirm a report that General Haig had been selected as the commander of NATO forces, saying that several possibilities were being discussed and no decision had been reached.

At the briefing, the press secretary cautioned reporters against being "locked in" to the report that General Haig would get the NATO post. He had no comment on reports that the Government of the Netherlands had objected to appointment of General Haig.

The North Atlantic Treaty says nothing about obtaining the ratification of member nations for appointment of a commander of the treaty forces. However, the United States, which has provided all the NATO commanders since the organization was formed, has made it a custom to seek the approval of the other nations.

CHRONICLE, San Francisco
19 August 1974

Royce Brier

All Foreigners Now Know the CIA

READING BETWEEN THE LINES of the news of the deterioration of American-Greek relations, strongly suggests an active factor in the misfortune of the Central Intelligence Agency.

If it surfaces, it will be but another example of the infernal meddling in foreign affairs of the vast and sprawling nest of spies operating out of Washington.

Initial stories of the cautious Greek alienation carry no detail. It came as unpleasant surprise to most Americans, including the large and socially valuable segment of Americans of Greek stock.

Though the story was fragmentary, it did contain information that anti-American demonstrators in Athens carried cards derogatory to the CIA. This manifests an unseemly paradox, in which a foreign people know more about the international machinations of a vested American institution, than do native Americans.



IT POSES the intolerable before us, and since President Ford is turning a new leaf in our national existence, he could do worse than address himself to the CIA tangle.

And is it a tangle! The Agency is a spinoff of a spy outfit seated in Switzerland during the Hitler war. With Hitler gone, the core of the outfit was moved to Washington.

WASHINGTONIAN
SEPT 1974

Open Secrets

Under the patronage of Senators Edward Brooke of Massachusetts and Philip Hart of Michigan, the Center for National Security Studies will sponsor a conference on "The Central Intelligence Agency and Covert Actions" September 12 and 13 on Capitol Hill. Robert Borosage, a young lawyer in the Nader mold, is head of the Center and the moving force behind the conference.

Borosage has no first-hand experience in intelligence, which may well qualify him as a critic. He wants the conference to "start a public debate," and he hopes the panels will produce thoughtful and animated discussion. The possibility that such discussion will lead to a not-very-secret secret service seems to bother him not at all.

"The cost of enforcing the rules is so great domestically for the benefit of those in bureaucratic power," Borosage says, "that it is better to go with the limited classification of secrets." This is a rather simplistic solution to the whole problem of security classification in government—in a very real sense it advocates solving the problem by denying that a problem exists.

In Borosage's view the remaining secret information—say one percent of what is now classified—would be protected by a "code of honor" among those in the intelligence establishment. Such a code worked to the satisfaction of the intelligence bureaucracy as long as only the "old boys" of the old boy network were doing the writing—Allen Dulles in *The Cult of Intelligence* and Miles Copeland in *The Game of Nations*. The code broke down with the recent publication of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* by Victor Marchetti and John Marks.

Not surprisingly, Marchetti and Marks, outcasts of the regular intelligence establishment, will be the stars of the September conference. Marchetti especially has been criticized for using his

In this lush bureaucratic jungle, it grew as tropical plants grow, ravenous and insatiable, resisting all restraint. It became a self-governing empire, spawning new agents like the oak-moth pest. As its work is basically secret, it drew an impenetrable cocoon about itself, defying Congress (while seducing it) and the executive, and as its action is overseas, the courts. Beside it, the FBI is a benign and honest policing body.

SINCE THE 1950s, repeated Presidents have bucked it, to be stricken with inertia by its audacity, power and propaganda wiles.

It is voted princely annual sums: They are used for bribery, for inventing systems for corrupting and suborning factions and anti-factions and governments in troubled little lands. It has accumulated ships, weapons, radio networks and guerrillas used to kill innocents in Indochina, Latin America, Africa and all Asia.

Collectively its judgments are often execrable and its bungling notorious. A score of its conspiracies have exploded, these but a fraction of its myriad schemes and entrapments.

CIA has swayed, distorted and frequently nullified American foreign policy, presumed to reside in the President, his advisers and congressional committees as checks on the President. It has often usurped the duties of our ambassadors.

On the efficiency scale its work is meager; on the perilous nuisance scale its record is enormous.

In our modern world of communications and technology, let us grant we need some prudent espionage. We don't need thousands of gumshoes running in packs about the globe, playing their nefarious tricks while we, the people, and our elected representatives don't have the slightest idea what the hell is going on. Could be the Greek thing will expose the CIA. If not, we must wait until these provocateurs land — and land us — in some real soup.

August 19, 1974

privileged position as a CIA agent to expose many of the agency's cherished secrets. Others, notably the American Civil Liberties Union, have praised as an heroic gesture his breach of the CIA secrecy agreement all employees must take.

Marchetti and Marks will lead the panel discussion on "The Scope and Structure of the Intelligence Community." Other panelists include Thomas Ross on "The CIA's Covert Operations in the United States"; Richard Falk on "Covert Operations and the International Law"; and Borosage himself on "Covert Operations and the Constitution." Traditional intelligence heavies such as Ray S. Cline, former CIA and State Department intelligence specialist, will add heft to the conference's loaf.

Borosage seems to agree with the new school of intelligence theory—namely, that it's impossible for an intelligence organization to do much good. "Foreign espionage doesn't work against the top Communist countries," he says, "So what we are talking about is putting people on the Agency's payroll (in minor foreign countries) to influence events, not to collect intelligence." This effort by the CIA to push people around, the new critics feel, causes crises in foreign affairs.

The conference's attempt to open the intelligence closet should draw critics of the system like bees to honey. In the wake of Watergate and the neo-isolationism that spreads with inflation, the old system is more vulnerable than ever. "National security" is now an inoperative defense. So if you drop by Borosage's conference, feel free to join in the discussion. And above all, don't keep any secrets.

---ROBERT J. MYERS

(Editor's note: The writer is a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency.)

NEW YORK TIMES
4 September 1974

Smile. The Prophets of Gloom and Doom Are Not All Right

By Colin Greer

Many formerly optimistic social observers have come increasingly to believe in the negative characteristics of being human.

More and more, the belief that the American Dream of equality would be fulfilled—if we could use the power of the state to guarantee that dream—has given way to the conviction that people must voluntarily (Robert Heilbroner) accept or be coerced (B. F. Skinner) into new controls. State powers are seen as undemocratic but necessary for order and security.

The belief that there has been enough economic growth to fairly distribute material things among people recedes as popular and scholarly observers tell us that such growth possibilities are severely limited.

Indeed, we are told, planetary survival is precarious because we have been greedy and irresponsible. The solution, in this view, is to give up our democratic aspirations rather than to redistribute existing benefits. Those without will probably have to continue to do without while the more fortunate protect their own interests.

There are, of course, immense material problems ahead of us, but supply and profit are so thoroughly manipulated for vested interests that the primary problem of more egalitarian, more gentle treatment of ourselves and our planet is barely approachable before the issues of privilege and exploitation are subjected to remedial social action.

How can we really know about the root scarcity with which we might be confronted until we can look at a social world in which we make better use of what is available?

To be sure, this probably means Government controls and some level of imposition on individual taste and appetite. That's not the problem. Making it so is to miss the real point—namely, the explicitly undemocratic nature of what we are being told is necessary.

The liberal creed has run out of steam. Liberals made a journey a few years ago and found that the directions they followed did not take them to the places they said they were going. Perhaps, many have come to believe, those places never existed. It is time to stop judging ourselves by unfulfilled American Dream promises.

Unfortunately success flourished less extensively than had been presumed: Not only black people were poor, not only hippies and Weathermen, were feeling out of joint in America. We were in danger of bankrupting what success there was through ecological and nuclear shortsightedness, and the population explosion. So, in a few years, we graduated from renewed talk of group-based genetic inferiority to a more generalized belief in species-rooted inadequacies.

It is in this perspective that Mr. Heilbroner's book, "An Inquiry into the Human Prospect," and the plaudits it has received are important as reminders of a growing pessimism.

This pessimism is characterized by the alleged rediscovery of the necessity for sin to govern human life (Karl Menninger), the dominance of heredity in intelligence (Richard Herrnstein), the overdue need to put a leash on human aggression (Erich Fromm), the imminent danger of the technological future (Alvin Toffler), and the recognition of predominating "animal" properties in us (Robert Ardrey, Desmond Morris).

Mr. Heilbroner, a contributor to the nineteen-sixties faith in the progressive power of social analysis and social action, now writes of a pessimism of millennial proportions. Confronted by ominous forecasts of material shortages, the darker side of human nature is emphasized with an atavistic, almost religious, awe of demons in us.

We continue to live in a culture based on material scarcity. We suffer not only from scarcity of oil or food but also from the competitive distribution of both goods and social rela-

tions. Social equilibrium in such a culture is maintained by a promise of either future plenty or the justification of limitations expressed through religious, industrial and technological myths. We are being pushed in the latter direction.

I have yet to see any pessimists call for heavy taxation of the rich; rather the message I hear is for the aspiring to aspire less and for those who have little to settle for that. Only when privilege is secure can other conditions be ameliorated. The current state of our socio-economic system, therefore, seems to require an emphasis on conservation rather progressivism.

Throughout our progress from religious to technological myths, the day-to-day activity of the state has increasingly deepened its influence and effect on our lives. Sixties' pessimism, just as much as seventies' pessimism, turned on the possibilities of that influence. The pervasive role of the state in everyday social as well as political life is a *fait accompli*. The involvement of the state in every sector of American life is unprecedented. The significant contemporary questions about the state are those having to do with the style, quality and content of its interaction with persons, not whether we are to rely on it heavily.

Economic shifts require value shifts, too. And so we are being educated into a new distrust of ourselves, a new lack of self-respect, a newly regimented grammar of aspiration. A climate is being created which will permit use of the state's increased power as an agent on behalf of the very exploitation many trusted it grew powerful to oppose. This is the real issue before us right now.

Colin Greer teaches social history at the School of Contemporary Studies, Brooklyn College, and is executive editor of *Social Policy* magazine.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 13, 1974

Black Envoys Seek More Non-African Posts

By THOMAS A. JOHNSON

Special to The New York Times

LAGOS, Nigeria—There is a growing fear among black Americans in United States Government service abroad that the concentration of their senior members in African assignments could lessen their effectiveness in Africa and around the world.

"There is this dilemma," said a black American in west Africa, "that while we are anxious to serve in Africa, the proof of our success in this field will be our postings—in addition to Africa—to France, Peru, Norway and China."

Five black Foreign Service career officers are ambassadors and all have been assigned by the State Department to Africa. They are John E. Reinhardt, Ambassador to Nigeria; Terence A. Todman, to Guinea; Rudolph Aggrey, to Senegal and Gambia; W. Beverly Carter Jr., to Tanzania, and David B. Bolen, to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

African assignments have also been given to all seven blacks who head operations of the Agency for International Development abroad. Seven of the 10 blacks who head United States Information Service offices abroad are assigned to Africa.

Twenty-two black Americans have served as Ambassadors since President Truman named Edward R. Dudley of New York as Ambassador to Liberia in 1949, and 17 of these have been assigned to black nations. The five others are Clifford R. Wharton, who served in Norway from 1961 to 1964; Carl T. Rowan, Finland, 1963-64; Patricia R. Harris, Luxembourg, 1965-67; Hugh Smythe, Syria, 1965-67, and Malta, 1967-69, and Jerome H. Holland, Sweden, 1970-72.

Comparison to Industry

Blacks in Government service abroad have been reluctant to discuss publicly their fears of what they see as a trend.

But in Washington, senior black officials from the State Department, the development agency and the information agency, organized loosely as the "Thursday luncheon group," met earlier this year with Secretary of State Kissinger to voice their concerns. Sources within the group say they hope to meet with Mr. Kissinger again soon.

One black American diplomatic source in west Africa said recently: "In a real sense the blacks in foreign service

are beginning to face the same problem as blacks in American industry who are executives in charge of urban or minority affairs, and special markets. Both are restricted to low-priority areas where their black skins are supposed to count."

Asked if a black skin really gave a diplomat an advantage in Africa, black Americans in foreign service generally reply with a limited "yes."

They say it helps to establish a rapport and to build closer and faster relationships with Africans than can many—although not necessarily all—of their white counterparts.

But, according to Mr. Todman, the Ambassador to Guinea, blacks in the Foreign Service find, at the same time, that when it comes to the basics of international negotiations, "Africans deal with you strictly as an American."

Mr. Reinhardt, the Ambassador to Nigeria, said, "Initial meetings, introductions and invitations to African social affairs aside, one does business in any field in Africa on the basis of one's competence."

"We should not expect that Africans, any more than other peoples, will make decisions on grounds other than merit and their own national interests," Mr. Reinhardt said.

What do black Africans think of black American diplomats? Some say, as one African diplomat did, that it is easier to "deal with a person who wants to be in Africa—who looks like us and feels a kinship." Another questioned how "a second-class citizen can really represent that racist land."

What seemed a majority view, expressed by a senior Nigerian diplomat, was that "the

only question to consider is does the diplomat come with real power, does he really speak for his Government, can he make a decision?"

The United States Embassy here in Lagos, the largest in Africa, has been headed since November, 1971, by Mr. Reinhardt, a former information official in Washington, Iran, Japan and the Philippines.

The Ambassador to Guinea, Mr. Todman, was assigned to Conakry two years ago after assignment as the Ambassador to Chad and earlier tours in the Middle East and at the United Nations.

Mr. Aggrey, appointed earlier this year as the Ambassador to Senegal, is a former information officer in Africa and a former State Department African expert.

Served in Africa

Before Mr. Carter was named Ambassador to the east African nation of Tanzania, he too served in Africa for the information agency.

The newest of the black Ambassadors in Africa is Mr. Bolen, who was named earlier this year to the southern African countries of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. He was a former economics counselor at the American Embassy in Yugoslavia.

The five black Ambassadors in Africa serve in about 3 per cent of the 143 head of mission posts maintained by the United States. In all, the 340 black employees of the State Department come to about 4 per cent of that agency's total.

Higher percentages of black employees have been registered by the aid and information agencies, reflecting primarily the recruitment of nonprofes-

sional personnel from the heavily black Washington area.

Blacks make up about 17 per cent of the employees of the aid agency. It has black Americans heading seven major aid programs in the African nations of Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia and Zaire.

The information agency has seven black public affairs officers heading information service offices in the African nations of Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, Somalia, Togo and Tunisia.

Three other black Americans head information service offices in Bolivia, Laos and Syria. The agency has 96 public affairs officers at the supervisory level worldwide. Fifteen per cent of its 4,300 employees are black.

List of the 22

The 22 black Americans who have served as Ambassadors are:

Edward R. Dudley, Liberia, 1949-53; Jessie D. Locker, Liberia, 1953-55; Richard Lee Jones, Liberia, 1955-59; John H. Morrow, Guinea, 1959-61; Clifford R. Wharton, Norway, 1961-64; Mercer Cook, Niger, 1961-64, Senegal, 1964-66, and Gambia, 1965-66.

Carl T. Rowan, Finland, 1963-64; Clinton E. Knox, Dahomey, 1964-69, and Haiti, 1969-73; Patricia R. Harris, Luxembourg, 1965-67; Hugh Smythe, Syria, 1965-67, and Malta, 1967-69; Franklyn H. Williams, Ghana, 1965-68; Elliott P. Skinner, Upper Volta, 1966-69; Samuel C. Adams, Niger, 1968-69.

Terence A. Todman, Chad, 1969, and Guinea, 1972 to present; Samuel C. Westerfield, Liberia, 1969-72; Jerome H. Holland, Sweden, 1970-72; Clarence C. Ferguson, Uganda, 1970-72; Charles J. Nelson, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, 1971-74; John E. Reinhardt, Nigeria, 1971 to present; W. Beverly Carter Jr., Tanzania, 1972 to present; Rudolph Aggrey, Senegal and Gambia, 1974 to present, and David B. Bolen, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, 1974 to present.

NEW YORK TIMES
25 August 1974

Pentagon Kept Tight Rein In Last Days of Nixon Rule

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 24—Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept unusually close control over lines of command in the last days of the Nixon Administration to insure that no unauthorized orders were given to military units by the White House.

A senior Pentagon official said today that the decision to monitor closely all orders from any source was taken by Mr. Schlesinger, in consultation with Gen. George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to prevent any of a series of hypothetical situations from developing.

Two Areas Cited

The official said that Mr. Schlesinger began to worry about the situation when in late July and early August he felt that the impeachment or resignation of Mr. Nixon was inevitable.

There were two major areas of concern on Mr. Schlesinger's mind, the official said.

The first was that in some "improbable" situation, Mr. Nixon or one of his aides might get in touch with some military units directly without going through the usual Pentagon chain of command and order that some action be taken to

block the "constitutional process."

The second was that a genuine national emergency might develop in which American military units might have to be placed on alert or go into action, and Mr. Schlesinger and General Brown wanted to insure that they would be able publicly to justify the actions.

No Event Apparent

The Pentagon official stressed today that the concern of Mr. Schlesinger was hypothetical and did not evolve from any event. At no time, the official said, was there any sign that the White House or any military commander was contemplating any action outside the chains of command.

Mr. Schlesinger reportedly became concerned that if there was an impeachment debate and then a Senate trial, which seemed likely after the House Judiciary Committee voted articles of impeachment, the country could "have difficult times."

There was concern not only that somebody at the White House might order some unit to act against Congress, but also that some official might seek to have some unit oust the

President.

Moreover, Mr. Schlesinger, in his conversations with Secretary of State Kissinger, was also concerned about a national crisis arising while the President's future hung in the balance, the Pentagon official said.

Both Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Kissinger remembered the general skepticism when American forces were placed on a heightened alert last October when it seemed as if the Soviet Union was contemplating sending forces into the Middle East.

Allegation Denied

The alert, on Oct. 24-25, came only a few days after the so-called "Saturday night massacre" when Mr. Nixon dismissed the Watergate special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, pre-Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson and the ouster of his deputy, William D. Ruckelshaus.

When Mr. Kissinger had a news conference on Oct. 25, he was asked repeatedly if the alert was linked to some desire to distract public attention from the domestic crisis. He denied such an allegation, stressing then and later that the alert was legitimate.

But the Pentagon official

said that the public skepticism shown during the alert worried Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger, and that they were determined to insure that if a crisis developed, they would be in a position to justify any military moves.

Mr. Schlesinger decided that he would not leave Washington during the White House crisis so he would be at the center of the Pentagon command.

Under the National Security Act, the President is Commander in Chief, as specified by the Constitution, and his commands flow downward from the Defense Secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the military units.

Mr. Schlesinger, on the record, limited his comments to the following:

"In keeping with my statutory responsibilities, I did assure myself that there would be no question about the proper constitutional and legislated chain of command, and there never was any question."

The Pentagon official who disclosed Mr. Schlesinger's concern denied some published reports that Mr. Schlesinger had been particularly concerned about the loyalty of Air Force officers. He said that there had been no sign of any problems with any branch or group of officers.

Washington Star-News

Wednesday, August 28, 1974

POST-BURGLARY PERIOD

Nixon Tapes Subpoenaed By McCord in Civil Suit

James W. McCord Jr., one of the men convicted in the Watergate break-in and bugging case, has subpoenaed all presidential tapes during the period of the original Watergate trial for use in his civil lawsuit.

The subpoena, filed at U.S. District Court yesterday, calls on White House Counsel Philip W. Buchen to deliver all tapes between Jan. 1 and Jan. 31, 1973.

The trial itself began that Jan. 8, and ended Jan. 30 with the conviction of McCord, a former employee of the Committee for the

Re-election of the President, and G. Gordon Liddy, a former White House aide. Five other men charged with McCord and Liddy pleaded guilty during the trial.

This is the second subpoena directed to Buchen in the last week calling for the

tapes of former President Richard M. Nixon. The first was filed by R. Spencer Oliver, former executive director of the Association of State Democratic Chairmen, who also has a Watergate-related suit pending.

A White House spokesman has said that the Justice Department has been asked to issue a legal opinion on the ownership of the tapes and documents left behind by Nixon, and on Buchen's responsibility to comply with such subpoenas.

The bulk of the Watergate civil suits was settled on Aug. 9. However, McCord and Oliver, who are asking damages from Nixon's 1972 campaign committees and various individuals involved in the Watergate affair, refused to take part in the settlement and are pressing their suits.

GENERAL

BALTIMORE SUN
26 August 1974

Blemishes among the Spectaculars

The Minuses of Nixon's Foreign Policy

By R. H. SHACKFORD

Washington.

Richard Nixon's die-hard supporters and some of his severest critics claim that he left an admirable record in foreign policy in spite of his impeachable crimes and abuse of the presidency.

Even in the final hours, before abdicating to avoid ouster from his high office, Richard Nixon brushed aside the Watergate scandals that had done him in and sang the praises of his foreign policy accomplishments. He even invoked, for the last time as President, those well-worn clichés—"a generation of peace" and "a structure of peace." It was done in such a way as to suggest that these should compensate for the disgraceful scandals over which he had presided.

But does the record support the view that the Nixon foreign policy was extraordinary? Does the legacy in foreign affairs that he left for Gerald Ford warrant such acclaim?

There have, indeed, been accomplishments. And given the public relations operations at the White House during Nixon's incumbency they were about the only things the public was told about. But there were also some great failures both of commission and omission. And both Nixon and his only foreign policy advisor, Henry Kissinger, seldom if ever mentioned them. When forced to do so, as in the current Greece-Turkey-Cyprus disaster, lame alibis or attempts to blame others were put forth.

In addition to failures that find American relations with old allies at an all time low, the Nixon accomplishments themselves are not without blemishes. For example, one of Nixon's last foreign spectaculars—a second summit meeting in Moscow early this summer—was a failure. It disclosed that even in the area where Nixon claimed highest marks for himself, detente with the Soviet Union is at best fragile, uncertain and viewed by many Americans with skepticism. Nixon's crude and unwise attempt while in Moscow to justify detente on a special "personal relationship" with Leonid Brezhnev, fortunately for those who want real detente, was rejected by the Soviet leader.

The opening to China, which

Nixon exploited with a sensational televised trip to Peking in 1972, muddles along. Reversal of American policy toward China was an accomplishment worthy of praise and long overdue. Yet the manner in which it came about is not necessarily the way Nixon describes it—his idea and initiative. There is some evidence that the initiative came from Peking, because of China's quarrel with Russia, and that Nixon wisely took advantage of it.

Maybe the Nixon "accomplishment" about which one hears the most is Vietnam. It is indisputable that all American fighting men were extricated from Vietnam during his presidency, even though the war and its cruel casualties went on for more than four years of the Nixon Administration. But contrary to claims, Nixon did not bring peace to that tortured part of the world. He used the "peace is at hand" claim on the eve of his landslide election in 1972, but there is no peace in Vietnam or Cambodia. The war goes on. Although American GI's are not fighting, the war is carried on with American money and American military equipment and American advice. It remains an American war, albeit by proxy.

The verdict on the Middle East is still unknown. The Cyprus crisis is separate from the Arab-Israeli problem. But both affect the stability of the Middle East. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy between Arab countries and Israel early this year brought about a separation of forces. All sides were ready for a military cooling off period. Whether they are ready to make the concessions necessary for a permanent peace—on issues like the future of the Palestinians on which the U.S. equivocates—remains to be seen.

But it is not just in these major areas where the claim of a successful Nixon foreign policy is subject to challenge. It is in all the rest of the world, especially among America's old allies, where his policies and attitudes have rendered dubious if not negative results.

The last three White House tapes, which were made public on the eve of Nixon's departure in disgrace, revealed some shocking Nixon views on fundamental world problems. They contradicted the myth, perpetuated for so long, that he was a

man too busy with great world problems to be involved in Watergate. In the midst of a discussion on Watergate, however, Nixon's attention was called in June, 1972, to serious international monetary developments, especially with respect to the British pound and the Italian lira.

On the new "floating rate" for the British pound which affected the value of the American dollar, Nixon said: "I don't care about it. Nothing we can do about it."

And when told about grave worries with respect to speculation in the Italian lira, Nixon's shocking reply was: "I don't give a (expletive deleted) about the lira."

Once one moves away from Nixon "spectaculars" in foreign policy—detente with Russia, opening to China, extrication of American troops (but no peace) in Vietnam—the list of foreign policy matters which were bungled or ignored by Nixon is lengthy.

Here are a few issues on which any objective observer must give Nixon low marks:

- Western Europe and NATO. A year ago last June, Kissinger proclaimed that Nixon was making 1974 "the year of Europe." A new Atlantic Charter was to be devised, as though another piece of paper setting forth general principles would solve complex problems. Unwisely, our European allies had not been consulted and the ill-conceived idea fizzled.

- Japan. The "shocks" administered to this major Asian ally are still felt. They included no advance warning about a new U.S. policy toward Peking and no warning on monetary and tariff changes that severely disrupted Japan's economy which was dependent upon trade with the U.S.

- Bangladesh. Nixon's now famous "tilt" toward Pakistan and against India in that tragic episode, while piously and falsely proclaiming neutrality, was a disgrace to American foreign policy.

- Middle East. Until forced to do so when it exploded last October, Nixon ignored the Arab-Israeli problem. Only when the Arabs used their oil as a weapon that affected the U.S. directly, did Nixon focus upon the area—and then with total concentra-

tion to the detriment of other problems, such as Cyprus, which was right on the Arab-Israeli doorstep.

- Dictatorships. Unquestioning support of harsh and suppressive military dictatorships such as in Greece and South Korea has led to diplomatic disasters in the Greek area (with that part of NATO now in shambles) and portend potential ones in Korea where stability is so dependent upon a reasonable working relationship between Japan and Korea and respect and trust in both countries for the United States.

- Nuclear weapons. Despite the tiny but hopeful start with the first SALT agreement with Russia to limit nuclear weapons, the Nixon administration never succeeded in reaching a consensus on the issue in its own country. President Ford inherits

from Nixon a serious and fundamental dispute on nuclear policy between Kissinger and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger which should have been resolved, but wasn't, before Nixon went to Moscow in June.

- International monetary affairs. For several years the daily financial pages of newspapers tell of the failures in this field, as in the correlative field of run-away domestic inflation. When the old monetary system broke down, Nixon allowed his former Treasury Secretary, John Connally, now indicted on charges of accepting a bribe, to try to bully our European partners into a solution. When an interim agreement was reached, Nixon, with typical overstatement, proclaimed it the greatest agreement in the history of mankind. But just as there is no peace in Vietnam in spite of the "peace is at hand" statement, there is no monetary stability in

the world.

The list could go on and on—refusal to normalize relations with Cuba, the tragedy of war brought by Nixon to Cambodia, failure to tackle world food, energy and resources problems on a global scale, such follies as the sale of most of our surplus grain to Russia at bargain prices and with American taxpayers' subsidies on the eve of zooming prices and world shortages.

President Ford has proclaimed a new era of openness and candor in all fields, including foreign affairs. It remains to be seen whether a man like Kissinger, whose one-man road show and secret methods of operating fitted Nixon's own proclivities so well, can perform for a man like Gerald Ford, who, thus far, has displayed a forthrightness so in contrast to the duplicity associated with his predecessor, Richard Nixon.

Mr. Shackford is a veteran Washington newspaperman.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1974

Ford's Foreign Problems and Prospects: The View From Major World Capitals

In an address to a joint session of Congress the week before last, President Ford said that he intended to continue the foreign policies of President Nixon. In the accompanying dispatches, correspondents of The New York Times report on how capitals around the world currently view their chief problems in relations with the United States. A dispatch from Washington gives the view of the problems from there.

The Soviet Union

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW—Despite a residue of goodwill left from President Nixon's three summit meetings, the Kremlin leaders will be pressing President Ford on at least two issues that remain major stumbling blocks to better Soviet-American relations.

The more conspicuous is trade, which in Soviet eyes has been stifled by the unwillingness of Congress to grant most-favored-nation status and investment credits.

If the Soviet Union views tariff policy as a matter of prestige, given the relatively low volume of exports to the United States, the matter of low-interest credits is of practical concern, for only with such credits, the Russians contend, can they afford more American technology.

Consequently, Moscow is counting on Mr. Ford to help break the deadlock posed by Soviet restrictions on emigration, particularly by Jews, and deliver on the trade promises Mr. Nixon made to the Soviet leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev.

No Real Progress

A still thornier problem

limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, on which no real progress was made in talks this summer. As some Western diplomats viewed it, the Kremlin, nervous about Mr. Nixon's vulnerability on Watergate, was unwilling to offer concessions that could be dissipated if he were swept out of office.

Although President Ford is dealing from a position of greater strength, a problem as complex as the limitation of offensive arms will continue to resist simple solutions. Negotiations at the recent meeting reportedly reached a deadlock over the number of missiles that the Soviet Union would be allowed to equip with multiple warheads.

Moscow has also resisted American proposals that both sides phase out their land-based missiles, in which the Russians have numerical superiority. Instead, it has sought parity in multiple warheads, while demanding that Washington halt its deployment of the Trident submarine-based missile and the B-1 strategic bomber.

Western Europe

Special to The New York Times

PARIS—The major Western European concerns about the United States involve economics and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The NATO issue stems from the Cyprus crisis and speculation that Greece may ask the Sixth Fleet to withdraw from port facilities. This particularly upsets Italy, where there is a strong current of opinion, mostly but not only on the left, against granting additional

The argument is that more bases would increase American "colonialism" and the temptation to interfere in Italian politics to prevent the Communists from being admitted to the Government.

Other countries are also worried about NATO. France, which, like Greece, has withdrawn her military forces from the alliance, is planning to bolster over-all Western defenses in the Eastern Mediterranean outside it.

The economic issue is perhaps more keenly felt by governments at this point than by the general public. There is criticism that the United States fed worldwide inflation by allowing a huge trade deficit to build the colossal Eurodollar supply, now estimated at \$200-billion. And there are fears that if the United States tries to fight inflation too vigorously, it will set off a general recession by constricting world trade. Bonn in particular has been critical of on-again, off-again policies and is watching warily to see how President Ford will handle the problems.

There is also concern about American talk of restricting agricultural exports since this would drive prices up, hurt European cattle raisers who rely on American feed grains and contribute to inflationary pressures. It is ironic that after 15 years in which the major United States-Common Market dispute was American insistence that Europe accept more agricultural exports, the issue now is fear of inadequate American exports.

Eastern Europe

Special to The New York Times

BUCHAREST — During the

long drama of Watergate the governments of Eastern Europe were especially concerned with the fate of President Nixon's trade bill, which has been held up in Congress.

All would like to expand trade, but even more important, they seek access to financing through international agencies and banks available only to those given most-favored-nation status.

All of Eastern Europe presumably welcomes détente, and there has been apprehension in some quarters that President Ford will not regard the issue as being as important as his predecessor did.

All the countries of Eastern Europe have specific and sometimes highly emotional quarrels with the United States. An example is Hungary, which has been demanding the return of the golden crown of St. Stephen, founder of the Hungarian state during the Middle Ages. The crown, which came into American hands at the end of World War II, is still withheld on the ground that Hungary has shown little interest in being more friendly.

Greece

Special to The New York Times

ATHENS — Greek-American relations are dominated by the Cyprus issue and its widening ramifications.

Athens is living with the humiliating fact that it could not stop the Turkish invasion, and the Greeks are attributing most of the blame to Washington.

Greece is used to blaming others for her troubles, and the more conspiratorial theories are largely unsubstantiated. But Americans here feel they are

performing a service by absorbing criticism that otherwise might endanger the frail new civilian Government of Premier Constantine Caramanlis.

Athens wants Washington to exert more pressure on Ankara to make significant concessions on Cyprus. Many of Greece's recent diplomatic moves—withdrawing of troops from NATO, acceptance of a Soviet proposal for a conference on Cyprus—were aimed mainly at the United States.

A related issue is the presence of important American military installations here. Greek officials keep threatening to close them—another move designed to make the United States use its influence with Turkey.

President Nixon was long identified with support of the now-defunct military junta; President Ford has the distinct advantage of starting fresh with the new Government. But in Greek eyes America is mainly embodied by Secretary of State Kissinger, and he has become the archvillain of the piece because of Cyprus policy.

Turkey

Special to The New York Times

ANKARA, Turkey—The Turks feel that they are off to a good start with the Ford Administration on the Cyprus issue, but United States objections to the resumption of opium-popp cultivation are a threat to good relations.

Premier Bulent Ecevit says Turkey may be a more difficult ally in the future as she asserts a more independent position on controversial issues. He also says there will be frankness on Turkey's side, with all the cards on the table.

In the case of Cyprus and the larger issue of Turkish-Greek relations in the Aegean Sea, the feeling here is that the United States has reacted in a constructive way and shown appreciation for Turkey's point of view.

In return, the Turks say they have kept fully in mind the basic United States interests in NATO defense in the Eastern Mediterranean and the preservation of détente with the Soviet Union.

The Middle East

Special to The New York Times

CAIRO—The United States, under President Ford as under his predecessor, holds the key to Middle Eastern peace. Arab leaders are in agreement on this point, but they differ on how the Ford Administration intends to use the key.

President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt, in a series of speeches reported by the press, has strongly reaffirmed his belief that the October war imposed a basic policy change on the United States. Instead of confining itself to unconditional support for Israel, he holds, it is now genuinely working for a permanent settlement acceptable to the Arabs. He has added in his statements that such a settlement would have to include the return of all ter-

ritories occupied by Israel in 1967.

Mr. Sadat has also been stressing the sorry state of the economy and Egypt's dependence on American, Western European and Arab investment.

At the other end of the scale are the Palestinian leaders, including Yasir Arafat, who have been accusing Secretary of State Kissinger of duplicity. As they see it, the United States is not interested in real peace—which, in their eyes, includes a Palestinian state—but simply wants to separate the Arab and Israeli armies and prevent a new war, prolonging the status quo and permitting Israel to keep most of the territories won in 1967.

India

Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI—India, once the largest recipient of American aid, is struggling to revive good relations with the United States after two years of bitterness and anger.

From India's point of view, the crux is American policy toward Pakistan. As long as the United States maintains its arms embargo against Pakistan, Indians say, relations will improve. They soured during the 1971 Bangladesh war, when the United States sided with Pakistan's unsuccessful effort to crush the autonomy movement in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh.

India's interest in spurring better relations is based on two interlocking factors.

One is the realization among officials that India, in economic disarray, needs American assistance. Discussions have taken place for a joint commission to strengthen economic, cultural and scientific ties.

A second factor is the concern here that India has become too dependent upon the Soviet Union and wants some balance in the form of closer relations with the United States. Indian officials say that the past pattern of a donor-recipient relationship is being replaced by a more mature link involving trade and commercial exchanges.

South Vietnam

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam—After a decade of utter dependence on American aid, the Government has refined the skill of Washington-watching into such an art that officials are somewhat jaded by the shifts in the Administration.

As a result officials note with confidence President Ford's record as a conservative and a hawk, and some even go so far as to suggest that he will be more beneficial to South Vietnam than was President Nixon because his relations with Congress are more amicable.

Congress has become the real source of worry for the Saigon Government these days, mainly due to sharp cuts in military aid voted in recent weeks. The Nixon Administration had asked for \$1.45-billion for this fiscal year; both houses voted \$700-

million.

Cambodia

Special to The New York Times

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia—The Government has always been worried that some day Washington might sharply reduce or withdraw its support—which would almost certainly mean victory for the Communist-led insurgents. This concern has been heightened with the advent of a President unknown to the leaders, who are seeking assurances that he will be as staunch in his backing as was his predecessor.

In the course of the four-and-a-half-year war the Government of President Lon Nol has become more and more isolated, its supporters dwindling, its United Nations seat threatened by the claim of the exiled leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Should Phnom Penh lose its seat when the General Assembly convenes next month, the process of demoralization and isolation would be intensified. The army could go on fighting only if American aid was close to its present level, which is more than \$600-million a year. Military aid represents nearly \$400-million of this, four-fifths of which goes not for stockpiling or for new heavy weapons but merely for the daily expenditure of ammunition.

Japan and Korea

Special to The New York Times

TOKYO—In Japan the immediate concern about the Ford Administration is that no one here knows much about the new President. Equally important from the point of view of senior Japanese officials, President Ford doesn't know much about Japan.

This lack of a personal and political connection with Mr. Ford takes on special importance here since personal relationships, even among national leaders, is vital in the Japanese scheme of things.

Thus, Premier Kakuei Tanaka indicated, immediately after the new President took office, that he wanted to go to Washington to meet Mr. Ford. The meeting is now scheduled for Sept. 21, while Mr. Tanaka is in the Western Hemisphere on a trip to Mexico, Brazil and Canada.

In addition, Mr. Ford is planning to visit Japan, probably between the November elections and Thanksgiving. If he does, he will be the first President ever to have visited Japan while in office. A planned state visit by President Eisenhower in 1960 was cancelled because of anti-American leftist riots.

The great policy issues of the Nixon era have either been resolved—Vietnam, trade, textiles—or are dormant—China, the Nixon Doctrine, the security treaty, monetary reform.

On China, Japanese policy is basically working in the same direction as American policy, only faster and unencumbered

by security considerations such as those arising from the United States's defense treaty with Taiwan. On security, the Japanese Left constantly tries to overturn Japan's alliance with the United States but is not making significant headway.

Japan's conservative politicians and businessmen are expected to use the occasion of the Ford visit to test him for isolationist and protectionist attitudes, and to try to dissuade him from such policies if they detect signs of them.

Across the narrow Strait of Tsushima, the South Korean Government has started to worry about President Ford and the United States commitment to Korean defense. Mr. Ford recently issued a statement expressing concern over President Park Chung Hee's jailing of Koreans for political reasons.

In addition, Congress has indicated that it may cut military aid to Korea. Congressmen have criticized Korea's alleged disregard for human rights and prominent American scholars have called for a reduction in the 38,000 United States troops there. Some Christian leaders, seeing fellow Christians in Korea jailed for their political beliefs, have protested to their Congressmen, although other American Christian leaders have defended President Park's repressive policies.

China

HONG KONG—The recent personal letter from Premier Chou En-lai to President Ford is believed to reflect China's desire to establish good relations with the new Administration. And the visit to China by a bipartisan congressional delegation led by Senator J. W. Fulbright is interpreted here as evidence that contacts begun during the Nixon Administration will be maintained.

From Peking's point of view at least, its main problem with the United States remains the Taiwan issue, which "is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations," in the words of the 1972 communiqué at the end of Mr. Nixon's visit.

Though the United States has reduced its military presence in Taiwan, China was annoyed by the recent appointment of Leonard Unger as Ambassador in Taipei and by the opening of Chinese Nationalist consulates in Atlanta, Kansas City and Portland, Ore.

China, which sees the Soviet Union as its main foe, is not in confrontation with the United States anywhere, though serious differences remain over such issues as Indochina, the Middle East, the rights of coastal states and liberation movements in the third world.

Latin America

Special to The New York Times

LIMA, Peru—"What Latin America wants from the United States is a real policy of cooperation to facilitate development," a Peruvian statesman,

NEW YORK TIMES
24 August 1974

The Opium Of the People

By C. L. Sulzberger

KONYA, Turkey—The opium of the people in Turkey is not religion but politics or, put another way, opium is the politics of the people in terms of an agitated argument with the United States that is not adequately understood by either side.

Premier Bulent Ecevit assured me that "the Turkish Government is not emotional on this but in the areas where it is grown, the entire peasant economy depends on the poppy. Therefore the curb imposed in 1971 stirred up psychological reaction. Opium areas have been reduced by natural process from 42 to seven provinces and will be reduced further as new livelihoods appear. We will do what we can to control illegal traffic but world medicine needs more or less, opium."

Poppy growers depend not only on the sap from which the drug derives but also on flour, fuel and oil extracted from the plant. And the Anatolian peasant is sometimes at the lowest subsistence level. Prof. Ragip Uner, an expert, says: "In Turkey there are still people who live in caves and burn oil lamps."

The United States pledged \$35 million three years ago when a ban was announced by Turkey in accord with Washington. Nevertheless, the government of Konya Province, which now resumes cultivation on a small scale, says the money was slow in reaching actual growers. Substitute crops weren't swiftly introduced and peasants found themselves idle. This became a psychological problem.

The Turks make surprisingly little out of opium. Between 1967 and 1971 the annual crop ranged between 120 and 350 metric tons. (It takes ten metric tons of opium to make one metric ton of heroin.) The grower here was getting perhaps \$75 a kilogram for raw opium gum and now might receive roughly \$200. But the retail price of heroin, smuggled out of this country, processed, then sold in New York, is about \$400,000 a kilogram.

It isn't the farmer who got the vast differential, but the crook. The moon-shining peasant holds back a minor share of his crop from the Government purchasing agency, sells it to a local bootlegger who sneaks it along to

refiners and transporters elsewhere. Although this country grows far fewer poppies than India, it is said 80 per cent of U.S. heroin derives from Turkish gum.

On June 30, 1971, Premier Nihat Erim (whose Government was put in by the military) prohibited opium production. He said: "Illicit traffic from our country has become very distressing"; Turkey had been "unable to prevent smuggling"; and "we cannot allow Turkey's supreme interests and the prestige of our nation to be further shaken."

But politics got into the question as full democracy returned. The minority Ecevit Government is based on a coalition. The vote of the poppy growers was needed and all parties courted it. Were an election to be held now, in the wake of the Cyprus landing, Mr. Ecevit would win by a landslide. But the ban was rescinded July 1, just before Cyprus exploded.

Politicians argued that farmers were being oppressed, that there was a world shortage of medicinal opium, that the U.S. was turning to India as a source, that anyway America had no right to boss Turkey. Professor Uner writes: "No other country has any right to dictate what we have to cultivate or not to cultivate." But he acknowledges that Turkish opinion doesn't realize the "hysteria" in the United States prompted by drug addiction.

American politics is also involved. The United States Congress, influenced by exaggerated statistics, felt its own Government wasn't doing enough. To propitiate Congress, American Ambassador Macomber was withdrawn from Ankara right after the restoration of poppy-farming. Mr. Macomber had to fly back out of the opium frying pan into the Cyprus fire.

There has been inadequate understanding on both sides. Americans cannot grasp the misery of impoverished poppy farmers—or the significance of their vote. Turks cannot even imagine the horrors of mass addiction among American youth. It is certainly imperative that smuggling here (which Mr. Erim admitted was "impossible to prevent") be curbed and that the criminal chain from farmer to addict be broken.

But it would be well for both nations to remember the tolerance of Mevlana, a thirteenth-century philosopher-poet who founded the whirling dervish order here and counseled the fanatical medieval world: "Our center is not one of despair. Even if you have violated your vows a hundred times, come again." The word "try" should be substituted for "come."

Carlos Garcia Bedoya, said recently, emphasizing that this did not exist, despite "formal expressions of goodwill."

Peru's left-wing military Government has settled the most urgent problems of compensation for expropriated United States property, but it would like to see the abolition of threatening legislation such as the provision for cutting off aid to countries that expropriate American property without compensation.

Brazil is concerned over increasing United States protectionism in fields such as the shoe industry. Brazil and Columbia are demanding fair prices for such commodities as coffee and Argentina would like to see meat quotas lifted. Panama and other Central American countries are seeking to raise the price of bananas.

Venezuela is concerned over how to take over the United States oil companies while keeping the door open to capital and technology where they are needed. Chile is worried about increased opposition in the United States Congress to aid and loans.

Mexico's most urgent problem is restriction against migrant workers, which cause constant tension. The Mexican Government is also troubled by recent revelations that the Central Intelligence Agency penetrated the administration.

Canada

Special to The New York Times

OTTAWA—Both Canadians and Americans in Ottawa are hopeful that the political changes here and in Washington in recent weeks, by introducing a new outlook, will provide a more favorable climate for mutual efforts toward settlement of numerous nagging problems.

Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, no longer dependent upon left-wing support since the Liberal party's surprising victory in the election July 8, can take on external issues with a stronger hand. He is expected to meet President Ford in Washington some time this fall, but no date has been set nor is there any indication of changes in Canadian policy on long-standing issues.

An indication of the trend may emerge from the current negotiations between American and Canadian diplomatic teams on Canadian objections to a projected dam in North Dakota that threatens to cause pollution of the Souris River in Manitoba. Canada has asked for a moratorium on construction pending environmental studies.

A long list of issues includes American concern over a Canadian quota on United States beef, special taxes on fuel exports that make Canadian oil expensive for American consumers and the cutting of commercials from United States television programs rebroadcast in Canada.

Eastern Europe

WASHINGTON POST
03 September 1974

Victor Zorza

'Wishful Coexistence'

The Kremlin is developing a blind spot where President Ford is concerned, much like the blind spot that caused it to miss the real significance of Watergate.

Because Moscow was committed to Mr. Nixon and saw him as the embodiment of detente, it wanted him to stay in power and refused to believe that he might have to go. In Mr. Ford's case, the same kind of wishful thinking in the Kremlin is causing the Soviet press to play down the sharp edge which shows every now and again in the new administration's pronouncements about the need for big defense buildups and major expenditure on them.

The Soviet press mildly remarked, with some delay, on Ford's "regrettable inaccuracy" in saying that the Soviet Union had naval bases in the Indian Ocean, but all the emphasis in Moscow is on Ford's commitment to Nixon's detente policy, on the continuity represented by Kissinger's control of foreign policy. Pravda observes with delight that Ford sees Kissinger first thing every morning, while such hawks as Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and CIA Director William Colby have to await a summons.

It is not naive to think that causes Moscow to see only what it wants to see in Ford, but a deliberate tactic. There was a time when Moscow assumed that the "imperialists" always had the worst intentions and, in preparing to counter them, it brought on the very actions it feared. So, for that matter, did the West bring out the worst in Moscow. Now, by ascribing only good intentions to Ford, by granting him the presumption of innocence, the Kremlin is trying to make the wish the

father to the thought which begets the action. It is all part of the new pattern of what is wrongly described as peaceful coexistence. Wishful coexistence would be a better term. Do unto others as you would have them do unto you—and they will respond accordingly.

But there is another aspect of foreign policy making in Washington to which Moscow has drawn attention from time to time—the "zigzags" which make the White House veer this way and that, blow hot and cold on detente, usually for reasons of domestic politics which have little or nothing to do with foreign policy. The Moscow theory has it that the zigzags, often due to electoral considerations, will make a President take a harsher stance toward the Soviet Union than he might otherwise wish.

Those who take the zigzag view of presidential motivation have warned in the past that the Kremlin cannot just take a new wave of harshness lying down, that it must respond accordingly, and that the mutual buildup of suspicion and hostility could play havoc with detente. The Soviet practitioners of wishful coexistence have now banished any such forebodings from the pages of Pravda. But this does not mean that Moscow's zigzag school of thought has been banished to Siberia—only that its spokesmen, temporarily out of favor, have been told to keep quiet.

If Moscow's surface view of the Ford presidency could be stripped away, it would probably disclose a tangle of contradictions and fears about the future far more intense than the simple-minded confidence it presents in public. An attempt to reconstruct what is

underneath, based on past patterns of Kremlin thought and of Kremlinological evidence, would reveal the uncertainty about Ford which is glossed over by the press.

The Kremlin presumably knows as well as most of us how unpredictable the vagaries of the American electoral process are. But it has to draw up foreign policy plans for the future, and it has to make certain assumptions about it. One scenario obviously favored by at least some people in Moscow is a 1976 election fight between what the Soviet press represents as the forces of darkness and evil, led by Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), and what must inevitably appear against this somber background as the forces of light, led by President Ford.

This in itself would provide Moscow with very good reasons to give Mr. Ford the benefit of any doubts it might have, as the Soviet press is now doing. But as Watergate must have taught Moscow, the straight projection of U.S. trends into the future is a thankless task, and some of its experts must now be busy drawing up alternative scenarios.

Moscow would obviously want to help Ford against Jackson, and this is something that Kissinger could use to good advantage in the negotiations that lie ahead. But some Soviet leaders feel that Brezhnev has already made too many concessions to Nixon in the past three summits, and that it is high time the White House started paying back. The coming negotiations could be tougher than any in the past.

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MOSCOW PRAISES FORD LEADERSHIP

Pravda Gives Assessment
of His First 2 Weeks

Special to The New York Times
MOSCOW, Aug. 22 — The Communist party newspaper Pravda today made an optimistic assessment of President Ford's first two weeks in office, suggesting that initial Soviet nervousness over Mr. Nixon's sudden departure was rapidly being assuaged.

Pravda noted that Mr. Ford

was hard at work to solve the problem of inflation, which, the newspaper said, had reached "catastrophic magnitude" under Mr. Nixon.

While there has been no hesitancy about focusing on American problems, the Soviet press had been careful not to link the former President with them by name.

But today's article indicated that the immunity from criticism that Mr. Nixon had enjoyed by virtue of his relationship with the Soviet leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, had been pragmatically set aside, although the Soviet press has still not released the full details of the Watergate affair.

The article, which was written by Pravda's Washington

correspondent, Boris Strelnikov, painted a cautiously bright future for Soviet-American relations under President Ford, with an allusion to the trade legislation pending in Congress.

In assessing President Ford's first days in office, Pravda said he was trying "to raise at least some barriers in the way of inflation which began under the Kennedy Administration, intensified during Johnson's rule, and assumed catastrophic magnitude under Nixon."

While saying that Mr. Ford was spending "nearly half" his time on the inflation problem, the newspaper also stressed that he was devoting "much time" to foreign affairs.

BALTIMORE SUN
1 September 1974

Free emigration is essential to broad, meaningful detente

By JACK FRUCHTMAN, JR.

Twenty-two years ago on a warm August night, Soviet secret police agents executed 24 Jewish writers, poets, actors and intellectuals in the basement of Moscow's notorious Lubyanka Prison. At that moment, Joseph Stalin's drive to eradicate Jewish life and culture from the Soviet Union attained its ugliest expression through ultimate terror.

To this day, the Kremlin has maintained its original death sentence on Jewish identification and tradition, even if it has ceased executing Jews outright.

And yet, Jewish cultural identification and ethnic consciousness flourish today in the Soviet Union, although much of their expression is private and relegated to the underground. Jews study Jewish history, read Jewish literature, write, paint, dance and compose in a Jewish idiom even when prohibited. They study the Hebrew language in secret classes, because the study of Hebrew is specifically proscribed.

A new generation of Jews bound to their tradition has evolved in the Soviet Union, a generation steadfast in its will to survive and motivated actually by the oppressive atmosphere created by the Soviet government. And yet, survival there as a Jewish community has become almost an unbearable effort.

Thus, since 1971 the struggle for Jewish rights in the Soviet Union has become synonymous with the principle of free emigration. The only alternative for many identifying Jews is to go to a place where they can give full and complete expression to their Jewishness.

As a result, attention has inevitably focused in the United States on the Trade Reform Act of 1973, Section 402, commonly known as the Jackson amendment, which denies credits and most-favored-nation status to any nation with a restrictive emigration policy.

Opponents of the Jackson amendment believe it would drastically interfere with the growing U.S.-Soviet detente. Its supporters, on the other hand, have felt that a viable, meaningful detente provides for the accrual of benefits for both sides. Unilateral concessions—in this case billions of dollars in foreign trade to the Soviet Union with nothing in return—cannot achieve an authentic detente.

While it is true that Jewish emigration greatly increased from the Soviet Union in 1972 and 1973, the decline of those permitted to leave this year demonstrates what can occur when emigration is not free despite the mutually professed spirit of detente. In 1972 and 1973, almost 33,000 Jews each year were

granted exit visas. To date in 1974, that number has declined about 35 per cent. At the current rate, no more than 22,000 will be allowed to leave by the end of this year.

Moreover, since Soviet officials have arbitrarily chosen who shall go and who shall stay, most of those recently granted visas have come from the Soviet heartland, not from the major urban areas. They are less educated and less professionally trained than their more sophisticated urban brethren.

In recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on multinational corporations, Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia University spoke of two kinds of detente. He distinguished the rather comprehensive American view from the more narrow Soviet idea based on a continuing ideological struggle with the West. The Soviet view of detente is limited and expedient to the extent that it is aimed solely toward the achievement of tangible economic benefits.

By contrast, Mr. Brzezinski said, the broader American view is not "artificially compartmentalized to economics alone." Included in this genuine version of detente is a possible social, political and cultural accommodation which could lead to closer social links between the two great nations.

The American view would have, according to Mr. Brzezinski, an obvious impact on the current Soviet refusal to permit free emigration. Indeed, part of this vision of detente lies within the realm of the basic human right to leave one's country. Free emigration would precipitate no changes in the Soviet sociopolitical system.

The Jackson amendment is a means toward the attainment of this broader view of detente. Professor Brzezinski stressed that the denial of free emigration is not an internal Soviet domestic matter, even if many Americans have a direct and highly personalized concern for those in the Soviet Union who want to leave. Deploring the possibility that the right of free emigration would not be included in the detente agenda, Mr. Brzezinski concluded that "given this country's traditions, the adoption of a posture of amorality is to give up something very precious, something which should not be given up lightly."

It is important to recall that the United States has on several occasions displayed concern for oppressed minorities abroad. Throughout the past century alone, there have been both congressional and presidential initiatives on behalf of Russian Jewish rights. President William Howard Taft in December, 1911, abrogated a commercial treaty with Russia, for example, under pressure from public opinion and a unanimous Congress after reports of mistreatment of Jews there.

Moreover, the right and opportunity to emigrate is a transnational concept, pointedly expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and generally recognized in international law. The Soviet Union, as a signator of the Universal Declaration as well as of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, has violated the provisions in these documents which specify the right to leave one's country.

There are, therefore, both an accepted norm embodied in international conventions which encourages transnational concern for the right of free emigration and a long American tradition of tangible action on behalf of human rights through the exercise of American diplomatic and economic influence.

Thus, a rationale exists for the Jackson amendment which may not have been made clear to the American people. Support of the Jackson amendment need not mean that one has to be opposed to detente, but support of a broad, meaningful detente would logically require support of the amendment.

It is through the implementation of the right of free emigration, then, that Soviet Jews hope to act out their Jewish consciousness. Those 24 poets and intellectuals murdered in 1952 represented the leadership of Jewish thought and letters, and they posed a major threat to the Stalinist goal of liquidating Jewish culture. The murder of the 24 was a result of Stalin's creation of a Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in 1942 when a number of Jewish intellectuals, all of whom regarded themselves as Soviet patriots, were recruited to generate wartime support by Jews in the West for the Soviet struggle against Nazi Germany.

Little did these Soviet emissaries suspect Soviet duplicity. On its return after the war, when its services were no longer needed, the committee was disbanded, and all its members arrested. The assimilated Jewish Communist and publicist, Ilya Ehrenburg, was later to write in *Prawda*, the Soviet Communist party newspaper, that Soviet Jews' associating with Jews in other countries were demonstratively disloyal Soviet citizens. His words marked the death-knell of hundreds of Jewish artists, musicians, poets, writers, and government and party officials who disappeared in the winter of 1948-1949.

Jewish survival in the Soviet Union has been accomplished over the past 22 years against all odds. Deprived of the cream of Jewish artists, writers and other intellectuals and in the face of almost daily attempts to halt Jewish self-expression, the Soviet Jewish community refuses to wither and die. The United States' obligation in its strife for detente is to stand on principle and not simply gross material gain, mirroring

Mr. Fruchtmann is executive director of the Baltimore Committee for Soviet Jewry, a standing committee of the Baltimore Jewish Council.

the Soviet goal.

The United States must reach out to all oppressed groups in the Soviet Union at a time when U.S.-Soviet relations have never been closer in more than 30 years and insist that these groups possess

the right to go where they can give full expression to their culture and tradition. In this way, U.S.-Soviet detente will be elevated to a high moral plane, and all Americans will be proud of their nation's reaffirmation of a basic human right.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 August 1974

Sea power: U.S. vs. U.S.S.R.

By Richard Burt
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

London

The publication this week of the 1974-75 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships has revived the lively but complex debate over the relative strengths of the U.S. and Soviet navies.

Echoing the repeated claims of former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt, the editors of Jane's state that the Soviet Union has achieved substantial supremacy in a variety of areas of naval weaponry, and has begun to challenge the United States in others.

Writing that the U.S. Navy is "in the van of navies subjected to misinformed, illogical, and irrational attacks by those who depend upon it most," the editors said that the Soviet Navy enjoys a major numerical edge in submarines and heavy cruisers and "leads the world in seaborne missile armament, both strategic and tactical, both ship and submarine-launched."

In the strategic area, the Soviets have launched over 60 ballistic missile submarines, including the new Delta-class boat which is capable of launching 12 missiles with a range of 4,600 miles. With this range, the editors note that the Delta-class subs will be able to strike targets in the United States from protected waters near Soviet shores.

The United States now possesses 41 missile-launching submarines with 3,600-mile range missiles. The first of 10 new Trident submarines equipped with 4,600-mile range missiles will not be ready until 1978-79.

In the tactical area, the Soviet Union is given a major lead in cruise missiles, a technology area that U.S. officials admit has not been fully exploited by the Navy. Deployed aboard both submarines and surface vessels, the Soviet missiles are at present viewed as the primary threat to the U.S. carrier force.

The Soviet Navy is also given high marks in surface vessels, where its fleet of cruisers outnumber the U.S. force 34 to 6. Included in this figure are the Soviet Navy's new Kara and Kresta-class ships, which are described as the fastest and most heavily armed heavy combatants in the world.

One of the few areas in the surface vessel category where the editors still give the U.S. Navy a clear lead is aircraft carriers, where the present force of 14 stands unchallenged. However, they warn, with one carrier now undergoing sea trials and another being constructed, the Soviets could challenge U.S. carrier supremacy in the 1980's.

Few naval analysts doubt the editors claim that the Soviet fleet "is a very powerful fighting force." But numerous experts emphasize the difficulty of comparing the two forces.

Thus, while the Soviet Navy enjoys an advantage in number of ships, U.S. naval vessels, on the average, tend to be larger and more capable. In fact, it is estimated that the total tonnage of U.S. naval vessels is twice that of the Soviet fleet.

In terms of individual vessels, the U.S. Navy is also generally given an edge. While the Soviets have deployed sophisticated ships such as the Kara-class cruisers, most U.S. vessels are believed to be three to four times

more effective than their Soviet counterparts, possessing greater endurance and flexibility.

Analysts also note an important difference between how the two fleets are deployed. Possessing a true "blue water" capability the U.S. Navy continuously deploys large forces throughout the world and possesses a wealth of experience in maintaining ships at sea for long periods of time.

Defensive force

Despite Soviet forays into the South Atlantic and naval visits to Africa and South America, analysts argue that the Soviet Navy has yet to master a strategy of "forward naval deployment" and is still viewed by the Kremlin as a defensive force to protect the Soviet homeland from attack.

The U.S. Navy and its supporters, however, have seized on these deployment differences to argue that U.S. forces must possess superiority over the Soviet Fleet. While the United States, they argue, must maintain the freedom of the seas to ensure a secure supply of strategic commodities or to project force in areas such as the Middle East, the Soviet Union only needs to disrupt the sea lanes to achieve its objectives.

This view was recently questioned by Michael McGwire, a retired Royal

WASHINGTON POST
24 August 1974

Violinist in Concert

MOSCOW — Violinist Georgi Yermolenko, who caused Australian unionists to think he was being dragged back to the Soviet Union after seeking asylum in Perth, appeared on Soviet television to say that his goal now is to enter the Moscow Conservatory.

Yermolenko, 19, sat smiling while Soviet composer Dmitri Kabalevsky, who had accompanied him on the Australian tour, described the "four days of nightmare" until the unionist let the Soviet artists depart by plane.

"Georgi, you are smiling now, but it was not a smiling matter in those days, which we recall now with contempt and horror," said Kabalevsky on the TV show after the evening news.

Navy commander now teaching at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Canada. Arguing that Soviet naval deployment is still defensive in nature, Commander McGwire says that the Soviet Navy does not yet have the capability for large-strength, distant deployments. Moreover, he notes that "becoming a super power has not changed Russia's geographical position, with all its disadvantages in terms of deploying maritime force."

Commander McGwire also criticizes Western "prophets of doom" for delivering a major propaganda success to the Kremlin for exaggerating Soviet naval capability. "Naturally enough," Commander McGwire says, "the Soviet Union welcomes the Western amplifier which is now plugged into her naval propaganda machine, whose authoritative voice helps to compensate for the sometimes glaring shortfall between her words and deeds."

Western Europe

NEW YORK TIMES
27 August 1974

How to Lose an Ally

By Graham Hovey

Secretary of State Kissinger still seems oblivious to the dimensions of the disaster sustained by United States foreign policy in the Cyprus tragedy and insensitive to the hurt of people who feel let down by Washington.

How else explain his ill-timed offer to mediate the Cyprus crisis and his bland invitation to a harried Greek Premier to come to Washington to talk things over—at a time when Turkey was grabbing the northern third of Cyprus and drawing only a wrist tap from the State Department?

Did Mr. Kissinger really believe that Greece's Premier Caramanlis or Foreign Minister Mavros could accept a summons to Washington at that point and survive? As former United States Under Secretary of State George Ball said, the Kissinger mediation offer in that context exhibited "an insensitivity beyond belief."

And at whom was Mr. Kissinger aiming his warning of last week that "a foreign government must not expect that every time there is a crisis, the Secretary of State will come rushing into the area and spend all his time settling that particular crisis?" Was anyone asking for what he grandly calls "the personal shuttle diplomacy of the Secretary of State?"

Mr. Kissinger did promise that in any negotiation, Washington would "take into full account Greek honor and dignity," but he felt it necessary to add a warning that this country would "not be pressured by threat of withdrawal from the [NATO] alliance" nor by unjustified anti-American demonstrations.

But the Secretary surely misreads

the political signals from Athens if he regards the pullout of Greek forces from NATO and the anti-American demonstrations merely as ploys by the Caramanlis Government, rather than reflections of utter disillusionment with an alliance and a superpower ally that could not prevent Turkey's blitz and Greece's humiliation on Cyprus.

In fact, Mr. Kissinger's trouble from the onset of the Cyprus crisis has been a lack, in dealing with allies, of the sensitivity that was an ingredient of his success in the Middle East and Vietnam negotiations, as well as in the initiatives that led to President Nixon's visits to China and the Soviet Union.

The United States is not omnipotent and, as Mr. Kissinger reminds us, cannot stop "every local war between smaller nations." No one can prove that any feasible Washington effort this time would have halted Turkey's invasion of Cyprus.

One is forced to recall, however, that President Johnson twice got Turkey to call off a scheduled invasion of Cyprus: in 1964, with a tough letter to Premier Inonu; in 1967, through a skillful, even-handed negotiating job by envoy Cyrus Vance.

Once a shaky military regime in Athens had staged a putsch against President Makarios, clearly aimed at enosis—the union of Cyprus with Greece—there was only one way to prevent Turkish intervention: to demonstrate that Greece would not be allowed to get by with it. Washington could have made the point by backing Britain in refusing to recognize the new Cyprus regime and in demanding that Athens recall the Greek officers who had directed the coup.

Instead, the United States gave Tur-

key and the world every reason to believe it accepted the coup. Washington refused to pin responsibility for it on the Greek dictatorship and even hinted that on Cyprus it preferred the swaggering murderer, Nikos Sampson, to the devious Makarios.

Turkey's initial invasion of July 20 was the inevitable result. This at least accomplished the salutary secondary results of blasting out of power both Sampson and the Athens junta. At that point the imperative was to persuade Turkey to go no further.

Ankara had made its point: it would not accept enosis and it intended at any cost to protect the Turkish Cypriote minority. The Turks could now negotiate from strength. They could expect American and British backing for constitutional revisions to give the Turkish Cypriotes a large measure of autonomy.

But the invasion had been heady wine for Turkey and Washington again seemed to blow a timid trumpet. At the showdown in Geneva, Turkey presented a drastic plan for division of Cyprus as an ultimatum, refusing to give the Greeks and Greek Cypriotes even a 36-hour recess to consult.

Turkey's blitz killed hundreds, displaced some 200,000, sowed new seeds for protracted intercommunity strife, provoked Greece into pulling its forces out of NATO, and increased instability in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. It also dealt a heavy blow at United States credibility and the reputation of Henry A. Kissinger. More's the pity that he seems not to understand why.

Graham Hovey is a member of the Editorial Board of The Times.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
23 August 1974

The Risk of America's Role as a World Umpire

BY MAX LERNER

NEW YORK CITY—In years ahead there will be other outbursts of anti-Americanism around the world, like the one in Nicosia where American Ambassador Rodger P. Davies was cut down by gunfire in a confused mob attack on the embassy. Americans have become the inevitable targets for national and sectarian rages the world over. To be an American envoy in a world trouble area—let us face it—is to hold down one of the high-risk jobs of our time.

As an infrequent visitor at the senior seminar of the State Department where envoys return for refresher studies, I have come to know some of these men and to respect their courage on the firing line.

They are no CIA agents involved in covert operations but ambassadors reporting to Washington and carrying out decisions reached there. They may be innocent of the decisions for which they are held responsible, but they offer a natural target for these cruel symbolic slayings.

In Athens, too, where many of the young are in the camp of the recently returned leftist politician, Andreas Papandreu, there are banners with the inscription, "Kissinger Killer." Nor is Athens alone.

It may be true that in the early phase of the Cyprus crisis there was a Kissinger tilt toward the Turks. But if their military fortunes had gone differently, who can doubt that the "Kissinger Killer" banners would be raised by enraged Left Nationalist youth not in Athens but Ankara?

The anti-Americanism in the world today differs sharply from that of the '40s through the '60s. It is not a decadent and scorned American capitalism that is attacked, as in the '40s, nor the American "cold war mentality," as in the '50s, nor the imperialist interventions in insurgent situations, as in the '60s.

When the new anti-Americanism is not directed against the multinational corporations or the CIA—the two still favorite targets—it is directed against America as the arbiter of the world's quarrels.

That is part of the price America will have to pay for the Kissinger era in diplomacy and for the world image which Kissinger has achieved as mediator, especially in his shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East.

The new anti-Americanism can be put in a single simple, earthy Americanism: "Kill the umpire!" Surely that is better than "Kill the intervener" or "Kill the cold warriors" or "Kill the fascist imperialists." But how did the United States become such a target?

Mainly it is because the world has run into a shortage of arbitrators. The United Nations tries to do its best as umpire, but it

is largely without power and is just starting to build its authority. The Russians are not trusted. The Chinese—and the Indians also—are too involved in their inner power struggles. NATO has the wrong setup for umpiring. Only the United States is left to function, well or badly, in this vacuum.

In a way it is a form of left-handed tribute, both to Kissinger and to the United States, to declaim and protest against their role. It implies that they have more power than the facts probably warrant, and that the arbitrating role is actually theirs, even if wrongly used.

Kissinger has explicitly offered his mediation efforts to the Greeks and Turks. But it would be a dangerous mistake to believe, whether abroad or in the United States, that America must right every wrong, redress every grievance, heal every injury, balance out every inequality that occurs in the world.

It was stupid for America to try to be the world's policeman. It is dangerous to try to be the world's umpire.

It is absurd. Yet for the moment there is no one and nothing else to fill the role.

WASHINGTON POST
28 August 1974

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

A Greek Military Scandal

Blatant misuse of American military aid by the ousted Greek military dictatorship, which probably caused the junta's fatal inaction in the Cyprus crisis, is about to be exposed in a major international scandal—threatening the permanent end of U.S. military aid to Greece and widening the dangerous Washington-Athens breach.

This scandal, a closely-held secret within the new civilian government of Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis (which had nothing whatever to do with it) may help explain the sudden collapse of the military junta following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. Turkey's move was triggered by the Greek junta's overthrow of Archbishop Makarios as President of Cyprus on July 15.

Karamanlis and his top aides, including Foreign Minister George Mavros, are convinced the junta was preparing military operations across the Turkish border in Thrace immediately following Turkey's decision to intervene militarily on Cyprus. But when the junta mobilized the Greek reserves, military stores of U.S. aid—rifles, ammunition, boots, machine guns and rockets—were discovered to be totally inadequate. Crates of the American M-16 rifle, for one example, were found to contain one or two layers of rifles on the top, with rocks, wood and other filler material hidden underneath.

The discovery of this shocking shortfall of arms and equipment was the final nail in the coffin of the junta, already under heavy political pressure for its stumbling Cyprus adventure.

The full extent of the disappearance of American arms aid is still not

known. Some well-informed experts on the outrages perpetrated by seven years of Greek military rule believe that arms were sold for cash to foreign countries, possibly black Africa, behind the backs of regular military commanders.

But wholly apart from the devastating impact on the junta itself, the discovery of the shortfall raises profound questions about Greece's military defenses in her role as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Karamanlis, pressured by the Turkish Cyprus invasion into an anti-American posture, withdrew Greece from the military arm of NATO two weeks ago.

High officials here are unaware of the Karamanlis-Mavros investigation which revealed the junta's inability to mobilize the Greek reserve. That investigation is now centered on three major military depots: Attica, the site in the Athens-Piraeus area of major Greek military installations; Larissa, in central Greece, the headquarters of the First Army; and Salonika, Greece's second city and the headquarters of the Third Army corps.

Although administration officials are in the dark, key members of four congressional committees—the Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees of both Senate and House—have been apprised of the scandal by Elias Demetracopoulos, the best-informed anti-junta Greek exile here the past seven years. He recently returned to Washington from high-level talks in Geneva with officials of the Karamanlis government.

Key congressional committee members, including one senator who supported U.S. military aid to Greece even during the military dictatorship, will soon demand a complete investigation by the General Accounting Office (GAO), congressional watchdog over government spending.

The results of that probe could be dynamite. In 1971, Rep. Wayne Hays of Ohio pushed through Congress a ban on U.S. military grant aid to Greece. Only last week Hays authored a bill to repeal that ban, on grounds that grant aid could be restored now that the colonels were gone.

But if the GAO probe shows that there really was wholesale abuse of American military aid, Congress will be most reluctant about new grant aid even to the respected civilian government of Karamanlis.

Even without the scandal, restoration of aid seems dubious considering the fact that Karamanlis bowed to anti-American sentiment by withdrawing from NATO's military organization and accepting Moscow's formula for a political settlement on Cyprus.

The impact of a finding by GAO that large amounts of American aid were pilfered or squandered would go far beyond Greece. It would radically advance the argument against foreign aid that is widespread in Congress and fanned by neo-isolationism. In this way too, the chickens of obsequious U.S. support for a clique of primitive Greek colonels are coming home to roost with a vengeance.

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ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
10 AUG 1974

Intervention Arm

Greek democrats have long complained that the Central Intelligence Agency was pulling the strings of the so-called colonels' dictatorship, before the military government was replaced recently. State Department officials have now confirmed that CIA agents subsidized politicians and bought votes in Parliament. The CIA, and not U.S. Ambassador Henry Tasca, dealt directly with the Greek junta's strong man, Brig. Gen. Dimitrios Ioannidis, who ran the secret police.

Perhaps the State Department officials put out this information because they disliked being bypassed by the CIA, or because the department now wishes to repudiate complicity in the former dictatorship. The fact is that the American Government supported and manipulated the Greek military government through the CIA, as it has used the CIA to support secure right-wing regimes in other countries. And the Greek experience, like the Bay of Pigs, proved a disaster.

In 1963 former President Truman wrote, "I never had any thought that when I set up the CIA it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations." It was supposed to be

an intelligence-gathering agency. The work of intelligence can only be compromised by interventionist activities that have to be justified through the intelligence arm.

Still, the basic question is whether the United States should meddle in foreign governments, particularly in support of oppressive governments, in ways that are kept more secret from the American people than from foreign peoples who are victimized by the intervention. In Greece the CIA carried out a form of foreign policy that the State Department could not afford to acknowledge.

Despite frequent revelations of CIA paramilitary and political projects, usually after failures, Congress has done little to bring the agency into some form of public scrutiny and responsibility. The joint special CIA Oversight Committee itself led the Senate rejection last June of Senator Proxmire's proposal to make the CIA disclose the total amount of money it spends. So far congressional oversight has simply meant congressional approval. In view of the Greek exposure, how much longer will Congress wait to bring the CIA to reasonable account?

NEW YORK TIMES
28 August 1974

The Flotsam of the Storm

By C. L. Sulzberger

SPETS AIS, Greece—Right after announcing withdrawal of Greek armed forces from NATO, Premier Caramanlis overhauled the command of those forces, firing all top leaders associated with the previous junta and with the boomerang Cyprus coup that touched off Turkey's invasion. The odd thing is that the men now named to command have all been pro-NATO enthusiasts.

It will take months before Athens unscrambles its idea on relations with the Western alliance. So far it merely says it will emulate France, which pulled out troops but retained political membership. Greek studies claim General de Gaulle's experts analyzed the French-NATO problem four months before he moved—then gave the allies a year to evacuate. If that's an indication, it will be Christmas 1975 before anything irrevocable happens.

Neither the United States nor NATO earned any consistent kudos from Turkey or Greece during the Cyprus confrontation. Turkish Premier Ecevit initially told me it would be "difficult" for Turkey to continue in the alliance if Greek-Turkish problems weren't first solved. Later he thought Turkey could "fill up the gap" created by Greece's withdrawal.

Washington warned Greece and Turkey that they would be cut off from American arms supplies if they went to war. This particularly threatened Greece, which expects to get another squadron of F-4 Phantoms next month.

American diplomacy tried to be active. President Ford made his first foreign intervention by asking Turkey to do nothing that would "humiliate" Greece. Like dozens of other

Aegean; not much ripple. Secretary Kissinger's call to Premier Caramanlis weren't received with approbation or even respect. The United States is today widely disliked and mistrusted in Greece.

Moscow, for its part, made scant headway. The Turks resented a Soviet-launched rumor that 50,000 Russian troops were ready to help Ankara invade Cyprus. But Moscow, no slouch in these affairs, prompted its latest friend, Libya, to give Turkey minor air-force and financial aid and also applauded sprouting friendship between Ankara and Soviet-armed Syria.

Greece rightly saw in all this a Kremlin effort to bust up NATO—which Greece ended up doing itself. When Moscow suddenly shifted to a pro-Greek stance, there was little genuine enthusiasm. Meantime, Belgrade counseled Athens that since NATO couldn't protect its adherents, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus one non-aligned spokesman, Yugoslavia, should look after unattached lands like Cyprus. This suits Russia's present diplomacy.

Although both Greece and Turkey pride themselves on martial prowess, they each did badly in a military sense. The Greek mobilization was deplorable. Turkish paratroop drops in Cyprus were often far off target. An original Famagusta landing, scheduled to coincide with that at Kyrenia, had to be called off because it was so badly coordinated. The Turks bombed one of their destroyers, with heavy losses; the Greeks shot down one of their planes.

Washington, which has mishandled Turkey for almost as long before,

might be well advised to sponsor a joint United States-West German mission of distinguished generals to explain to the Turkish Army why it should keep its cool. The army remains Turkey's ultimate political force.

Gen. Lauris Norstad, former NATO boss, and Gen. Johann Von Kielmansegg, who commanded its central front, would be ideal for that purpose. America has much military prestige in Ankara but Germany's is of far greater duration.

Another thing. I hope Greece eventually reconsiders its promised expulsion of U.S. and NATO bases. But, in any event, there is too large an American military presence in both countries. The homeporting arrangement for our destroyers around Athens is useless; the carrier they were to protect won't receive similar facilities. The accord should be terminated. Likewise, too many little United States "facilities" are dotted around Turkey.

Washington's diplomacy must now work to tranquilize the Aegean and seek to help compose its disputes—while also trying to hang on to those few facilities crucial to NATO and to Western defense.

These still include the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey and the magnificent Suda Bay in Greece's island of Crete, a deep harbor that could easily hold the entire Sixth Fleet and includes massive ammunition and warhead installations. No Turkish port could substitute for Suda Bay.

These are primordial long-range goals we should be thinking of now with respect to this area. The short-range goal is more obvious: Keep our two partners (originally linked by us in the Truman Doctrine even before NATO existed) from permanently wrecking the alliance.

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Aug. 26, 1974

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Greece to Shut All Its NATO Bases

By Jack Anderson

Public statements to the contrary, Greece is already making plans to shut down every NATO base in the country within a year, thus leaving a gaping hole in the fabric of the Western world's defense systems.

So secret are the new Athens civilian government's plans that even top U. S. officials are unaware of the seriousness of the threat. Just a few days ago, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger was speaking honestly when he said he had "little indication" of such a move.

Our information, however, from high but confidential diplomatic sources who backed up their talk with documents, is that the NATO shutdown is already a matter of Athens policy, barring a radical change in the current U.S. attitude toward Cyprus.

The importance of the Greek NATO bases is difficult to overestimate. Naval, bomber, missile and communications facilities in Greece give NATO a striking power directly beneath the belly of Soviet Russia and her satellites.

At the same time that Greece was setting its course on NATO, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was assuring a private meeting with President Ford and Republican leaders that the U.S. policy on Cyprus is neutral.

"We have made major efforts to elicit concessions from both the Greeks and the Turks," he said, according to confidential minutes of the White House meeting. "We will take a new look if the Turks cross the cease-fire line."

The restive Republicans wondered why Kissinger had not simply halted aid to Turkey. Kissinger replied, according to the minutes, that this "would not have stopped the three-day occupation."

Indeed, Kissinger warned, such drastic action "Would have enormous consequences on NATO, Turkish nationalism and (the) possible approach to the Soviet Union." One "possible solution," Kissinger said, "may be a federalized republic or a Cantonal structure"—in short, a semi-partitioning of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey each controlling part of the island.

Added President Ford hopefully, "I think we'll come out all right as friends of both parties."

Kissinger also met privately with five congressmen of Greek descent who gave him a far more obstreperous going over than the Republican leaders. One of the Greek-American legislators who attended the off-the-record meeting told us they tore into Kissinger "in a manner to which he is unaccustomed."

The congressmen were Louis Bafalis, (R-Fla.), John Brademas

(D-Ind.), Peter Kyros, (D-Maine) Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.), and Gus Yatron (D-Pa.). At one point, they told Kissinger he was personally responsible for a "grievous policy. The U.S. has egg all over its face."

The strong-willed Kissinger was "patient" but "stuttered, reeled back and reddened" under the onslaught, we were told. At one point he left the meeting for a telephone conversation with Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit. But at the end of the meeting, Kissinger courteously invited the lawmakers to come back again.

Despite appearances of evenhandedness, we are told by high diplomatic sources that Kissinger tentatively and confidentially agreed in recent meetings with British Ambassador Peter Ramsbotham to a Cyprus plan drawn up in London.

To the distress of the Greeks, it would, in effect, chop Cyprus into Greek and Turkish enclaves. The Turks would make an ostentatious pull-back to a line running across the northern third of the island to pacify world opinion a move they had intended anyway.

When the plan was delicately put to deposed Cypriot president Archbishop Makarios in London by Britain's Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary James Calla-

ghan, the peppery Makarios was outraged, we were told.

In Athens, Greek leaders are also fuming. For years, they have gone along with almost every twist and turn in American policy, while the Turks have often refused to cooperate with Washington. A few weeks ago, for instance, Turkey defied the United States and resumed cultivation of opium.

Meanwhile, we have learned that Athens risked her good relations with the Arabs by secretly permitting the United States to use Greek NATO bases for shuttling supplies to Israel during the Middle East war last October. As a result, Israel is secretly grateful to Greece and hopes it will keep its NATO ties.

During the October War, Greece also allowed U.S. intelligence services to use a communications station outside Athens to monitor Soviet and Arab radio broadcasts. Turkey, on the other hand, reportedly permitted the Soviets to overfly her territory to deliver arms to the Arabs.

Footnote: At the State Department, a spokesman denied Greek bases were used by the United States to resupply Israel. He also said the British initiative was not yet "developed." It does not have any "arms or legs" yet, he said.

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BALTIMORE SUN

29 August 1974

Giscard's chiding of Ford ascribed to French desire for European unity

Paris Bureau of The Sun

Paris—American diplomats here were yesterday puzzled over the unexpected rebuke of President Ford delivered in a Tuesday night television speech by French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

The French criticism centered on Mr. Ford's failure to mention Europe during his major foreign policy speech after assuming the presidency.

President Giscard d'Estaing said he saw this as clearly indicating that Europe would have to look after its own affairs and went on to call a European summit meeting, expected at the end of November or early December.

Given the careful preparation of such nationally broadcast speeches, American diplomats assume there was some specific reason for the

gratuitous criticism of Mr. Ford.

The question they faced was whether it was simply directed to the French domestic audience—a sort of political sop to the traditional suspicions of United States intentions—or whether it had a more direct trans-Atlantic bearing.

The outcome of a morning's analysis appeared to be that not too much importance should be attached to the chiding comment as a signal of any serious setback to the recent cordiality between Washington and Paris.

Rather, it was assumed, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing was seizing on a topical issue—the change-over in American leadership—to bolster what has been his constant argument for increased European unity.

Officials involved in the U.S. analysis pointed out that the

French president also cited the Cyprus situation as illustrating the basic impotence of Europe in its present state to influence world events.

The same officials argued that there were many more obvious reasons for stressing the need for European co-operation—inflation and the energy crisis not the least of them—without looking either across the Atlantic or the Mediterranean for outside pretexts. But these outside events at least provided more immediacy.

It seems certain that, if nothing else, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing was restating his basic commitment to an independent Europe, which, while maintaining more flexible relations with America, would avoid any form of trans-Atlantic dominance.

Wednesday, Aug. 28, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

Bonn Starts Probe of Espionage

By Joe Alex Morris Jr.

Los Angeles Times

BONN, Aug. 27—Public hearings into West Germany's most sensational spy scandal opened here today with the government expressing determination to keep "the smell of Watergate" out of the proceedings.

A seven-man parliamentary commission is investigating the circumstances under which Guenter Guillaume managed to rise in 15 years from a supposed East German refugee to a position at former Chancellor Willy Brandt's elbow. Guillaume was arrested last May, and his exposure was the motivation for Brandt's dramatic resignation as head of the West German government.

A key subject in the parliamentary investigation is how Guillaume managed to get so far despite suspicions leveled against him by official and private intelligence bodies

concerned with Communist espionage.

This was not the immediate concern of the parliamentary committee, which will hear some 20 witnesses this week. The opening session was marked by partisan squabbles and a denial by an Interior Ministry official that there had been any government manipulation of documents.

Government witnesses also testified there had been nothing out of the ordinary in the procedures involved in Guillaume's employment, first as a junior member of Brandt's staff and later as one of his three personal advisers. But the committee has yet to go into the hotly disputed question of how Guillaume slipped through the security checks.

In a lengthy article on this subject, the respected Frankfurter Allgemeine newspaper said yesterday that it was clear that pressure from the Social Democratic Party had

overridden the hesitations of Bonn's security advisers. A key witness is expected to be former Gen. Gerhard Wessel, head of the Federal Intelligence Service.

At the time of Guillaume's appointment to the chancellor's office in 1970, Wessel said that the East German agents background should be more closely investigated because of the reports about him. the Frankfurter Allgemeine reported.

According to the paper, nothing was done other than to question Guillaume "in a naive and dilettantish way" and some officials who wanted to pursue the matter more intensively were told that the investigation was closed.

The pressure to close the investigation came both from the chancellor's office and from the Social Democratic Party, the paper said.

The doubts about Guillaume were traced back to a report in 1955 by the Investigative

Affair

Committee of Free Jurists, a private organization in West Berlin. At the time, Guillaume was employed by an East German publishing house, and the committee noted that his superiors there had reportedly been told by the Communist Party not to concern themselves with his frequent absences from his post.

Guillaume was making frequent trips to West Berlin and West Germany, where he aroused the committee's suspicion. The committee's report on him was handed to the West Berlin police and, according to the paper, later sent on to Bonn but in a watered down version.

NEW YORK TIMES

23 August 1974

View From the Rhine

By James Reston

BONN, Aug. 22—This capital of West Germany is outwardly as calm these days as an American university town in vacation time, but inwardly it is acutely worried about the world economy.

For while West Germany has the lowest inflation rate of any of the advanced industrial countries—about 7 per cent—it depends for its prosperity and relatively full employment on selling its goods abroad.

Compared to other European countries, it is in excellent shape. Though it still feels amputated with the loss of East Germany, its gross national product per capita is now almost double that of Great Britain.

As things now stand, West Germany exports as much to the Western world as the United States and imports almost as much from the Western world, but this trade accounts for about 23 per cent of West Germany's G.N.P., as compared to only about 5 per cent in the United States, which is therefore far more independent of the movements of the world markets.

Officials here are watching the new Ford Administration in Washington with the greatest care. For as they see it, a strong anti-inflation policy in the United States would mean lower prices for American goods, higher unemployment and therefore less U.S. demand for goods from Germany and other countries.

BONN

Since West Germany has led the world in combatting inflation, it is aware of the difficulty of arguing that other countries should do the same. But the point emphasized here is that the U.S. economy is five or six times as large as Germany's and that whatever the United States does greatly influences the world economy on which all industrial countries depend more than the U.S.

It is noted here that President Ford's main emphasis in his inaugural address to the Congress was on the need to fight inflation, and that he also spoke of the importance of world peace and order. But how far will he go, officials here ask, not only verbally but actually, on a deflationary policy? Will he look at it mainly from a U.S. point of view, or try to find the delicate balance between just enough anti-inflation to help the United States and not so much as to produce world-wide deflation?

The answer to this, of course, is that President Ford has been in office for only a few days, with a new Secretary of the Treasury, a new chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and a new world-minded Vice-Presidential nominee. Both the cast of characters and the mood of Washington are changing and nobody can be

will go.

Conversations with officials in Bonn and in other European capitals, however, demonstrate how difficult it is to generalize about America's relations with Europe, especially in the field of economics.

Each country is still looking primarily at its own problems. Thus Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium have had stronger anti-inflation policies than others on this continent. France, before the death of President Pompidou, was more concerned with the growth of her economy than with inflation, but under President Giscard is now taking a more deflationary line. Britain is in an alarming state, with grievous labor-management problems and an annual inflation rate of 20 per cent.

The members of the European Economic Community are talking more frankly to one another now about their common problems, and the relations between Chancellor Schmidt here and President Giscard in Paris are particularly good, but all leaders are still having trouble in reaching common policies to fit their quite different traditions and economic and political problems.

As the testimony of German officials here shows, however, Europe, no matter how much she may worry about the power of the United States, cannot insulate herself from that power economically or financially any more than she can militarily.

Europe's papers are now full of biographies of the new men in Washington and speculation on what line they will

take toward wages and prices. For while the U.S. now has 5.3 per cent unemployment and West Germany only 2.3 per cent, unemployment here is seen as a greater menace to the stability of the West German Government than it is to the Ford Administration.

"The only trouble with U.S.-Euro-

pean relations," the late Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen once said, "is that America is just too damn big and strong. We can absorb troubles others cannot stand. We are more independent of Europe than Europe is of us, and it's hard for people on both sides of the Atlantic to understand the differences."

NEW YORK TIMES
14 August 1974

Italy and the C.I.A.

To the Editor:

After the corruption of Greek party politics, the systematic subversion and then the total destruction of political liberty, after the spiritual humiliation of modern Greek culture, following murder and torture by its Greek servants—the C.I.A. has been told to desist from interference in Greece. Had not the regime of the Colonels ended in buffoonery and chaos, the C.I.A. would have received no such directive—if, indeed, it can be obliged to respect it. Has anyone suggested dismissal, or even punishment, for the American public officials responsible for outrages committed in our name in a friendly country?

Perhaps, however, it is wiser to look to the future. There is another Mediterranean country in which democracy is endangered. The recent bomb outrage on an Italian train shows that the Italian right is determined to sow terror and disorder—to provoke (or provide an excuse for) a coup d'état by certain elements in Italian politics and the armed forces.

Many Italian citizens are indeed revulsed by the inefficiency, corruption and parasitism of the state bureaucracy (which is a fief of the Christian Democratic party). A new alliance for structural reform in Italian government and society is being negotiated by influential leaders of Italian business, by the unions, the Communists and Socialist parties and by some Christian Democratic leaders with a sense of responsibility. That alliance might well entail the entry of a Communist party in the Government. The right seeks to oppose this, at all costs. The Italian Communist party is so reformist that it has been criticized by the Italian left for its moderation. Only the blindest and most primitive political thinking could deny that the Italian Communists have in fact been pillars of the Italian republic since the fall of Fascism.

Precisely that sort of political thinking, if it can be dignified by that term, has characterized the operations of the C.I.A. We are obliged to ask, before it is too late, whether the C.I.A. (and the American Embassy) have intervened in Italian politics. The New York Times has published reports that Mr. Fanfani, the leader of the right wing of the Christian Democrats, has received American subventions. Before events take a turn tragic for Italy, and for our good name in the world, our involvement in Italian politics should be re-evaluated. NORMAN BIRNBAUM

Amherst, Mass., Aug. 7, 1974

The writer is professor of sociology at Amherst College and a consultant to the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation of Turin.

NEW YORK TIMES
25 August 1974

Bonn Chancellor Bids Ford Act Cautiously on Inflation

Warns in Interview That Extreme Moves by U.S. Could Upset World Economy —Asks Day-to-Day Consultation

By JAMES RESTON
Special to The New York Times

BONN, Aug. 24—Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany is warning the Ford Administration that extreme measures to curb inflation in the United States could seriously disrupt the world economy.

In an interview with The New York Times, released today, the former German Finance Minister recognized the need to combat inflation in the United States, but appealed for day-to-day consultation among the major industrial powers to avoid unemployment and recession.

"There is a danger," he said, "that if the United States as a whole goes deflationary... this will inevitably spread to the world markets. It will mean less demand from the U.S. on the world market, and it will mean that we can sell less."

"You have to fight inflation, but please don't enter into deflation policy, because you might incur too much unemployment, too much deflation in the world economy."

Chancellor Schmidt was particularly concerned to avoid harsh action by the United States without adequate consultation with other countries whose economies would be affected by American policies. He indirectly criticized former Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally for having done so in the past.

What is required, he said, is the closest personal and almost daily contact among key officials in the United States, Germany, Britain, France and Japan.

"They must never permit

themselves again," he remarked, "what happened in August, 1971, when somebody acted on his own, even without previous warning. . . . This was a grave mistake susceptible to destroying the trust, the confidence in the economic leadership of the United States."

The Chancellor also made the following points:

¶Already, "quite a few governments were starting to act on their own." He seemed determined to raise a warning against the spread of unilateral action.

¶The world has not yet seen all the negative consequences of the new floating monetary system. The world has been living with fixed exchange systems for generations and with floating rates for only 15 or 17 months. "We don't know what to do with this new phenomenon of the so-called Euro Market."

¶Labor union leaders have to take their share of blame for the inflation that is now Europe's major political and social problem. Real wages are falling in the industrial countries and the unions are naturally trying to catch up, but this also affects inflation.

¶Fortunately, the rising generation in Europe, and particularly in West Germany, takes both economic and political cooperation between the nations much more for granted than the previous generation.

¶All nations are caught up together in a vast stage of structural economic and financial change, "but it is not a situation in which you should lose your nerves or in which one should switch to pessimism."

The Chancellor referred to the new "shattering experience of the world monetary system

after the oil price crisis." He indicated that the world had not yet begun to feel the full force of this explosion.

This aggravated the balance-of-payments deficits of countries that were in deficit, and put into deficit some countries that had previously been in balance. The result was that some nations were getting to the point where they could not pay their bills, and were naturally cutting imports and affecting the balance of the exporting countries.

While West Germany's unemployment rate was only 2.2 per cent as compared with the United States' 5.3 per cent, Mr. Schmidt noted that the American economy was five times as large as West Germany's. He noted that exports amounted to only about 5 per cent of the United States gross national product, whereas exports counted for almost a quarter of West Germany's GNP.

The Chancellor emphasized that he favored a faster unification of Europe. But he said Europe now lacked the outside threat and the dynamic leadership that tended to produce common action.

"We are living in an era of détente," he said, "and it's really détente. It is a much less dangerous world than it was at the time of the Cuban missile crisis and the Berlin crisis. We have had enough of that. The menace has gone, at least it has shrunk."

Sees Problem of Coping

But he added that nations had not yet learned to live in this new and complicated world, part nationalistic and increasingly interdependent.

For example, he noted that the Euro Market now had a volume of roughly speaking \$200-billion.

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
8 August 1974

CAROLINE TISDALL on the new strength of Italy's neo-Fascists and their successful appeal to the young: Bologna, Wednesday

The right wing renaissance

HAD THE Rome-Munich express in which 12 people died in the early hours of Monday morning been running on time the bomb it carried would have exploded in Bologna station. The thought has been formulated countless times during the strikes and protest demonstrations that have followed yet another attempt to transform a state of crisis into a state of chaos.

In five years the terrorism that began with the bomb in Piazza-Fontana, Milan, in December 1969 has spread to all the major cities of Italy apart from Bologna, stronghold of the largest Communist Party in Europe.

The victims, some burnt beyond recognition, were to have received the full State funeral that was accorded to the victims of the Brescia bomb two months ago. But President of the Republic Leone and the police had misgivings. The tide of feeling here is too great to risk an open confrontation, and a decision has yet to be taken as to what will be done with the unidentified bodies.

The funeral, which was to have been held today, has now been postponed until Friday, but Bologna is still holding out for a State funeral. Meanwhile, 18 kilos of Tritol were discovered yesterday buried under one of the main streets of the city.

Speculation about the bomb's origins reflected the confusion that is now prevalent. Was it the extreme Right playing off the extreme Left, or vice versa? Or was it a straightforwardly right-wing attack, part of the now-familiar attempt to "overthrow democracy," coming as it did in the wake of the arrests of key neo-Fascist figures for the Brescia bomb and the discovery of paramilitary airfields near Rieti?

The heights of imagination were reached by the Rai (Radio-Televisione Italiana) in a hastily retracted early morning news bulletin, in which the choice of Bologna was explained as a plot by dissident Soviet intellectuals to confuse and discredit the Communist-governed region.

During the course of Monday morning a communiqué issued by the Ordine Nero (Black Order) claiming responsibility for the bomb was discovered in a phone box in the suburbs of Bologna. The voice of the Left grew louder, for Ordine Nero is the new face of the Ordine Nuovo, one of several extreme right-wing organisations dissolved through the application of the Scelba Law of 1953 aimed to outlaw

Fascist organisations.

Ordine Nero is among the most feared of the groups, allegedly trained by the OAS, with efficient European links and a certain infallibility in bombing techniques. In the political spectrum groups like this, whether neo-Fascist or neo-Nazi, have the same ambiguous relationship to the official parliamentary party of the extreme Right — the MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano) as do the extra-parliamentary left-wing groups to the official PCI (Partito Comunista Italiano).

According to circumstances they are reviled, or tolerated, and in some ways funded, for the MSI the situation is all the more complicated by the fact that, in order to remain a legal party,

'Ordine Nero is among the most feared of the groups, allegedly trained by the OAS, with efficient European links and a certain infallibility in bombing techniques.'

they cannot be seen to be Fascist.

In the strikes and demonstrations of Monday—massive considering that most of Italy in general and Bologna in particular has escaped to the beaches—the MSI had no voice. Extreme right-wing deputies and representatives were not invited to address the meeting, and the official MSI newspaper, *Il Secolo d'Italia*, does not appear on Mondays. The speeches by representatives of the railway union, the PCI, and the PSI Partito Socialista Italiano were emotive, but the call for non-violence was unanimous. The enemies of the people were the "thugs drugged with violence, the speculators, the cowards who seek to overthrow the democratic state, those who take advantage of a moment of economic crisis in order to bring about a vast and possibly international plot."

The regional Communist spokesman, Mauro Olivi, reminded Bologna of Togliatti's warning of 25 years ago: "Be careful not to let events happen that could give fascism another chance. Do not fall for the adversary's provocation." The Left had opted to condemn the extremists of both sides, and the reception they received indicated that this was what the Bolognese wanted to hear.

The hoots and whistles that eventually drowned anything the Christian Democrat Deputy had to say indicated

party has become in the events of the last few years.

Bologna has of course been Communist since 1946 exactly the same period in which the Christian Democrats have been in national power, and all forms of corruption and erosion of democracy are laid implacably at their door.

Every fine phrase that rolled from the Deputy's lips made his ride rougher: "We are the party that created the democratic state..." (roars of derision)... "we formed the resistance..." (an emotive argument ill-placed since the recent arrest of Fumagalli, ex-partisan and now a key neo-Fascist figure)... "The sacrosanct values of liberty" and the rest was inaudible. The Christian Democrat stepped down, and 60,000 people were sharply reprimanded by a PCI official for impeding freedom of speech.

The regional seat of the Movimento Sociale Italiano di Destra Nazionale in Bologna occupies an entire building in one of the oldest, darkest and most picturesque streets of the city. For the past few years it has been constantly guarded by police in civilian dress. Two MSI buildings in other cities have already been attacked.

In left-wing Bologna the position of the MSI is particularly odd. This is not just because the present city government is solidly Communist, but also because the city has a tradition of extremism on the other side that it would rather forget. The first agrarian Fascist groups, for example, were formed in Bologna two years before the march on Rome, and Mussolini was first elected in elections in Bologna and Milan.

The MSI is an official political party, formed in 1948. Under its leader Almirante it commands 3 million votes and 52 Deputies in Parliament. It cannot call itself Fascist, since that is beyond the pale of the Scelba Law. At the moment it would seem that the law is catching up with it, in spite of Christian Democrat reluctance to take action. There are two important cases pending. One is an attempt to outlaw the party as a clearly neo-Fascist organisation. The other is the charge of war crimes (the execution of partisans) levelled at Almirante in the hope that he will not be able to hide behind his parliamentary immunity.

Almirante is an able talker and a gifted slogan maker. His attitude to his followers is paternalistic. He is amenable for discussion and

politicians, to have direct and close links with the grass roots of his party. His great pride is the youthfulness of many of the MSI members, and the fact that his call to order seems to meet such approval among a generation too young to remember Fascism.

The door to the MSI HQ was opened by a very young tough in sturdy boots. The MSI Deputy and regional propaganda chief, Cerulli, with whom I was to have talked, was unable to be there because he had been urgently called to Rome where Almirante was explaining that he had long ago warned the authorities that dangerous chemicals of the type used on the train were being smuggled out of the university.

Instead I was to talk to the Regional Organiser and the regional head of the Youth Division. Both were in their twenties. Like their other "Camerati" they were both voluntary workers for the party. The talkative one was a mineral water sales representative, and the other, who only talked when directly addressed, was an economics student in Bologna University. They were later joined by a nervous doctor who was the only one who did not give his name. Throughout the door was guarded.

It was difficult to keep them off the subject of the PCI. Their aversion to it was obviously the backbone of their policy, and it was obsessive. Next in line of attack were the Christian Democrats. The reason for this was devastatingly simple: they were convinced that all attacks, like this latest one, were organised by the Christian Democrats.

In other words, the Christian Democrats were conniving with the Communists to discredit the extreme Right. This, of course, is exactly the opposite to the PCI version, which is that the Christian Democrats are actively funding and supporting the spectrum of the extreme Right in order to bring about a collapse of democracy.

They denied any links at all with extremist groups like Ordine Nero, Sam (Squadri Azioni Mussolini), Mar (Movimento d'Azione Rivoluzionarie), or La Fenice (The Phoenix).

This is official MSI policy, since to admit links with blatantly Fascist and neo-Nazi groups would be to court disaster at the present moment. So the answer was that such groups only damage the true Right: "Every time the MSI is about to have another big success another bomb explodes."

And so it was that this latest

incident had set them back a long way, since the MSI was seeking a constitutional collapse through fanning public opinion on the current economic crisis, and the scandals of corruption. But economics and corruption had now been swept off the front pages by the bomb, and the effect would be to undermine the capital they had hoped to make in September on the hardship and ill-feeling caused by inflation and the new taxes.

When confronted with the hard facts of an individual like Rauti, an MSI man accused along with Freda and Ventura for the bomb in Piazza Fontana, they genuinely seemed to have no answer. During the course of the interview it became clearer that they could say little more than what they had been taught to say.

On the subject of policy they were much more at their ease: the language was alarming, based on Almirante's slogans and the phrases of a previous generation of Fascist and Nazi ideologists. Their explanation of policies was both grandiose and vague. The central hinges were the liberating effect of work and the inequality of

man.

The state towards which the Movimento Sociale Italiano di Destra Nazionale (they never abbreviated it) was working was the cooperative state in which life would be less boring. It would centre round "the challenge of re-creating the great Italian State to the glory of its free and civilised people." The way would be through socialisation: the workers would share the profits and the losses of industry.

In recognition that all are not equal, wages would not be either, but the worker would know that "work creates liberty." He would not hate his boss since this was a concept instilled by the Communist unions, and would feel his life was enhanced beyond the narrow limits of the Sicilian phrase "my things" (home and family).

It was on the subject of education that the regional organiser really got going: "Education will be based on the concept of selectivity, since men are not equal. The present Italian system levels students too much, in the cooperative state the new and modern emphasis will be based on technical skill and

a high degree of specialisation. Italy will regain her rôle as a supreme producer of top-rate scientists and technologists. Education will be the battle of life, history will be based on arguments not dry facts, new technological studies will have pride of place in our schools.

"In this the help of the Catholic Church will be sought, but it will be a different Catholic Church. It will be free of all creeping progressiveness. We will oppose the idea of the progressive priest. Above all, we will fight corruption, and conduct a policy of denunciation directed at the young. We are convinced that in the long run there can be only one party that has the courage to reject corruption in all fields of life.

"The Italian people will throw off the ignoble propaganda with which it is fed by the current media and will choose the higher values we propose. We will demand necessary sacrifices of the Italian people, sacrifices that will bring them back to the position of a major power."

Here I interrupted the flow of words, partly to ask for more details and partly be-

cause I was by now disturbed by the glazed expression in the eyes of this ordinary-looking Italian. I asked how this programme would be carried out. The reply was that the Movimento Sociale Italiano di Destra Nazionale did not believe in mathematical formulae like the Communists. In answer to a question about the relationship of this new Italy to the rest of the world, the reply was that Italy would play a major rôle in the nations of Europe that would no longer be the instrument of Russia and the US.

The conversation had the familiar ring of the old brand of Fascist propaganda. What did they think was new in the arguments they propounded. The student of economics answered and had the final word: "Our emphasis on the phenomenon of the youthful Right is new. It is new because it follows a period of permissiveness and because youth, having been used by the old political powers after 1968, is sick of this permissiveness and seeks the moral values we offer. We can solve the problems of youth in Italy, and the strength of our youth groups is the new element we bring."

NEW YORK TIMES
11 August 1974

Strategy of Freedom

By C. L. Sulzberger

ATHENS—The bruise on NATO's southeastern flank caused by the Greek-Turkish showdown over Cyprus is going to take time to heal. In the end the alliance should be strengthened by the mere fact that it survived another confrontation between two of its partners. But that "end" is still far off.

NATO is a curious pact. It has managed to survive a quarter of a century of peace equalled only by the Delian League created in these parts 25 centuries ago and it somehow keeps going despite private wars involving its members.

Thus, during its lifetime, Belgium has fought in the Congo, the British and French in Egypt, France in Algeria, Portugal in its African colonies, America in Vietnam, Iceland and Britain in naval mini-exchanges and Greece and Turkey on and off again around Cyprus.

But weirdly enough, none of these confrontations has smashed the coalition irreparably. Indeed today, for the first time, NATO is a genuinely uniform alliance in the philosophical sense of being democratic, thanks to political upheavals in Portugal, Turkey and Greece.

But purification came at a price.

Turkey now maintains in Cyprus about two divisions, which would be better stationed near Russia. Both the Turks and the Greeks paid heavily for a mobilization against each other. The Greek call-up was a disastrous mess.

Turkey has unilaterally warned Greece it is revising its national airspace and henceforth regards offshore Greek islands as Turkish. This means that if Athens sends planes to Rhodes or Chios without first asking Ankara's permission, they might be shot down.

The psychological atmosphere remains nasty. Maneuvers NATO hoped to stage in Greek-Turkish Thrace this fall, involving troops from both countries, must be canceled. Likewise, there is no present thought of sending back to Izmir, Turkey, the Greek officers and men normally attached to a NATO subheadquarters there, withdrawing during the Cyprus affair.

None of this is pleasant news and tension is likely to continue. Cyprus is a boil not yet lanced. It is hard for the Greeks to replace the 650 officers assigned to that island's national guard. If they withdraw the lot who made so much trouble there, replacements are likely to be just as hardheaded, coming from the same background of chauvinistic training under the seven-year Athens junta.

The Turkish Army is by no means deployed to accord with NATO's strategic convenience—most of the air force having moved to bases near the Aegean. The Greek Army is dispirited and disorganized. It has fallen behind on equipment because of the United States Congress's antipathy to sending material aid while the junta ruled. Also, it has been riven by politics.

Many of its best officers were fired for opposing the recent dictatorship. It is difficult to bring them back now.

Certain key junta supporters have been moved from Athens to distant units. But the military remains politicized and uneasy.

Another weakness is the question of strategic relations with the United States. Washington had based Greek policy on the need to maintain bases here, including homeporting facilities for one Sixth Fleet carrier, in order to be able to maintain a credible position vis-à-vis Russia in the Middle East.

The first part of this formula was worked out and a destroyer flotilla was centered around Athens, including families of the crews, although every intelligent American recommended it would be preferable to keep a low profile, arguing, if the United States Navy insisted, it was wiser to do the homeporting in relatively remote Suda Bay, Crete.

But negotiation of the formula's crucial second part—involving the carrier itself—came to a head just as the junta headed by Colonel Papadopoulos was replaced by the junta headed by General Ioannides. The latter immediately demanded a higher price from Washington—in terms of aid and weapons—and the proceedings got stuck. So, by inept policy, the United States earned the blame for tolerating a nasty political régime in order to get naval privileges it never really obtained.

Thus, in the material sense, NATO is in poor shape now in the critical area separating the Soviet Union from the turbulent and vital Middle East. Allied diplomacy must work hard and swiftly to rectify this situation. In doing so, fortunately, it can rely on the fact that, despite their quarrel, in both Greece and Turkey for the first time in years the spirit of democracy has revived.

Near East

NEAR EAST REPORT

28 AUG 1974

American Friends of the Middle East

This is the second in a series of articles describing the affiliations, statements, and activities of several Washington organizations which promote Arab interests in the United States.

American Friends of the Middle East (AFME), located in an expansive office on Massachusetts Avenue, describes itself as a "private, non-profit organization dedicated to furthering communication and understanding between the peoples of the Middle East and North Africa and the people of the United States through educational and informational programs."

According to Director of Information Services, Joan L. Borum, AFME was created in 1951 when it became apparent that the United States was destined to play a significant role in the Middle East. As a result of efforts by several noted individuals active in the Arab Middle East, AFME was organized to present "the other side" of the Middle East story, which its founders felt was not adequately represented or heard in this country.

"We have always tried not to favor the pro-Arab side or the pro-Israel side," Borum said, "but have looked at the Palestine question from a pro-American side." She maintained that American political decisions concerning the Middle East are often "made without adequate access of information."

Avowed Anti-Zionism

Politically, however, AFME is anything but neutral. The organization is avowedly anti-Zionist—though not anti-Israel—asserted Borum, who did not see this as a political orientation. Challenging Israel's right to exist as an "exclusive theocratic state," Borum insisted that because the creation of Israel was predicated by the Zionist movement "it was established on wrong premises." She called American support for the founding of Israel "a big mistake in terms of American national interest. We don't think Israel will ever be a viable entity in the Middle East," she said.

To be sure, AFME today has assumed a much more restrained political role than in the past when it boasted such extremists and well-known anti-Zionists as Dr. Elmer Berger, Harold B. Minor, and Kermit Roosevelt on its Board of Directors. The stigma of the viciously anti-Zionist diatribes of founder Dorothy Thompson, however, has not yet worn off entirely. Nowadays, AFME is less concerned about disseminating outright propaganda as about

emphasizing Arab medical, educational, and economic progress.

With total membership under a thousand, AFME relies in small part on a little over three thousand individual contributors to help finance its operations. There is no need to actively solicit funds, however, since a steady flow of money comes from numerous contracts and grants from major corporations and foundations. Among these are the Ford Foundation, the Department of State, and the American-operated Saudi Arabian Airlines.

Oil companies and other major industries have also contributed, but Borum termed these sums "very minor" since the organization itself is "not a direct service to them" and, therefore, not necessarily in their interest to support. In recent years no corporate funding has exceeded \$5,000 per year.

CIA Funding

Borum admitted that in the past AFME had received significant sums from organizations, including the philanthropic Dearborn Foundation, which were later shown to be conduits for CIA funds. Borum added that since the disclosure in 1964, there has been no financial assistance from sources receiving CIA funding. (See *Near East Report* Special Survey, 1964.)

A significant portion of AFME's disbursements are to its eight overseas offices in the Arab world—none in Israel. Besides the main Washington office, there are U.S. branches in New York, Chicago, and San Francisco, with several more local chapters scattered throughout the country.

Although funds are primarily used for "manpower and development proj-

ects" in Arab countries, nearly one-half of AFME's total revenues go to maintenance and administration. At present top priority is being given to counseling Arab students for admission to American universities under programs sponsored by the U.S. government. AFME also sends specialists to Arab countries to establish bases of cooperation with religious, cultural, and social-minded leaders of the Middle East. It sponsors programs of Arab speakers before student, church, and civic groups to acquaint American audiences with the Arab viewpoint and conducts an active publication campaign.

Besides its bi-monthly newsletter, *AFME Report*, the organization puts out literature describing its activities and promoting the sale of books and pamphlets articulating the Arab position. These publications unabashedly reflect AFME's anti-Zionist posture.

Viewpoints, published monthly, deals with cultural and economic events in the Arab world. The "Basic Facts Series" is a compilation of pamphlets providing general information on individual Arab countries. *Mid East*, a monthly review of events, was discontinued in 1971 for lack of funds. Additionally, AFME acts as a clearing house for information on the Middle East by offering books and other publications to its members and contributors at substantial discounts. Perusal of the list of information services, however, favors representation of the Arab perspective on the problem.

One of AFME's principal objectives is combating what Borum categorized as "misinformation" of the American public by Zionist elements. Asked whether AFME's anti-Zionist leaning did not place the integrity of the organization as a nonpartisan one into question, Borum hesitated before saying that this was a serious consideration which she needed more time to think about.

—DAVID ETTINGER

WASHINGTON POST
23 August 1974

Americans Denied Bail In India

CALCUTTA—Two Americans charged with spying were denied bail for the 14th time yesterday, but an Indian judge said he might reconsider the decision Sept. 3 if they find a suitable place to live.

The two, Richard W. Harcos, 27, and Anthony A.

Fletcher, 30, have been in jail for 16 months. They began a hunger strike June 17, demanding a trial.

Their appearance in court yesterday was their first since their arrest. They were pale and thin.

Court sources who attended the closed hearing said that the prosecution did not oppose the bail petition, but contended that the house in which Harcos and Fletcher planned to stay was not suited for police surveillance.

Police said the two were arrested after Harcos was found swimming in Calcutta harbor and Fletcher was found in Harcos's room.

THE NEW REPUBLIC
31 AUG 1974

Whom Do You Trust?

Justifying Diego Garcia

Something has gone wrong with the administration's game plan for Diego Garcia. CIA Director William Colby broke ranks and qualified the arguments of the Pentagon—particularly those of the recently retired chief of naval operations, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt—which sought to justify the need for America's first Indian Ocean naval and air base because the Russians either already were around, or certain to come.

In presenting the case before Congress, Adm. Zumwalt and Adm. Thomas Moorer, recently retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had marched up to the Hill with those trustworthy old persuaders, the large-scale maps heavily rouged in red to dramatize the Soviet areas of penetration. But Sen. Stuart Symington of Missouri, who gained x-ray military vision as President Truman's Secretary of the Air Force and who uniquely straddles seats on both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, had doubts. He summoned Colby to testify before allowing his Senate military construction subcommittee to proceed on the navy's request for \$29 million for the initial expansion of the Diego Garcia project. And since only two fellow senators showed up to listen, Symington persuaded Colby that it would be in the public interest for him to sanitize his testimony and permit as much as possible to be printed in the *Congressional Record*.

In contrast to the admirals' red maps of the Indian Ocean area, Colby had his own way of dramatizing:

Socotra, in the Chagos Archipelago: "A bare island. There is almost nothing there except for a small garrison from South Yemen. . . . The only air strip is an old World War II air strip which is really not feasible for modern operations."

Berbera, in Somalia: "A small installation which will handle two or three ships. . . . They [the Soviets] have been building an airstrip there for about a year, but have not gotten very far."

Mogadiscio, Somalia's capital: "The area within the breakwater is somewhat shallow water. . . . There is an airfield about 30 or 40 miles northwest. . . . which they [the Soviets] have been gradually building up a little bit. But there is not much progress on that either."

Umm Qasr, in Iraq: "The so-called port is about four, five or six buildings here, a place where you can anchor. It is a little complicated to get through the delta down to the [Persian] Gulf. The Iraqis appear to be a little bit restrictive as to the degree to which they will

allow the Soviets free use of this particular port."

Aden: "The Soviets have not used it very much. They have not done much more than port visits there. . . . [The airfield has] a short runway, not big enough to handle the TU-16s and larger aircraft."

Singapore: "The Soviets have bunkered there. Singapore sells to whoever happens to go by."

Mauritius: "Port Louis is a very good port. It is not all that highly developed. . . . They have sold bunkering to the Soviets."

Adm. Zumwalt, testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Near East and South Asia subcommittee on March 20, almost four months before Colby, used different binoculars.

Socotra: A Soviet "fleet anchorage" and an airfield which "provides a potential Soviet base for reconnaissance or other aircraft."

Berbera: A Soviet "communications station. . . . a restricted area. . . . combined barracks and repair ship and housing for Soviet military dependents."

Mogadiscio: The Soviets are building "a new military airfield. . . . which could be used for a variety of missions."

Umm Qasr: Soviet-assisted facilities "considerably more extensive than any which would be required for Iraqi needs alone."

Aden: Extended Soviet "port facilities [and] air facilities which are used for refueling, replenishment and minor repairs."

Singapore and Mauritius: Places where "the Soviets have recently secured bunkering rights."

Summarizing, the CIA director testified: "Our assessment is that you will see a gradual increase in Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean area, that if there is some particular American increase, that the Soviets will increase that gradually to match any substantial additional American involvement. . . ."

Sen. Symington then asked: "You expect the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean to continue to grow regardless of what we do, but that it will grow faster if we start developing Diego Garcia?"

Colby: "I think that is true, yes sir."

Until now the House has gone along with the Pentagon's desire to build up Diego Garcia, but the Senate has shown some hesitation. Senate concurrence now may hinge on how many senators find time to read their *Congressional Record* of August 1.

Warren Unna

MR. UNNA is the American correspondent of The Statesman of India.

NEW YORK TIMES
1 September 1974

Soviet Says Ford Erred On Indian Ocean Bases

*Denies That It Has Any Naval Stations in
the Area—President Stands on
Statement It Has Three*

By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Aug. 31—The Soviet Union charged today that President Ford committed a "regrettable" inaccuracy in stating earlier this week that it was operating three naval bases in the Indian Ocean.

"Unfortunately, it must be noted that the head of the American Government was misinformed by his staff. In reality there exist neither three nor even one U.S.S.R. naval base in the Indian Ocean," asserted a commentary issued today by the official press agency Tass.

The Tass rebuttal to a remark made by Mr. Ford in his news conference last Wednesday was the first criticism of the new President to appear in the Soviet press. While it was couched in mild language, the response pointed up Moscow's sensitivity about the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

At the news conference, President Ford had supported the expansion of the American naval base on the small British-ruled island of Diego Garcia, for which Congress recently appropriated \$29-million.

"I don't view this as any challenge to the Soviet Union, which is already operating three naval bases in the Indian Ocean," the President said.

However, Moscow has consistently condemned American plans to develop an existing naval communications center on Diego Garcia, a small coral atoll about 1,200 miles south of India.

Earlier this week the Communist party newspaper, Pravda, cited the Congressional appropriation as proof that American and British imperialist circles were trying to turn the British-owned island into a new seat of tensions, creating at the same time a threat to the independence of the countries of the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Presence

The Pentagon has maintained that expansion of the Diego Garcia base into a naval and air support facility is necessary to counter the growing Soviet naval presence in the area.

The Soviet Navy first moved into the Indian Ocean in 1968. Since 1971, it has kept a flotilla estimated at up to 20 vessels in the ocean, drawn from its Pacific fleet based at Vladivostok.

Moscow has not established

any formal naval bases in the Indian Ocean. But the Pentagon has contended that Soviet naval vessels enjoy equivalent privileges in some ports, notably in Somalia where the Soviet Union is understood to maintain an active naval communications facility.

The Soviet Navy is also reported to have access to ports in Aden, on the island of Socotra and in the Bangladesh port of Chittagong, as well as major repair privileges in Singapore.

Moscow has vigorously denied that its naval presence in the Indian Ocean constitutes a threat to peace in the area similar to that it attributes to the proposed base on Diego Garcia.

The Moscow press has contended that the Soviet Union, as "a great maritime power," is entitled to use the Indian Ocean as a normal route between its own eastern and western ports.

The Soviet Union's maritime self-image was reflected anew today in a Pravda commentary, which, while discussing the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference that ended in Caracas Thursday, stressed the need to preserve "the freedom of navigation and the free passage of all ships through international straits."

Pravda indicated that Moscow would oppose any effort in the final conference document to restrict such movement, as China has proposed, and assailed Peking for trying to create "chaos on the seas and oceans" at the 10-week conference.

Today Tass gently reproved President Ford for his stance on Diego Garcia by noting that the Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby, had in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee described the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean as "relatively small" and had said that the final size of Soviet forces there would depend upon what the United States put into the area.

The Tass commentary, which was written by Anatoly Krasikov, depicted the proposed new base as a bustling, formidable island fortress.

"The Pentagon's plans have, however, met with serious objections from the U.S. Congress and at the same time triggered a wave of protests in the countries of the Indian Ocean," Tass

Ford Stands by Comment

WASHINGTON, Aug. 31—The White House said today that President Ford stood by his comment at his news conference that the Soviet Union had "three major naval operating bases" in the Indian Ocean.

When asked to identify the bases, the spokesman referred newsmen to the Pentagon. A Defense Department spokesman listed the three as Berbera, a port in Somalia; Umm Qasr, a port in Iraq; and Aden, in Southern Yemen.

Whether the bases are "major" has been a subject of some controversy in the Administration.



The New York Times/Sept. 1, 1974
Pentagon says Soviet Navy has bases at places with names underlined.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 August 1974

Israeli trip to U.S. set up despite spat

By Jason Morris
Special to

The Christian Science Monitor

Jerusalem

Yitzhak Rabin's American debut as Israel's Prime Minister, now officially scheduled for early next month, began stirring up squabbles here even before its political aims were formally defined.

Much of the controversy stems from the awkward way in which Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's invitation was extended to Mr. Rabin, according to some Israeli commentators.

They complain that Dr. Kissinger announced that the Israeli Premier would be visiting Washington, D.C., before Mr. Rabin had agreed to the prospective date, thereby presenting him with a "fait accompli."

The hardnoses among them even suggested that Mr. Rabin should defer a decision on the matter, if not reject the American bid outright for that reason.

Other critics of the Rabin mission contend that it is part of the current spate of "sham diplomacy" in which a great many Middle Eastern comings and goings are no more than a camouflage for a very real diplomatic stalemate.

One highly tuned source in the Israeli capital suggested that chances for resumption of the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East this fall are weak, if only because of the sweeping changes in the U.S. administration.

Mr. Rabin's Cabinet, however, voted unanimously to approve his plans regarding the U.S. visit, specifying that it would take place during "the first half of September."

At the same time it bowed to the Premier's request that deliberations on the trip's objectives be postponed.

until a later date on the ground that political developments may occur in the interim. According to the independent daily Haaretz the session probably will be held Sept. 8 — as close as possible to Mr. Rabin's actual departure.

The Premier attempted to mollify Dr. Kissinger's local critics by pointing out that the original invitation was extended by former President Nixon during his tour of Israel June 17.

Not only was the project mentioned in the joint Israeli-American communique at the close of Mr. Nixon's stay but it also was reiterated in a message sent by President Ford on Aug. 9. Mr. Rabin noted that Mr. Ford suggested that the visit take place "at end of the summer."

Mr. Rabin evidently subscribes to the belief that the U.S. interest in having him follow in the wake of his own Foreign Minister and those of Jordan, Egypt and Syria and to precede Egyptian President Sadat to Washington is linked to the desire to preserve the diplomatic momentum.

On the other hand, the Israeli

Premier, who served until last year as his country's Ambassador to the U.S., reportedly observed that domestic political considerations may have played a part in President Ford's timing — the approaching congressional election.

'Hysteria' decried

He urged his countrymen to avoid taking extreme or "hysterical" positions on the implications of the next U.S.-Israeli summit, contending that "calm" would serve them better at this stage.

The emotional background of the anti-Kissinger groundswell lies in the impression that Secretary Kissinger may be about to exert pressure on Israel to accept a disengagement formula along the River Jordan.

This would entail a withdrawal of Israeli forces, establishment of a United Nations buffer zone, and renewal of Jordanian civil administration in occupied Jericho.

Opposition circles argue that no territory in the occupied West Bank should be relinquished without sub-

mitting the matter to a national referendum, as pledged previously by Mr. Rabin.

Evacuation specter raised

These groups fear that Israel will be forced to evacuate the West Bank in its entirety and hand it back to Jordan, which in turn might lose it to a militant Palestinian Arab regime.

However, Mr. Rabin will not be empowered to act at his own discretion once in Washington, nor will his discussions be limited to territorial questions.

Under Israel's political system, which is based on parliamentary coalitions of political parties, a prime minister is duty bound to represent the policies approved by the Cabinet as a whole.

Hence the importance of the pre-departure cabinet deliberations. They will virtually write Mr. Rabin's script for presentation to President Ford, Dr. Kissinger, and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger.

WASHINGTON POST
24 August 1974

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Despair in the Mideast

Private word from a top American diplomat to a Western ambassador last week that Israel "has shut the door" to further withdrawal from the Syrian Golan Heights brought this instant rejoinder: "If so, that means war."

The exchange is symbolic of the sudden descent from soaring optimism that marked every step of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's brilliant shuttle diplomacy following the Arab-Israeli war of last October.

Indeed, a mood approaching black despair has now taken hold in all Arab capitals since Kissinger's last Mideast success—pinning down the partial Israeli withdrawal from Syria's Golan Heights on May 31. Since then, the abrupt change of Presidents in Washington, coupled with U.S. impotence regarding the Turkish-Greek war on Cyprus, has led Israel into bold new diplomatic intransigence.

Although it is far too early to prove him right, the Arabs fear that President Ford, long a champion of Israel as a Republican congressional leader, will be less hardnosed with the Israelis than was Richard Nixon.

Because of his extreme political weakness at home, a desperate President Nixon this year needed diplomatic successes in the Mideast as fast as Kissinger could get them and so leaned hard against Israel. Mr. Ford is under no such pressure. Moreover, with the 1974 congressional election only two months away, the President might be understandably reluctant to use two-fronted pressure against Israel this fall.

This at least partially explains prime minister Yitzhak Rabin's new hard line in Jerusalem. Rabin's government has now systematically closed off every bargaining opportunity with the Arabs

save one: a second-stage Israeli withdrawal from the Egyptian Sinai peninsula. But that single opportunity has been tightly closed by the Arabs themselves.

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat is under overwhelming pressure from other Arab capitals not to make any new withdrawal agreement with Israel, on grounds that the Palestinian issue must be dealt with first. That Arab pressure would threaten Sadat with political overthrow if he went ahead, as he would prefer, with a new Israeli withdrawal agreement.

Thus, Israel's desire to negotiate with Egypt is meaningless. Sadat's hands are tied.

On the other two fronts, Rabin himself is now taking a muscular position: the Golan Heights will remain an inseparable part of Israel; and Israel's "right" to settlements in Judea and Samaria, the West Bank of the Jordan River that Israel seized from Jordan in 1967, goes back to "ancient times." In other words, Israel will not make even the token six-mile withdrawal from the river that King Hussein demands as the price of attending the ever more distant Geneva conference.

This stalemate, which many experts believe will lead to a far more dangerous war—bloodier, longer and more apt to involve the superpowers—than last October's, has continued despite the parade of Israeli and Arab leaders to Washington the past few weeks.

Indeed, the Ford administration has not yet finally decided where Israel should next be pressured to move: the West Bank, the Golan Heights or a combination of both.

To prepare for another war, Israel is now negotiating with reluctant Pentagon officials for a vast increase in its military arsenal: \$1 billion in "urgent" aid, plus a separate package of \$1.5 billion a year for each of the next five years.

This is supposed to balance the huge Soviet arms shipments to Syria. But many military experts here feel it would give Israel too much potential for long-run military operations: the United States would be powerless to stop.

Yet, threatened disintegration of the southern arm of NATO in Greece and Turkey gives new substance to Israel's arms demands. With the United States, the United Nations and NATO itself unable to stop the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Israel has gained an important new argument to support its demands for defense against the Arabs.

Only personal intervention by President Ford, convincing Israel that he will not relax U.S. pressure for territorial concessions and that he stands as firmly behind his beleaguered Secretary of State as Nixon did, can now arrest the alarming decline in once bright hopes for a settlement.

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NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, AUGUST 26, 1974

India's Downtrodden Burst Into Literature

By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI, Aug. 25—A wave of angry writing by impoverished and low-caste authors has burst across the literary landscape of India.

The literature, mostly poetry, is unusual because of its furious explicitness, its sexual bluntness and its dark tone. Perhaps most significant, this is the first time that a large body of writers who are so-called "untouchables" are expressing their rage at high-caste Hindus and at a system the authors term exploitive.

Within the last year, the spate of angry poetry has emerged in such states as Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Bihar, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal. Although the poetry is written in regional languages and published in small magazines, radical newspapers, leaflets—even on walls—literary critics are terming the movement a significant break from tradition.

"In the past, high-caste writers dominated our literature," said Dr. Prabhakar Machwe, secretary of the Government-supported Sahitya (literary) Academy, a coordinating body that seeks to advance modern Indian writing. "Now the so-called depressed classes are getting educated. Social and political causes are reaching the masses. People are finding frustration everywhere and looking for means to express it."

Although untouchability is outlawed in India's Constitution, discrimination and prejudice are still widespread against Hindus born to families outside the tiered caste system, in which the priestly Brahmin caste is the highest.

Reject Ideology

Dr. Machwe, a poet himself, said: "Many of these young people have gone beyond ideology—they say ideology has no meaning. They say it's all part of a chessboard that must

be discarded. It's a kind of nihilism."

Perhaps the most noted writers are the Dalit Panthers, from the Bombay area. These young authors, writing in the local language, Marathi, have named their movement after the Black Panthers—the word Dalit means oppressed—and have sought to merge poetry with political activism.

Virtually all the Dalits were born as Harijans—the Hindi word for "children of God," a term Gandhi used for untouchables in an effort to remove the stigma against them—and have converted to Buddhism.

These poets write for two local magazines and have been published in the English-language press.

"We've always had liberal Indians writing about Harijans, but not Harijans writing about themselves," said Dileep Padgaonkar, an editor of The Times of India who is compiling a book on Dalit poetry. "But the language was still a Brahmin's language."

"The new poets have literally aggressed the language. They use obscenity, new words, new speech that are part of the culture of poverty."

"These new poets are more desperate than angry," he said. "They're desperate about the economic situation, about the lack of solutions, about the lack of public morality."

Linked to Politics

In some cases, poetry and politics have intertwined. A Harijan minister in the southern state of Kannada, formerly Mysore, was forced to resign when he termed current establishment literature there as cattle feed.

A minister in the state of Tamil Nadu has urged poets to emulate—in Tamil—the writings of the angry young authors in other states. In Andhra Pradesh, an eastern state, several angry poets have joined a violent movement based on the Naxalites, who were terrorists

in West Bengal five years ago.

Moreover, the tough poetry as well as several new plays and novels are now splashed with explicit sexual passages, unusual in Indian literature. Incestuous and homosexual relations have been dealt with in recent novels and plays by Bengali, Marathi and Hindi authors.

One play in Bombay "Vasana Kand" ("Passionate Affair"), is now facing a court test on obscenity charges because it involves incest.

Cites Newspaper Violence

"It comes simply to this," Mr. Machwe wrote recently in a literary journal. "We tolerate and even connive at violence in life—every daily newspaper is full of such harrowing tales of rape of Harijan women, burning alive of untouchables, murders of poor people. But if one mentions them in literature, the poor author is banned."

Writers and critics have said that the most forceful influence among the younger authors is Allen Ginsberg, the American poet who lived briefly in Calcutta and Benares nearly a decade ago.

"He made a tremendous impact with his form, his writing, his way of life," said Shakti Chatterjee, a poet and critic in Calcutta.

"He taught people something very simple: that a poet can go without a job, can be solely devoted to poetry. He taught us that."

Other influences include the Spaniard, Federico Garcia Lorca; the Chilean, Pablo Neruda, and the Russian, Vladimir Mayakovsky.

Recite on the Streets

Some poems express empty despair. In the impoverished northeastern state of Bihar, for example, where a restless student movement is mounting an anti-Government protest, poets have actually come out on street corners and recited their work. One poem, recently pub-

lished in English by an anonymous writer, starts:

The university gave me
A bundle of paper,
Weighed down by that burden
I knocked at every door,
And today after having sold
myself
For a whole month,
And emerged from the office,
I realize—
That there are a few coins in
my palm

But no rations in the bazaar...
Mother,
What kind of jungle have you
brought me into?

Some poems express the anger of the untouchables. An anonymous South Indian Tamil author, in a recent anthology of angry poetry, wrote:

How do we bear the hot sun
By being burned by it
How do we shield ourselves from
the rain
By being drenched in it
How do we keep hunger away
By Starving
How do we cure diseases
By Death
Do you know
Who are we?

Numerous poets mock the National Government, including Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and write ferociously of the ruling Congress party, whose members often symbolically wear clothes of white homespun, called khadi. A poet from Kananda writes:

Spit on you! two faced, double-
tongued
Khadi-wearing, silk-draped
Fellow with an open empty skull...

And some of the poets express anarchic rage. Namdeo Dhasal, one of the most prominent writers in the current movement and a central figure in the Dalit Panthers, wrote recently:

Here every season is cruel
So it is not enough to hang a
skeleton by a branch
Here eyelids have no lashes
Here every offerer is a miser
So only breaking the glasses is
not enough
Here there is no burning inner soul
All creation is turned to coal
Here every epic poet is a Lilliputian dwarf...

Thursday, August 29, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

Bangladesh Nurses Its Credibility

By Lewis M. Simons

Washington Post Foreign Service

DACCA—Without doubt, this year's floods in Bangladesh have killed people, destroyed crops and wrecked homes.

No one knows, however, how high the death toll is, or how extensive the damage.

More important, no one knows, either, how to respond to Bangladesh's pleas for help, so thoroughly has the government destroyed its credibility.

"We believe the flooding has been more widespread than normal," says a U.S. aid official, "but the damage to housing and loss of lives and crops are not severe."

"What matters is not how widespread the floods are," says a leading government agricultural economist, "but how long the water remains on the ground. Anything more than five days and rice plants cannot survive. In some parts of the country they have been inundated for weeks and the water is only now beginning to recede."

"The damage to property, particularly to housing, has been enormous," says a Danish official of the international League of Red Cross Societies. "And the floods have perhaps been the last straw to what was already a highly critical food situation."

The World Bank conducted a survey of crop damage and concluded that the official government claim of a loss of 1.1 million tons of rice was accurate.

A number of diplomatic observers and foreign experts are mildly surprised that the government has limited its claim to this figure because it was matched during the floods of 1968 and surpassed in 1970, while Bangladesh was still east Pakistan.

The explanation seems to be that cooler heads among senior government officials have prevailed upon the flamboyant prime minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, to try to convince increasingly suspicious and cynical aid donor nations of Bangladesh's good faith.

Mujib was the prime force in evoking skepticism through his endless repetition of enormously inflated figures of death and destruction perpetrated on Bengal by the Pakistan army before and during the 1971 independence war.

This time, even the statistics on flood deaths are relatively modest by Bangladesh standards, 1,800.

The smaller numbers have confused Bengalis and foreigners. Everyone in Dacca seems to have his own formula for proving or disproving the official statistics. But the fact is that no meaningful assessments will be possible until the waters recede.

The attempt to appear sincere may be too late and, ironically, may work against Mujib's efforts to attract foreign aid.

To date, worldwide response to the country's appeals has been just over \$3.6 million. Earlier this month, more than 30 ambassadors based in Dacca were taken

on a helicopter tour of flood-stricken areas, and were later told that the government required \$450 million to cover what Foreign Ministry officials termed a "guestimate" of damage.

It is certain that nothing like this amount will be donated.

"It's not that we've been bitten once and are wiser," said a Western economist who has helped Bangladesh through five years of recurring disaster. "We've been bitten dozens of times."

The "biting" began when the world responded to the death and destruction wreaked by the cyclone of November 1970. Then in 1971 came the Pakistan army's campaign of terror to put down the Bangladesh independence movement. The war was followed by a drought in 1972. Then came the effect of the oil price rise on the feeble Bangladesh economy in 1973, and now the floods of 1974.

Bangladesh is a desperately poor country and needs all the help it can get.

But foreign governments are reluctant to keep on providing it because of Mujib's government, which is crippled by bureaucratic corruption and paralysis.

Middle-class residents of Dacca show foreigners the new brick homes ministers are building in the best suburbs. They point out ministers' Mercedes Benzes. They tick off on their fingers the numbers of trips this minister or that has taken to London, to Paris, to New York.

"Where do they get the money for this?" the editor of a Bengali newspaper asked. "Before liberation

none of them owned even a bicycle."

Most foreigners representing potential aid-giving governments and organizations are convinced that Mujib is using the latest calamity as a device for prolonging his government's life.

U.S. representatives here believe that the country has had serious losses in the floods but they have made it clear that the United States is not going to "get back into the old bag."

U.S. policy in Bangladesh and the rest of southern Asia appears to be preparing governments in the region for the time when they must face massive food shortages without significant U.S. help.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger is expected to visit India late in October and may extend his tour to Bangladesh, Pakistan and Iran. There are hints in Dacca that Kissinger may convey this point to Mujib at that time.

Mujib may fly to New York next month to attend the U.N. General Assembly and he has already expressed interest in seeing President Ford and top U.S. leaders.

The unwillingness on the part of the United States to keep bailing Mujib out does not necessarily mean that Kissinger would be willing to see his ship sink. On the contrary, U.S. officials stress that America's interest here is "stability."

With any possible contenders for Bangladesh leadership unknown quantities, stability and Mujib are—for now — one and the same.

Far East

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 September 1974

Reds retaliate for S. Viet Army's land grabbing

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Saigon

The South Vietnamese Army has paid a price for its land grabbing in the northern part of South Vietnam.

Retaliation by the Communists in this area has led in recent weeks to the heaviest fighting since the cease-fire was declared more than a year and a half ago. The North Vietnamese have regained a good part of the territory they held in the northernmost region at the time of the cease-fire.

Casualties have been high. One well-informed military officer reports that there are more wounded South Vietnamese soldiers in hospitals at the moment than at any time since the cease-fire was supposed to have begun.

But veteran analysts say that the Communists' aims for the moment appear to be limited. The attacks that have occurred are not intended to be knockout blows, they say. In fact, Hanoi is far from releasing the full force of its war machine in the northern region.

"What we are seeing is first an attempt to roll back 'pacification' and second an attempt to make the GVN [Government of Vietnam] more reasonable from the Communist point of view," said one Saigon analyst.

"They [the Communists] are attempting to regain the territory which they claim was theirs or which in fact was theirs at the time of the signing of the peace agreement," this analyst said.

Mobility shown

Some analysts think that the current attacks may also turn out to be a prelude to some sort of new Communist

political initiative coming perhaps as early as the beginning of next year.

One thing which the recent fighting has clearly demonstrated is the improved mobility of the Communist forces in South Vietnam. One Communist regiment, the 29th, appeared quite suddenly and unexpectedly during the fighting around Thuong Duc last month. The soldiers in this regiment were rapidly deployed in trucks, thanks to new roads developed by the Communists since the cease-fire.

Intelligence experts agree that the North Vietnamese currently have enough material stockpiled in South Vietnam to launch a general offensive lasting many months.

South Vietnam's President, Nguyen van Thieu, has been predicting such an offensive for more than a year now. His information minister announced that a major offensive was imminent five months ago. But the much-predicted offensive has not come.

Public-relations effort?

President Thieu's predictions are seen by many observers as part of a South Vietnamese public-relations effort designed to secure continuing support and sympathy from the United States.

The predictions may also be designed to help maintain South Vietnamese Army discipline and to provide a pretext for Mr. Thieu's continuing refusal to agree to certain political provisions called for in the Vietnam peace agreement.

Contrary to Mr. Thieu's predictions, there are a number of reasons for believing that a major offensive is far from imminent:

- The rate of conscription and the rate of military training in North Vietnam are both currently at low levels. One would expect them to be at high levels before an offensive.

- While Hanoi has the supplies to carry out a major offensive, it has not been sending troops into the South in large enough numbers to indicate preparations for an offensive. Nor has it distributed its supplies in a manner that would signal an imminent offensive.

- North Vietnam's strategic forces have not shifted their posture in a way that would point to an offensive.

- There are numerous indications that the North Vietnamese are putting much of their energy into solving major economic problems and that they have given their highest priority to the repair of war damage in the North.

Cut in supplies hinted

Some analysts are convinced that while the Soviet Union and China continue to provide considerable military and economic assistance to North Vietnam they have actually cut down on deliveries of military supplies.

These analysts are equally convinced that if the North Vietnamese launch a major offensive they cannot count on having the Soviets and Chinese replace all their lost ammunition and equipment. If these analysts are correct, the North Vietnamese stand to gain more from a step-by-step approach to gaining control in the South than they do from organizing an all-out offensive.

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Aug. 29, 1974

The Washington Merry-go-round

Viet Aide Affirms Prison Horrors

Jack Anderson
and Les Whitten

Rumors of injustice and corruption in Saigon have always been rife, but only rarely do secret documents from South Vietnam's own leaders confirm the existence of such sordid conditions.

The documents, directly from the files of Premier Tran Thien Khiem, show that prisoners were held without trial for up to five years and that others were acquitted but remain in prison.

In classified memos begging his ministers of justice and interior and the national police chief to discipline their underlings, the premier, a reputedly decent man, admits such horrors exist.

"Persons have been indicted and held for exceedingly long periods of time without being brought to trial," Khiem said. There are "191 prisons . . . in Chau Doc re-education center; many have been held for two to five years without trial."

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Xuyen" were held without trial, then transferred to another camp where "they were virtually forgotten." Eventually, they were found not guilty.

But even those proven guiltless may languish in prison, Khiem complained. "After being acquitted or given suspended sentences (victims) were nonetheless held in prison (in) An Xuyen and Chau Doc provinces." Some of these abuses, wrote Khiem, can be eliminated if "dishonest officials" are fired.

premier urges his interior, jus-

tice and national police aides to accord suspects their rights and come down on recalcitrant police who "decrease the honor of the National Police forces and prestige of the government."

Footnote: In fairness, it should be said that the police and prison system in North Vietnam are worse. In our visits to Vietnam and talks with captured Communists, we have found little evidence that Hanoi believes in the humane treatment of prisoners. And the torture stories of U.S. POWs, for example, brought no call for prison reform from North Vietnamese leaders.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 September 1974

China Ties Reported Going Well

By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 4—The naming today of George Bush to fill the top American diplomatic job in Peking comes at a time when Secretary of State Kissinger is reported to be satisfied with the development of United States-China relations.

Certain Chinese leaders have expressed displeasure with the pace of change in American policy on the legal status of Taiwan. It is maintained, however, that Mr. Kissinger has received no indication of this in private communications.

It was acknowledged that Chinese representatives in Washington protested recently the appointment of Leonard Unger, a widely known career diplomat, to be the American Ambassador to Taipei and the decision to allow the Taipei Government to open new consulates in the United States.

The Chinese were said to regard these moves as a sign of strengthening United States-Taiwan relations and as contrary to the Shanghai communiqué of 1972, which was issued at the end of President Nixon's visit to China.

'Bureaucratic Snafu'

Mr. Kissinger explained to the Chinese representatives that these were "bureaucratic snafus," that he had not had much to do with Ambassador Unger's appointment and that he was not informed about the new Taiwan consultants.

The cultural upheaval in China is regarded as having moderated the intensity but not altered the direction of the Washington-Peking dialogue.

Top State Department officials recognize that at some point Peking will want some definition of the legal status of Taiwan, an island that is all the territory that remains un-

But Kissinger Is Said to Face Problem on Status of Taiwan

der the control of the Nationalist Chinese Government. The Nationalists, led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, contends that all China still rightfully belongs to them.

The American officials are said to think that the Taiwan issue does not have to be dealt with right away.

The Shanghai communiqué, drafted under the supervision of Mr. Kissinger and Premier Chou En-lai, states that the United States acknowledges that both Taipei and Peking say that Taiwan is part of China. It does not say that Washington accepts Taiwan as part of China.

This is the root of Mr. Kissinger's diplomatic problem—how can he recognize Taiwan as part of China and still maintain a separate defense treaty with Taipei.

Whether Mr. Kissinger has worked out a personal solution to this or what understandings he may have reached with Chinese leaders could not be learned. But informed State Department officials are extremely sensitive on this subject and also about whether there is an agreement between Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Chou on a timetable for resolving the problem.

It is clear that they do not consider the problem to be urgent, despite its importance.

Statements Fade

For awhile after the Shanghai communiqué was issued, Mr. Chou said publicly that the Taiwan problem might not be settled "in my generation." Neither he nor other Chinese leaders have made similar state-

ments lately.

What happens next on this key issue will depend only in part on events in Taiwan itself. It is said that Mr. Kissinger is not merely waiting for a change in the leadership there—General Chiang is 86 years old.

Nor will Mr. Kissinger be deterred from moving on this issue in the face of opposition from Taipei, it is said.

The factors governing official American thinking on United States-China relations are principally the condition of Washington-Moscow relations and internal Chinese politics. The factors also include several key assumptions about future Chinese-Soviet relations.

Secretary Kissinger's approach is reported to be determined in large part by how much pressure he wants to apply on Moscow. He is said to feel that Washington's potential for drawing closer to Peking—and the Russian's wariness of this—will make Moscow more conciliatory on certain Soviet-American issues, such as negotiations on nuclear arms.

Mr. Kissinger is said to have used such reasoning to block a Soviet proposal for a complete ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. He told Soviet leaders, Administration officials related, that a complete ban on tests could be depicted as Soviet-American collusion against Peking.

Chinese representatives in Washington are said to laugh at this argument. Nevertheless, it is maintained that Chinese leaders have told Mr. Kissinger that a total ban on nuclear testing would "isolate" China.

There is concern here about the impact of the Chinese cultural upheaval, but not because foreign policy seems to be a major component.

The concern is on how various Chinese leaders are aligning themselves on foreign policy

questions to seek advantage over their political rivals.

There is also concern about who will succeed Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou. The reason is not, however, that the potential new leaders are thought to be anti-American.

It is said to be much more a matter of Mr. Kissinger's having had little or no contact with potential leaders.

A key assumption is that long-term hostility between China and the Soviet Union is believed inevitable because of their common border and 15 years of mutual bitterness.

Drift From U.S. Seen

Specialists here assume that as China grows stronger, she will not move closer to the Soviet Union but will move further from the United States. This is not viewed with alarm, because top American officials do not see fundamental conflicts of Chinese and American interests.

Mr. Kissinger, it is reported, plans to visit China again at the end of this year or the beginning of the new year. It is known that he does not want regular or periodic meetings, however. He is said to feel that that might create expectations that could not be met.

Mr. Kissinger has frequent contact with Huang Chen, the head of the Chinese liaison office in Washington.

WASHINGTON STAR
29 August 1974

CIA Pay For Thais Is Slated

BANGKOK, Thailand (AP)—The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has deposited nearly \$3 million in Thai banks to cover full back pay of Thai, "volunteer" soldiers soon to be released from captivity in Laos, a government source reported today.

The Pathet Lao are reported ready to release some 640 Thai mercenaries and one American civilian and the Laos government to free its North Vietnamese prisoners in an exchange scheduled for Sept. 19.

Nearly 20,000 Thai mercenaries—recruited, supported and paid by the CIA—fought on the loyal Lao government side before the Laos peace agreement in February 1973.

THE U.S. EMBASSY spokesman in Bangkok refused to confirm or deny the reported compensation

plan. He referred questions to the Thai government because it was a matter involving Thai prisoners.

The government made no official statement on the pay question. But a government source said the CIA has deposited \$2.85 million in two Thai banks and each prisoner would get his monthly salary for time in captivity.

One Western diplomatic source said privately that "the Americans believed they had a duty to provide some kind of compensation to these people, and they are doing it."

THE TWO LAOS sides are to exchange prisoner lists 48 hours before the scheduled exchange on the Plain of Jars, the Thai Foreign Ministry said.

The liberated Thais will be flown for debriefing to Nam Phong, an air base south of Vientiane evacuated by U.S. Marine fliers a year ago and then to Korat air base northeast of Bangkok for physical checkups.

Washington Star-News

Thursday, August 22, 1974

Park's Regime Seen Stronger

By Matthew V. Storin
Special to The Star-News

SEOUL—The pistol shots that killed the wife of South Korean President Park Chung Hee also likely ended any hopes for an early relaxation of martial law government here.

The attempt to assassinate Park, as he made a nationally televised Independence Day address Aug. 15, is expected to preserve Park's virtual dictatorship and the strain it has created in South Korea's relations with Japan and the United States.

Only the day before the shooting, Japanese officials, in the words of one diplomat, "took very hard" the abrupt announcement from Seoul that the Korean government had dropped its investigation of last year's kidnapping of Korean opposition leader Kim Dae Jung from a Tokyo hotel.

Kim, a 49-year-old politician who narrowly lost the 1971 election to Park, disappeared for five days and then was freed in Seoul. Japanese police have linked at least one official of the Korean Embassy in Tokyo to the abduction scheme.

THE SEOUL government, however, announced Aug. 14 that their own probe of the incident was over with no charges being made. Kim Dae Jung, meantime, has not been allowed to leave Korea and faces trial on alleged election law violations in 1971.

In the wake of the assassination attempt, in which

Mrs. Park and a 17-year-old choir girl were slain, the Park government temporarily prevented all Japanese citizens and Koreans who live in Japan from leaving Korea. The detention stemmed from the apparent fact that Park's assailant, indentified at Mun 'Se Kwang, was a Korean who lived in Osaka, Japan, and traveled with a stolen Japanese passport.

Though they were embarrassed by the involvement of a Japanese resident in the incident, Tokyo Foreign Ministry officials were far from pleased with the travel ban, especially since Kwang had been taken into custody immediately after the shooting.

NEVERTHELESS, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka attended the funeral services last Saturday for Mrs. Park and later called on Park. The visit was seen as an indication of Japanese concern over the worsening relations between Seoul and Tokyo.

Tanaka's efforts, however, did do nothing to calm popular anti-Japanese feelings among South Koreans.

About 3,000 South Koreans demonstrated at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul today in the fourth straight day of protests. But Education Minister Min Kwan-shik, fearing a break in relations between Japan and Korea, called a meeting of high school principals after pupils joined the protest and ordered a ban on future demonstrations, the Associated Press reported.

(In Tokyo, Vice Foreign Minister Hisanari Yamada tried to ease the situation by saying his government regretted the assassination attempt. Japan was severely criticized in Seoul for an earlier statement attributed to Japanese Foreign Ministry sources that the Japanese government had no legal or moral responsibility in the attempt.)

In the United States, meantime, South Korea's image in Congress and at the State Department has appeared to rapidly deteriorate with the seemingly endless string of secret court-martial proceedings against opponents of the Park government.

AMONG THE MORE than 170 people convicted were Korea's leading poet, Kim Chi Ha, a death sentence commuted to life imprisonment; Catholic Bishop Daniel Chi, 15 years; 77-year-old former President Yum Po Sun, three years' suspended; and an American-educated leading intellectual, Kim Dong Gil, 15 years.

Only two days before the assassination attempt, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in Washington voted to cut in half the administration request for military aid to South Korea in fiscal year 1975. The request was reduced from \$252 million to \$123 million.

Park, who has been president since 1961, gathered the strength of his present power by declaring martial law in late 1972 and then pushing a new constitution through a national referendum under martial-law conditions.

The new constitution provides for emergency decrees of nearly unlimited power. Park invoked these

on Jan. 8, 1974, providing up to life prison terms for such crimes as "spreading false rumors" against the government. He promised the death penalty for those engaging in anti-government demonstrations.

Diplomats in Seoul consider Park a loner with a volatile temper but an indisputable talent for organization and economic planning.

"HE HAS an unswerving belief in his own mission. He thinks that something could be made of this country and that he's the one to do it," a Park observer of some years commented.

To date, the military has dutifully carried out the distasteful courts-martial, though there are some complaints in private. There are few serious predictions, even by Park's opponents, of restlessness in the military.

Kim Dae Jung, now under virtual house arrest, is one of those fearing the long-range effect of Park's policies on South Korea's standing with other nations, particularly Japan and the United States.

Still mindful of the military threat from North Korea, Kim told a recent visitor, "If we become isolated, we couldn't maintain this country."

WASHINGTON POST
01 September 1974

Hanoi Alleges CIA Role in Laos

Agence France-Presse

HONG KONG, Aug. 31—The United States Central Intelligence Agency has smuggled 3,000 troops of Laotian Gen. Van Pao's "special forces" into Thailand for military training. Hanoi's Vietnam News Agency said today.

Quoting the pro-Communist Khaosan Pathet Lao news agency, the Hanoi agency said Gen. Vang Pao has been appointed deputy commander of Headquarters 333, the command of the U.S. Special Forces in Southeast Asia at Udorn in the northeast of Thailand.

Western Hemisphere

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Quiet Moves Made on Restoring Relations With Cuba

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writer

Quiet but significant initiatives are under way toward ending the 13 years of hostile relations between the United States and Cuba.

Conciliatory signals are being flashed between Washington and Havana through a variety of intermediaries. Although these probes have been unofficial in nature, they are being monitored and evaluated at the highest levels in both capitals.

The next development in what Latin American specialists here regard as a fast-moving though low-keyed scenario is expected to be a call for normalization of relations between the two countries by the prestigious Commission on U.S.-Latin American Relations.

That panel is composed of prominent businessmen, financiers, publishers and academic figures some of whom have held high governmental policy jobs in Latin American affairs. It is headed by former Xerox Corp. board chairman Sol Linowitz, who served as the Johnson administration's ambassador to the Organization of American States.

Within the next few months the council is expected to produce a wide-ranging review of U.S. relations with Latin America that is bound to have considerable impact on the Ford administration.

"It is no secret that we are going to recommend normalization as fast as possible, although we've made no public statement to that effect," said one member of the council. "The only question is whether we issue a statement now or wait until we are ready to issue the full report."

"The whole Latin American position on Cuba," said another participant in the work of the council, "is moving so fast that there is considerable feeling we should say something now or we'll be caught in an undertow of reaction."

Officially, the position of the U.S. government is still

to look upon Cuba as a revolutionary pariah in the hemisphere. The line—from the lowliest desk officer to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger—is that "no change" in U.S.-Cuban relations is under way. Though this may be true, in the most literal terms, it is far from the whole truth.

Kissinger is known to have been aware of recent contacts by Americans with top Cuban officials, including Premier Fidel Castro and his influential chief economic adviser, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. The Secretary of State is reliably reported to have given private encouragement to those contacts.

Kissinger is also understood to have told both private and governmental acquaintances that, while he personally favors normalization of relations with Cuba within the general framework of detente diplomacy, President Nixon was inflexible on the subject.

With a new President in the White House the flexibility quotient of the U.S. government is now thought to be much higher, and Kissinger's hand considerably freer.

Castro, for his part, has expressed admiration in the recent interviews for Kissinger's ability and diplomatic objectives. High-ranking Cubans have recently told their American visitors that Kissinger's sympathetic attitude toward conciliation between the two countries has been relayed to them through second-party, official channels such as Mexican Foreign Minister Emilio Rabasa.

Because of the sensitivity of the current contacts, few of those who have been associated with them are willing to speak for attribution.

But the consensus of their reporting is that Premier Castro has substantially lowered the temperature of his rhetoric toward the United States and softened the public terms on which the Caribbean cold war might be ended.

The strongest public indication of this was the recent findings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's

chief of staff, Pat M. Holt, a Latin America specialist, who concluded in his formal report to the committee that "the Cubans are correct when they say . . . that the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba has been a failure. If this is so, then it follows that a new policy should be devised."

Holt, the author of a memo Foreign Relations Committee chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) handed to President Kennedy in 1961 opposing the Bay of Pigs invasion attempt, is the highest-ranking U.S. official to have visited Cuba since the rupture of diplomatic relations that same year.

In addition to the Holt trip, a 15-day visit to Cuba was made last month by Kalman Silvert, who traveled as a visiting New York University professor but is also a member of the Commission on U.S.-Latin American Relations and Ford Foundation program adviser for Latin America. Silvert is a former academic colleague of Kissinger's Latin American policy planning adviser Luigi Einaudi.

And another unofficial journey to Havana was made last month by a Washington-based television team led by Frank Mankiewicz, former Peace Corps director for Latin America and a social friend of Kissinger's. He was accompanied by his former Peace Corps deputy, Kirby Jones, and film producer Saul Landau of the Institute for Policy Studies whose work Castro personally knows and admires.

The Mankiewicz team had a rare four-day filming session with the Cuban leader during which he expressed his admiration for Kissinger and John F. Kennedy, and enunciated terms for rapprochement with Washington that are understood to be couched in far less reproachful terms than he has ever publicly stated them. Negotiations are being conducted with CBS for airing the interview.

Castro's choice of the Mankiewicz group upon which to lavish four days of personal interview time over the numerous requests that pour into Havana for

such sessions cannot be considered a matter of coincidence. It suggests a strong desire on his part at this time to reach through the airwaves to American public opinion.

During that interview Castro openly alluded to his keen interest in U.S. opinion in speaking of the hijacking agreement between Washington and Havana.

"We took an important step when we signed the hijacking agreement," Castro told Mankiewicz in the still-unpublished interview. "We have no major airlines and the hijackings were hurting the United States, not us. The determining factor that led us to sign the agreement was really a concern for international public opinion—for the people of the United States."

Cuba, Castro has repeatedly said, is waiting for the United States to take steps that will include ending the economic blockade launched by the Kennedy administration at the height of bad feeling between the two countries.

Castro and his principal advisers have been telling American visitors that, from Cuba's standpoint, the chief impediment to normalization is the trade blockade directed from Washington and carried out—with only partial success—through U.S. trading partners.

The official rationale for the trade embargo, which was adopted by the United States in 1962 and by the OAS under heavy U.S. prodding in 1964 was to retaliate against Havana's campaign of revolutionary insurgency elsewhere in Latin America.

It is conceded openly by U.S. officials and guardedly by the Cubans that Havana has since 1968 abandoned its efforts to export its revolution and instead sought to play the role of a showcase socialist state, depending heavily on the Soviet Union for its economic survival as a result of the hemispheric trade embargo against it.

Holt emphasized in his report that "Cuban support of

revolutionary or insurgency movements elsewhere in Latin America has been at a minimum, one might say a trivial level for years in other than an ideological sense."

As long ago as 1971 Castro proclaimed in a visit to Chile that there is "more than one road" to economic development and that each country must find its own road. Since Cuba abandoned the course of external revolutionary insurgency, as symbolized by the late Ernesto (Che) Guevara, relations have progressively warmed between Havana and many of its Latin American neighbors.

Today there are prospects, considered by regional experts to be quite imminent, that Venezuela and Colombia will soon join the ranks of countries in the hemisphere that have restored full diplomatic relations with Cuba. The most recent was Panama, which resumed relations on Tuesday.

It is expected that by the end of the year there may be only a handful of hold-outs, such as Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala and Nicaragua.

Although the blockade has failed to prevent a growing Cuban trade with such capitalist partners as France, England, Italy, Spain, Canada and Japan—and most recently with U.S. auto subsidiaries in Argentina—it has cost the Cubans dearly in the form of astronomical freight bills.

Since freighters calling on Cuban ports are automatically put on the U.S. blacklist and barred from North American ports the Cubans have had to charter ships both for import and export of goods. This has led to staggering transportation costs, which would be alleviated with a relaxation of the embargo.

Without continuing Soviet aid to the tune of some \$600 million a year Havana's economy would probably have collapsed long ago. Nonetheless in the view of many experts, the Cubans are leery of their lopsided dependence on the Russians despite Castro's repeated public declarations of gratitude for Moscow's help. The Russians, in turn, would probably like to lighten the burden of support for their

remote dependency in Havana.

And so the extension of the spirit of detente to the Caribbean could provide triangular benefits, as analysts of the region see it, to Cuba, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Politically, the full return of Cuba to the inter-American family has become an important symbol and rallying cry for the concept of regional sovereignty and independence of U.S. influence.

Mexican President Luis Echeverria has been campaigning for admission of Cuba to the conference of Latin foreign ministers, whatever Washington might think of such a move. Echeverria and other Latin leaders see the foreign ministers' conference as an alternative political body to the OAS, which is widely perceived as a Washington-dominated forum.

Kissinger this year took an adroitly ambiguous stand on Cuban participation in the next foreign ministers' meeting—an indication, in itself, of a new "flexibility"

toward Cuba in Washington. The traditional response would have been head-on opposition.

The key to the future of relations with Cuba is, of course, in the hands of President Ford and his prospective Vice President, Nelson A. Rockefeller—a man who over the years has demonstrated a more than passing interest in Latin America with its vast Rockefeller holdings in oil and land.

The issue of Cuba is replete with unknowns; if not dubious, benefits to a Republican President. During the Nixon presidency the bureaucratic folklore in Foggy Bottom was that any move toward mellowing U.S. relations with Cuba would have been blocked because of Mr. Nixon's friendship with C. G. (Bebe) Rebozo, who was probably the most influential of all Cuban expatriates.

Whatever the answer, the betting is that Kissinger will now have more leverage for whatever his objectives may be toward Cuba than ever before in his six years in Washington.

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Cuba Stance Eased

By Laurence Stern and Marilyn Berger
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Ford yesterday signaled a significant softening in the oft-repeated public U.S. stand opposing a relaxation of economic and political sanctions against Cuba.

The President laid heavy stress on U.S. action "in concert with" members of the Organization of American States, where there has been a strong surge of support for ending the 1964 hemispheric sanctions against the Cubans.

Official analysts here concede that as many as two-thirds of the OAS permanent council—certainly a majority—are now prepared to vote for an end to the economic blockade and support restoration of diplomatic relations with Havana.

OAS Secretary-General Galo Plaza of Ecuador acclaimed Mr. Ford's statement on Cuba and observed that "it is clear that a majority of the countries [in OAS] are now willing to lift the sanctions against Cuba."

He added that it is "highly satisfying to hear that President Ford intends to act through the mechanisms of the OAS."

The President said that U.S. policy toward Cuba "is determined by the sanctions voted by the Organization of American States, and we abide by those actions that were taken by the members of that organization."

He also said that the United States would exercise the option "to change our policy" if, as he put it, "Cuba changes its policy toward us and toward its Latin neighbors." In pursuing any such action, he added, "we would certainly act in concert with the other members" of the OAS.

It is widely conceded at official levels in Washington that the Cubans long ago abandoned the effort to export socialist

revolution elsewhere in the hemisphere. The chief political justification for the 1964 sanctions was to repel the spread of insurrectionary socialist movements from Havana to other Latin American countries.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in the past has suggested to Latin American foreign ministers that they not rush the Cuban issue to confrontation.

There was also apprehensiveness within the administration about the effect of an abrupt reversal on Cuban policy before the November elections. Mr. Ford's statement yesterday was the first hint of a new flexibility on the question.

OAS Secretary-General Plaza indicated yesterday that there has been strong pressure within the OAS for a meeting of the permanent council within the next two months to deal with the Cuban question.

The foreign ministers of Costa Rica, Venezuela and Columbia have been pressing for OAS action designed to normalize Cuba's political place in the hemisphere. Venezuela was the initiator of the 1964 motion in the OAS to impose the sanctions against Havana.

Panama quietly last week sent a full diplomatic mission to Havana, ending the 10-year rupture of relations with Cuba. This action is expected to be followed by other moves to restore diplomatic relations.

While most of the questions at the press conference involved domestic affairs, President Ford dealt with several other foreign policy issues.

Mr. Ford said that an effort

is under way to develop a U.S. position for the next round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Pentagon and State Department officials said negotiations will resume in Geneva in the second half of September.

The President said that there is now "an effort being made to bring the Department of Defense, the State Department and others together for a resolution of... the United States position regarding SALT II. This decision will be made in the relatively near future. I don't think there is any basic difficulty that cannot be resolved internally within our government."

Differences were known to have existed between Secretary of State Kissinger and Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger as to the timing and tactics on a SALT agreement prior to the last Moscow summit. These were superseded by the decision to conclude a 10-year agreement. Administration officials say the current discussions within the U.S. government have not reached a point where there are fixed departmental positions that require a presidential decision.

President Ford said Kissinger would be meeting with representatives from the Soviet Union "in the near future, I think in October." This was a reference to a trip Kissinger is planning in late October to discuss with Soviet leaders

prospects for a SALT agreement.

Kissinger told reporters yesterday that he is also considering a brief separate trip to the Middle East in mid-October, before the Soviet visit, to expedite negotiations toward a settlement there. That trip, to

unspecified Middle East capitals, would follow talks here with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and meetings with various foreign ministers in September at the time of the opening of the U.N. General Assembly.

The President yesterday

sidestepped a question about moving the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, a suggestion he had made in 1972.

"Under the current circumstance and the importance of getting a just and lasting

peace in the Middle East," he said, "I think that particular proposal ought to stand aside. We must come up with some answers between Israel and the Arab nations in order to achieve a peace that is both fair and durable."

WASHINGTON POST
01 September 1974

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Detente and the Cuban Commandos

If the U.S. starts doing business with Fidel Castro's Cuba, as is expected within the next six months, CIA-trained, anti-Castro commandos will turn their deadly skills against the U.S.

This is the vow of commando leaders, who have threatened to launch a campaign of terror in the U.S. like the Irish militants have been waging against the British.

For 13 years, these commandos have risked their lives raiding Cuba. They have lost comrades who have been killed and captured by Castro's militia. Now they see the U.S. preparing to embrace the hated dictator they have been fighting.

We spent a week in Miami talking to Cuban leaders and checking into the terrorism that has already erupted in the Cuban community.

"If the U.S. recognizes Castro," said one leader grimly, "we will look upon the U.S. as our enemy."

Another threatened: "If the U.S. won't let us fight Castro in Cuba, we will fight Castro here."

Others predicted assassinations, bombings and sabotage against American congressmen and businessmen who support a Cuban-American thaw. One described the coming terror campaign menacingly as "civil war."

Cuban commandos boasted that they have already shot up the door of the FBI's Miami office, have blown up the car of an FBI informant and have tried to run down an FBI agent.

U.S. authorities discount most of the talk as bravado. They acknowledge that the Cuban community has been hit by a dozen or more bombings, including the car of an alleged FBI informant. But the explosions have been small, with no casualties.

Cubans who are considered soft on Castro have also received threats on their lives. For example, storekeepers who sell a controversial Cuban news magazine have been threatened.

Although the commandos told us they shot up the FBI entrance with a .45 revolver, the authorities claim the weapon couldn't have been larger than a small .22 pistol. It is even possible, they say, that the damage was caused by teenagers throwing rocks.

There is no denying, however, that the FBI's Cuban intelligence specialist had to dive over bushes to avoid being run down by an automobile that whip-

ped around a corner and speeded straight for him.

The FBI contacted in Miami, had no comment on these incidents.

Miami's quietly competent Mayor Maurice Ferre acknowledged that a terror campaign is "definitely possible" in case the U.S. should restore official ties with Castro.

"Feelings run deep enough," he said, to cause Cuban militants to take desperate measures. "It could be like Ireland," he agreed. But he also said Cuban leaders have a tendency to overdramatize.

Although he confirmed terrorism in the Cuban community "undoubtedly is going on," he insisted it has been "greatly exaggerated." Most Cubans, he said, are law-abiding and grateful for the haven that the U.S. has provided them.

There are an estimated one million Cubans scattered across the U.S., with about half of them concentrated in the Miami area. They have formed several dozen anti-Castro organizations. The pattern, explained one official, "is for the members of the group to fight, fragment and form new splinter groups." Less than half a dozen organizations are effective, U.S. authorities estimate.

Yet hundreds of Cubans have been trained by the CIA in the military arts. They are skilled in handling guns and bombs; they are ready to strike swiftly and silently. It would be ironic if they should now use their schooling in violence against the government that trained them.

Yet we spoke to CIA-trained Cubans who swore they would fight anyone who advocates rapprochement with Castro. This is now expected to be President Ford's first major foreign policy move.

Sources close to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger say he has wanted to normalize relations with Cuba ever since he began practicing detente diplomacy. It made no sense to him to seek friendship with Russia and China on the opposite side of the globe and remain hostile to Cuba only 90 miles from our shores.

Kissinger was blocked from improving relations with Havana, our sources claim, by former President Nixon who had an abiding hatred for Castro. This personal animosity dated back to an audience that Nixon, as Vice Presi-

dent, granted Castro in 1959.

Castro came away from the visit, he confided afterward, feeling it had been friendly. But Nixon told friends afterward that the interview had solidified his hatred of the Cuban dictator. Nixon reportedly was also influenced by his best friend, Bebe Rebozo, an American-born Cuban who is strongly anti-Castro.

With Nixon in seclusion at San Clemente and Ford now in charge of the White House, Kissinger is believed to have a better chance to work his way. The new President is inexperienced in foreign affairs and is expected to rely heavily on Kissinger's advice.

The Secretary of State has already sent signals to Havana through intermediaries that he would like to improve relations. Castro has responded favorably. Commenting on the official U.S. attitude toward Cuba, Castro told a Kissinger friend, Frank Mankiewicz, recently: "Cuba is the only country in the world where John Foster Dulles is still Secretary of State."

The cold war has ended, Castro pointed out, everywhere except between the U.S. and Cuba. But now, in response to Kissinger's overtures, the newspapers and radio stations in Cuba have toned down their attacks on the U.S.

One by one, Argentina, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Peru and Trinidad-Tobago have established diplomatic relations with Cuba in defiance of the U.S.-imposed ban. Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras and Venezuela are getting in line. Not far behind them is the U.S. itself.

Footnote: Mankiewicz spent several days with Castro, filming his daily activities for a TV documentary. Mankiewicz found the Cuban leader to be immensely popular with his people. Castro drives his own jeep through the Havana traffic, acknowledging the friendly greetings of his fellow motorists.

Once they stopped at a restaurant in the outskirts of Havana. There was friendly banter between Castro and the waiters. "Tell these people that if they won't serve us lunch," he joked to an aide, "we'll lower their prices."

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Columnist Joseph Kraft is on vacation.